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Abstract 
This thesis examines cross-market correlations between means and variances in 
sovereign credit markets and captures the presence of any contagion effect by 
focusing on parallel movements between markets in the wake of the recent crisis. 
Furthermore, it focuses on the effect of policy interventions on the dynamics of these 
correlations. 
First, to look at the correlation between markets, we investigate the interaction 
between sovereign spreads and creditworthiness. Our results suggest that there are 
stable long-term cointegration relationships and significant short-term reactions 
between government CDS spreads to rating and outlook changes, with rating and 
outlook leading CDS spreads. After confirming the leading role of credit ratings, we 
further investigate the spillover effect from ratings to CDS spreads across markets 
and countries. We are concerned with the spillover effect of a change in the 
sovereign credit rating and outlook of one country on the sovereign CDS spreads of 
other countries. We find that rating and outlook announcements originating from 
different countries have a strong spillover effect across countries but not across 
UHJLRQV ZKLOH FRXQWULHV¶ LQLWLDO FUHGLW VWDWXV KDV OLPLWHG HIIHFW RQ VXFK VSLOORYHU
Moreover, the US market is a strong source of global spillover to all the countries. 
After controlling for US factors, the international spillover effects are found to be 
stronger during crisis periods than in tranquil periods. In addition, credit outlook 
changes have a greater impact on sovereign CDS spread responses than rating 
change announcements, suggesting that outlook changes carry more new 
information. 
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Furthermore, we are also concerned with the influences of rescue plans by the 
European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the 
interdependence of sovereign credit risk, measured by CDS spreads, in the Eurozone. 
The study focuses on the interaction between two groups of nations, µFores¶ (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and the UK) and µPIIGS¶ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
and Spain), before and after these bailouts. We are able to control for the rating and 
other external influences affecting sovereign CDS spreads. There are three principal 
findings. (1) Before the EU interventions, the spreads of the rescued countries ± 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (PIGS) ± had a strong influence on rating 
changes in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK (core European 
countries). (2) After bailout, our results underline increased interdependencies 
between sovereign credit risk in the EU area, especially between the rescued country 
and the core countries. This suggests that these bailout plans not only increase the 
influence of the rescued country on the development of the core nations, but also 
amplify the sensitivity of PIIGS to changes in the cores. (3) Different countries will 
vary in their financial stability and their fundamentals will differ, so they will be 
expected to respond differently to a bailout. Indeed, distinctive interaction 
behaviours across countries, related to country-specific characteristics (fiscal 
outlook), is found for each of the financial policy interventions. 
Second, to look at the correlation between variances, this study investigated 
correlation EHWZHHQPDMRU(08FRXQWULHV¶&'6PDUNHWVGXULQJWKHVRYHUHLJQGHEW
crisis, and hence examined the impacts of policy interventions on these markets, 
using the DCC-GARCH model. The main purpose was to assess the extent to which 
the policy interventions influenced the dynamics of correlations in sovereign CDS 
markets, after controlling for international influence (US VIX), and both domestic 
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and foreign sovereign credit rating and outlook. Our results suggest that correlations 
are time-varying for all the sample countries. Most of the policy interventions led to 
a significant increase in the pairwise correlations. Our interpretation is that the 
³two-wD\IHHGEDFN´ between the healthy country and the bailed-out country causes 
the public-to-public risk transfer. The increased debt and deficit partly result from 
assisting other troubled nations. Through policy interventions, any deterioration in 
the sovereign creditworthiness of the healthy countries could transmit back to the 
bailed-out countries. Moreover, the estimation result suggests that policy 
interventions, rather than VIX and credit rating/outlook, play the most direct and 
significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlation in the EMU markets. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
The 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 
Russian financial crisis and the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis demonstrate 
sovereign credit risk. When unable to meet their financial obligations, particularly 
government debt, both emerging and developed countries may default. Nevertheless, 
before the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the sovereign credit risk of developed 
economies was not considered a major concern.1 Minimizing the risk of financial 
contagion and better management of its impact require actions by governments in 
both emerging markets and industrialized countries.  
1.1 Motivation 
The international financial crisis in 2008 was the most serious since the 1929 Great 
Depression. It started with the American subprime market, which was purely an 
American practice (although it did exist in moderated form in other countries, such 
as the UK). The bursting of the real estate bubble in the US in 2007 initiated an 
international financial crisis, which led to major losses for financial institutions. It 
spread to most of the international financial markets through the interdependence 
                                                          
1
 The focus before 2009 is on the actions of the European Central Bank (ECB) to address the global 
financial shock and stability of the banking system during most of 2009 (Lane, 2012). After late 2008, 
international investors began reassessing their global exposures and repatriated funds to home markets, 
causing cross-border financial flows to dry up (MilesiϋFerretti and Tille, 2011). This process resulted 
in severe funding difficulties for countries with macroeconomic imbalances and those relying on 
external funding. For example, the government of the Republic of Ireland was forced to provide a 
two-year liability guarantee to its banks (Honohan, 2010, Lane, 2011). 
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characteristic of financial institutions. Investors could access foreign real estate 
markets through securitization.  
In response to the ensuing crisis in the European Union, and principally to maintain 
employment, a stimulus package of 200 bn euro over 2 years was announced in 
November 2008. The larger member states contributed more: Germany 31%, France 
13%, the UK 17%. Guarantees and credits were widely provided. For instance, 
Ireland offered a blanket guarantee to depositors, and the UK made use of equity 
injections, guarantees and central bank liquidity, and arranged a shotgun marriage for 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS, as well as for some failing building societies and Santander.  
The Eurozone debt crisis was a public debt crisis. All the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain), France and Germany exceeded the budgetary limit of 3% in 
2009-2010, while the Eurozone average exceeded 6%. To fight against the crisis, the 
EU undertook large-scale measures by setting up a financial stability plan with 750 
bn euros in the form of loans and equities, to support any member state in trouble. 
The IMF also supported the Europeans, with half that amount. The ECB lent its 
support by purchasing public and private debt in the Eurozone. European monetary 
XQLRQ GRHV QRW DOORZ IRU FRQWURO RI PHPEHUV¶ EXGJHW SROLFLHV &UHGLWRUV WKHUHIRUH
feared some governments would not be able to pay back their public debt, or even to 
service the interest payments. 
We observe increased sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads and greater 
volatility, which are proxies for sovereign credit risk, especially in Europe, since the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. Moreover, widening sovereign CDS spreads 
and higher variances are associated with extensive downgrades of sovereign credit 
ratings during recent tranquil periods. Sovereign CDS spreads and credit ratings 
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published by credit rating agencies (CRAs) are both supposed to reveal the credit 
qualities of sovereign states, since they are based on similar fundamentals. The 
CRAs have a crucial task in providing information to investors (Afonso et al., 2012). 
Changes in ratings are perceived to reflect an external assessment of risk associated 
with economic fundamentals or political risk, which should have an impact on 
sovereign CDS spreads. However, extensive downgrades after crises have been held 
up as signs of failure by the CRAs to anticipate crises and alert investors. 
Furthermore, the actions of the CRAs have been said only to increase the cost of 
government borrowing (also reflected in sovereign CDS spreads), thereby 
precipitating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hence, our interest is in the interactions 
between CDS spread changes and credit ratings. Furthermore, sovereign rating 
downgrades in one country could create an international contagion effect through 
both the wake-up call (Sachs et al., 1996) to neighbouring countries with similar 
macroeconomic environments and hedging channels (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). 
Therefore, the correlation between credit ratings and CDS spreads are investigated in 
the context of spillover.   
Fuelled by the extensive downgrades by CRAs, damaged credit and tightened 
liquidity resulted in central banks implementing the monetary policy known as 
quantitative easing, in an attempt to stabilize their domestic economies. Governments 
stepped in to provide unprecedented financial assistance to the failing banks, using 
public funds, which further worsened the fiscal deficit. These responses raised 
FRQFHUQV DERXW JRYHUQPHQWV¶ ILVFDO FRQGLWLRQV DQG WKH &'6 PDUNHW EHFDPH
increasingly volatile. Spillover from bank credit spread to the sovereign CDS market 
implied there was a private-to-public risk transfer, which partly contributed to the 
following Eurozone debt crisis. Indeed, these initiatives detonated the European 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
4 
 
sovereign debt crisis. When a government raises funds to save its troubled economy, 
as happened in the Eurozone debt crisis, its public debt and deficit are dragged in. In 
terms RI WUDGLQJ OLQNV *HUPDQ\¶V EDODQFH RI JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV ZLWK WKH 3,,*6
countries swung from a significant surplus for Germany in 2007, of 33bn euro, to a 
small deficit, of 1.2bn euro in 2012. Since the Eurozone countries operate under the 
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System, 
ODUJH WUDGH LPEDODQFHV UHVXOWHG LQ KXJH SD\PHQW GHOD\V IURP WKH 3,,*6¶ FHQWUDO
banks (600bn euro for Germany). Moreover, inter-holding of government bonds, 
derivative trading by central banks and commodity trading could also contribute to 
contagion. Thereafter, a public-to-public risk transfer should be expected. This 
assumption is supported by the rating and outlook downgrades in 2012 and 2013 for 
the relatively healthy countries in Europe2, which were also the main contributors in 
the bailout plans. The correlation of CDS spreads caused by public-to-public risk 
transfer, and the dynamic correlation between variances, have not yet been fully 
examined, along with the impact of policy intervention between EU countries and a 
possible contagion effect.  
With respect to the correlations between variances, from the perspective of both 
academics and practitioners, reliable estimates of correlations between the variances 
of financial instruments are critical for many of the common tasks of financial 
management. The instability observed on sovereign CDS spreads of one country is in 
part due to volatility in another market (volatility spillover), especially surrounding 
policy intervention date. Asset allocation and risk management rely heavily on 
correlations and covariances. Construction of an optimal portfolio requires a forecast 
                                                          
2
 Austria was downgUDGHGE\0RRG\¶VDQG6	3WRDQHJDWLYHRXWORRNRQGRZQJUDGHG
by Fitch to AA+ with a negative outlook on 13/01/2012; Germany also experienced outlook 
downgrade to negative by Moody on  23/07/2012; France was downgraded by Moody to Aa1 on 
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of the covariance matrix of the returns. In addition, to calculate the standard 
deviation in portfolio returns, a covariance matrix of all the assets in the portfolio is 
required. For hedging also, estimations of the correlations between the variances on 
the assets are similarly required. If there are changes in the correlations and 
volatilities over time in response to external shocks (policy interventions), then the 
hedging strategies will be ineffective and require adjustment to account for the most 
recent information and changes. For a better understanding of the way such 
correlations and variances react to financial policy interventions, a study of the 
nature of the correlation between volatilities over time is also necessary.  
1.2 Research Question  
Existing studies measuring cross-market correlation between means and variances in 
the context of EU sovereign CDS markets fail to explore their direction of causality 
and time-varying nature. This thesis presents a study that examined the dynamics of 
pairwise correlations in sovereign credit markets and captured the presence of any 
contagion effect by focusing on parallel movements between markets in the wake of 
the recent crisis, using the narrow definition of contagion. Furthermore, it focuses on 
the effect of policy interventions on the dynamics of these correlations between 
means and variances. However, it should be noted that the study did not seek to 
determine and quantify the effects of these interventions, which is a macroeconomic 
study. Rather, it examines sovereign credit risk interactions, by addressing the 
following two topics: 
1. Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and the impact of credit ratings 
2. Dynamic correlation in sovereign CDS variances during the Eurozone debt 
crisis 
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First, to look at the correlation between means, we investigate the interaction 
between sovereign spreads and creditworthiness. After confirming that credit rating 
changes lead changes in sovereign CDS markets, we further investigate the spillover 
effect from ratings to CDS spreads across markets and countries. We are concerned 
with the spillover effect of a change in the sovereign credit rating and outlook of one 
country on the sovereign CDS spreads of other countries.  
With the results from that empirical analysis of the correlations between credit rating 
and CDS spreads, we are able to control for the rating and other external influences 
affecting sovereign CDS spreads. We are next concerned with the influences of 
rescue plans by the EU and the IMF on the interdependence of sovereign credit risk, 
measured by CDS spreads, in the Eurozone. The study focuses on the interaction 
between two groups of nations, µCores¶ (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the 
UK) and µPIIGS¶ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), before and after these 
bailouts. 
Second, to look at the correlation between variances, this study investigated 
correlations EHWZHHQ  PDMRU (08 FRXQWULHV¶ &'6 PDUNHWV GXULQJ WKH VRYHUHLJQ
debt crisis, and hence examined the impacts of policy interventions on these markets, 
using the DCC-GARCH model. The main purpose was to assess the extent to which 
the policy interventions influenced the dynamics of correlations in sovereign CDS 
markets, after accounting for international influence (US VIX) and both domestic 
and foreign sovereign credit ratings. 
1.3 Contribution and Findings  
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we investigate spillover 
between sovereign CDS spreads and credit ratings, which are both natural measures 
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of sovereign credit risk, using cointegration analysis. We suggest that credit 
ratings/outlooks generally lead CDS markets in the lead-lag analysis. Furthermore, 
we also investigate cross-border spillover effects by focusing on events originating 
IURP GLIIHUHQW UHJLRQV LQ GLIIHUHQW EXVLQHVV F\FOHV GXULQJ µWUDQTXLO¶ DQG µFULVLV¶
periods. We check for asymmetries in the transmission of spillover effects in terms 
of geography and business cycle. We highlight that changes in regional 
rating/outlook and US markets have a significant impact on the development of CDS 
spreads, especially during crisis periods. We use an extended sample of data in terms 
of both time span and sample nations (November 2004-June 2012 for 37 countries). 
We differentiate between types of rating event (ratings, outlook and watch revisions) 
IURPWKUHHUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶V)LWFK     
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study investigating 
CDS spread spillover caused by public-to-public risk transfer, along with the role of 
policy intervention by the EU and IMF. Specifically, after controlling for the effects 
of credit ratings, we examine the sovereign credit risk interdependence of the 
bailed-out countries and other countries using lead-lag analysis, before and after 
government interventions. We highlight significant changes in the interdependence 
after bailout, which leads to our finding of credit risk contagion.  
Third, a search of the literature found no study examining dynamic correlations 
between variances in sovereign CDS markets in the context of the Eurozone debt 
crisis. This study hopes to reconcile the aforementioned two streams of literature: the 
econometric approaches estimating the time-varying correlation between markets 
and the empirical analysis of the impact of policy intervention. The main findings 
show that the correlations between variances are dynamic and time-varying for all 
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the sample countries. Most of the policy interventions led to a significant increase in 
the pairwise correlations. The temporary reaction, with a reversion to the normal 
range, is suggested to be an intervention-caused contagion effect. Comparing across 
countries, correlations with Austria and Germany are less volatile and show weaker 
reactions to these interventions. One of the interpretations is that the ³two-way 
IHHGEDFN´ between the healthy country and the bailed-out country, as proposed by 
Acharya et al. (2011), causes public-to-public risk transfer. The increased debt and 
deficit partly result from assisting other troubled nations. Through policy 
interventions, any deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness of the healthy 
countries could transmit back to the bailed-out countries. To assess the impact of 
policy intervention, our empirical analysis controlled for the external regressors, 
including VIX and credit rating and outlook. The estimation result suggests that 
credit rating/outlook and VIX do not have much impact on the dynamic conditional 
correlation between the variances of EMU countries, while announcements of policy 
interventions have a significant and consistent impact on pairwise cross-market 
correlations. This finding suggests that policy interventions play the most direct and 
significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlation in the EMU markets. 
In terms of dataset, we cover 10 major sovereign CDS reference entities in the 
correlation analysis and 9 nations in the analysis, including the top four contracts: the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Republic of Italy and the 
Kingdom of Spain. This allows us to examine all the major policy interventions 
during the crisis, including: *UHHFH¶VILUVWDQGVHFRQGEDLORXWWKH,UHODQGEDLORXWWKH
Portugal bailout and the Spain bailout. Also, the comprehensive time period covers 
the period beginning 28 April 2009, shortly after the bank bailout programme was 
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activated but before Greece announced its 12.5% deficit, and ending at 17 February 
2013. Comparison can then be made pre- and post-intervention for each bailout.  
1.4 Implications  
The pairwise correlations between means and variances in Eurozone sovereign CDS 
markets were significantly higher during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. This has 
WZR VLJQLILFDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IURP WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQYHVWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH)LUVW WKH
high level of correlation will diminish the effect of market portfolio diversification, 
and a portfolio of credit products from Eurozone countries will be subject to similar 
credit risk. Second, the greater volatility of this correlation suggests that the 
reliability of the correlation is weaker, creating doubts over any portfolio strategies 
that are based on estimated correlation and covariance coefficients. For these reasons, 
this thesis looks into the time-varying correlation coefficients and tries to capture the 
contagion effect of the policy interventions. It reports a comprehensive picture of 
international contagion, across national borders and asset classes, during the crisis 
period.  
International investors are worried about the rising links in asset prices across 
national boundaries and asset classes. If cross-country and cross-market correlations 
change during a crisis period, the existing portfolio diversification could fail to 
ensure safety. If diversification strategies for portfolio management are unable to 
diversify risk, the portfolio will be left exposed to international shock. Failing to 
account for the impact of policy intervention on the correlation would result in an 
over-diversified and sub-optimal portfolio. Our results confirm such worries about 
international integration. Nevertheless, our study also provides an incentive, in that 
the contagion is regional rather than global. An investor seeking to optimize a CDS 
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portfolio or portfolio containing credit risk of the EU nations can make more 
accurate estimates by taking into account the dynamic correlation. In a period of 
crisis, further portfolio diversification across international markets could help limit 
potential credit risk spillover. On the other hand, speculators could see a profit 
margin in the co-movement if they understand the direction and channels of 
information transmission. For arbitragers, the difference and lead-lag relation 
between credit derivate markets can be made more precise by taking into account the 
findings reported here.  
For policy makers, at the country level, of the two factors affecting contagion, the 
more crucial is economic and political stability. It reflects the fact that co-movements 
are unavoidable without reform at country level. To reduce financial contagion, it is 
necessary to reduce the fiscal and current account deficit, enhance the quality of the 
financial sector, and to improve the exchange rate. Without resolving the financial 
stress, either by improving fundamentals or through the receipt of a rescue fund, it is 
not possible to stabilize the sovereign credit market.  
At the EU policy level, the approval of bailout policies and the like should (amongst 
other considerations) be related to the identification of contagion effects. 
Interventions in one particular market give a strong signal for investors in similar 
countries. Therefore, information specific to one market is likely to be used in other 
markets, causing a spillover effect. This could explain why interventions are 
associated with higher correlation between EMU nations.  
The euro was introduced to strengthen currency across financial markets and avoid 
devaluation. The stability pact forces each government to remain within a deficit 
limit, at 6%, and a debt limit, at 60%. However, the Eurozone was established 
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without supranational control of tax, spending and transfer between poor and rich 
members. Although different countries fell into crisis for different reasons, excessive 
credit was a common factor identified by regulators and policy makers. The crisis 
resolution mechanism (the ESM) provides a lesson for the EU, and may serve as 
evidence that a future Eurobond will be required to solve the debt issue permanently. 
The ECB has constitutional and political obstacles to the use of quantitative easing 
(QE), unlike the Bank of England, which used QE to purchase the UK government 
debt. The ECB has nevertheless played a big part in avoiding an even worse crisis, 
E\DGRSWLQJVHULHVRI³XQFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDVXUHV´6HWWLQJXSDSHUPDQHQWILUHZDOOWR
protect its members from future crisis should be on its task list. 
1.5 Thesis structure  
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter Two we discuss studies related to our 
two research topics: correlation between means and correlation between variances. 
The dataset used in the thesis is described in the Chapter Three. Chapter Four starts 
by examining the correlation between means by looking at the dynamics of credit 
ratings and sovereign CDS spreads during the global financial crisis; then we present 
the study of CDS interdependence during the EU debt crisis and examine the 
potential credit risk contagion. Chapter Five investigates correlation of variances in 9 
PDMRU (08 FRXQWULHV¶ &'6 PDUNHWV GXULQJ WKH VRYHUHLJQ GHEW FULVLV DQG KHQFH
examines the impacts of policy interventions on these markets, using the 
DCC-GARCH model. Conclusions and implications are summarized in Chapter Six.   
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CHAPTER 2  
Literature review 
In this chapter, research topics related to spillover and contagion between markets 
are discussed, beginning with the features of sovereign CDS contracts, as a proxy for 
the sovereign credit risk of the underlying issuer, and the foundation for this research. 
7KHQJLYHQWKDWWKHUHLVVLJQLILFDQWGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµFRQWDJLRQ¶
WKH FRQFHSWVRI µFRQWDJLRQ¶ µLQWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶ DQG µVSLOORYHU¶ DVXVHGE\ SUHYLRXV
researchers, are reviewed. The concept of contagion as it is understood in this thesis 
is then presented.  
After clarifying the aforementioned concepts, this chapter reviews the most relevant 
literature: spillover3 of credit risk and contagion in terms of mean and variance. As 
noted in the Introduction, as indicators of sovereign credit risk, credit ratings and 
sovereign CDS share a number of similarities. Therefore, we start with the topic of 
the interaction between ratings and markets. Spillover effects are discussed both 
across financial markets (bond, stock and foreign exchange) and across countries 
(emerging countries and developed countries). Second, for spillover in the credit 
derivative market, we further divide the topic into: interactions within the sovereign 
CDS market, interactions between the sovereign and the financial CDS markets; and 
interactions between the CDS market and other markets.  
                                                          
3
 The chapter essentially reviewVZKDWPD\JHQHUDOO\EHWHUPHG³VSLOORYHU´VWXGLHVVRPHRIZKLFKLQ
fact look into the contagion issue, although they tend to use a different concept or do not differentiate 
the concept of contagion (this applies to much of the earlier research).   
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After the literature on spillover of returns has been discussed, another form of 
spillover, variance spillover, is reviewed in section 2.5. Furthermore, since this thesis 
tries to make a contribution to policy making by focusing on the European debt crisis, 
studies on bailout from sovereign debt crisis and the effect of policy interventions are 
discussed. Lastly, to better understand the results of the thesis, the macroeconomic 
literature regarding transmission channels for contagion is reviewed. A rational 
explanation can be found for the different responses across countries facing similar 
shocks. 
2.1 Sovereign CDS 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial derivative that serves as insurance against 
credit events that may happen to a reference entity, corporate or sovereign. CDS 
spread is a good proxy for the creditworthiness of the underlying issuer, for three 
main reasons. First, while a government bond is generally denominated in local 
currency, a sovereign CDS is denominated in a foreign currency, which helps to 
counter the effects of local inflation and foreign exchange risk. Second, its price 
cannot be manipulated by the government, since CDS is an over-the-counter contract 
that is settled on the global credit derivatives market. Consequently, CDS spreads 
represent the credit quality perceived by investors. Third, sovereign CDS spreads 
mainly capture credit risk, in contrast to bond prices, which include other risks, such 
as liquidity (Bai and Wei, 2012).  
Changes in the credit risk of a sovereign borrower should be reflected in its 
sovereign CDS spread. New public information should be immediately reflected in 
the sovereign CDS prices, since relevant information on the health of its economy is 
transparent compared with the corporate sector. Sovereign CDS are contracts 
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designed to protect sovereign debt investors from loss in extreme credit events, such 
as bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring, default, acceleration and repudiation. 
CDS contracts transfer the credit risk associated with sovereign bonds to a third party. 
7KHUH DUH WZR ³OHJV´ WR D VWDQGDUG &'6 FRQWUDFW $ &'6 VSUHDG LV WKH SUHPLXP
(premium leg), as a percentage of the notional amount of the contract, paid by the 
buyer in exchange for compensation (contingent leg) in the event of a default or 
other credit events. If pre-specified credit events occur, the settlement of CDS 
contracts generally follows physical delivery of bonds in exchange for the original 
face value. There are thus five necessary components to a CDS contract: the 
reference entity (debt issuer); the reference obligations; the contract term; the 
notional principal amount; and the selected list of credit events triggering payments. 
Most features of sovereign CDS contracts are identical to those of corporate ones.  
The Standard International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defines 6 
credit events: (1) bankruptcy of the reference entity, (2) failure to pay (the reference 
entity fails to pay interest or principal when due), (3) debt restructuring (e.g. maturity 
extension, coupon reduction, postponement in coupon payment, or change in 
currency), (4) obligation default, (5) obligation acceleration, and (6) repudiation. 
Nevertheless, the standard type of sovereign CDS contract event is based on 
restructuring, repudiation and failure to pay. Bankruptcy of the reference entity is 
considered impossible for a government and is not covered.  
Over-the-counter (OTC) sovereign CDSs accounted for half the CDS market in 1997. 
However, this had dropped to 5% by 2007. Since the Eurozone debt crisis, its share 
has risen rapidly again. According to the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
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(DTCC4¶V7UDGHLQIRUPDWLRQZDUHKRXVHUHSRUWWKHRXWVWDQGLQJJURVVQRWLRQDOYalue 
of live CDS contracts reached 15 trillion USD. According to the data for the last 
week of August 2011, among the top-20 reference entities by US dollar equivalent 
gross national amounts in CDS, 14 were sovereign entities, while 9 of the top 10 
were sovereign entities. All the top 7 were government CDS contracts, with the 
highest volume for the Federal Republic of Germany, while the total sovereign 
segment reached 2.2 tn USD.  
2.2 Definition of spillover, interdependence and contagion 
Spillover is a broad concept, defined as changes in one financial market in response 
to changes in factors in other markets, no matter whether during a crisis or a tranquil 
period. It reflects co-movement of market returns. Spillover effects are transmissions 
due to links among markets. Moreover, spillover causes contagion, or, conversely, 
contagion is the consequence of extreme spillover (Allen and Gale, 2000, Alter and 
Beyer, 2014). That is, spillover is necessary but not sufficient for contagion.  
Interdependence is a stable and elevated two-way link between markets, during 
tranquil and stress periods. Generally it is associated with fundamentals, and 
therefore is to be expected.  
Contagion, as opposed to interdependence, suggests that the international 
propagation mechanisms are different during times of crisis. There is no agreement 
on the definition of contagion, and many definitions have been proposed. Referring 
to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) DQG :RUOG %DQN¶V FODVVLILFDWLRQ ZH FDQ
distinguish three definitions of contagion: 
                                                          
4
 CDS trading volume is published on the DTCC (Depository Trust and Clearance Corporation) 
website. 
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Broad definition  
Contagion is identified with the general process of shock transmission across 
countries. It works in both tranquil and crisis periods and refers to general 
cross-country spillover effects. This definition has been used by, for example, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000, 2003), Afonso et al. (2012), Alter and Schuler (2012), 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), Christopher et al. (2012) and De Santis (2012). 
Restrictive definition 
As probably the most controversial definition, contagion is the propagation of shocks 
between two markets in excess of what should be expected from the fundamentals 
and considering the co-movements triggered by the common shocks. The 
construction of the underlying fundamentals needs to be investigated, then, if this 
definition is to be adopted. Otherwise, we are not able to appraise effectively whether 
excess co-movements have occurred and then whether contagion is displayed. This 
definition was used by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Mink and de Haan (2013). 
Very restrictive definition 
Contagion should be interpreted as the change in the cross-country 
correlation/covariance that takes place during a period of turmoil. This definition is 
more neutral because it leaves out the problem of identifying the transmission 
mechanism and the fundamentals (and there is no agreement on the proper set of 
fundamentals). More importantly, this thesis is not WKHSODFHLQZKLFKWRGHILQH³WUXH´
IXQGDPHQWDOV RU ³SXUH´ FRQWDJLRQ 7KLV GHILQLWLRQ  ZDV XVHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
studies:  Sander and Kleimeier (2003), Billio and Pelizzon (2003), Gande and 
Parsley (2005), Caceres et al. (2010), Arezki et al. (2011), Hassene and Kais (2011) 
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Missio and Watzka (2011), Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012). Caporin et al. (2013), 
Aizenman et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Alter and Beyer (2014) and 
Alter and Beyer (2014). 
Many papers have focused on the question of contagion, and their approaches vary 
with regard to the definition of contagion. The third, narrow definition implies that 
contagious effects are to be difIHUHQWLDWHG IURP µQRUPDO¶ WUDQVPLVVLRQV RI VKRFNV
across countries, also known as interdependencies. Following this widely used 
definition, the task of empirical contagion studies is to investigate whether or not 
interdependence and causality across countries are changed in certain crisis periods. 
Four major categories of tests have been utilized for evidence of contagion and 
information transmission: correlation of asset prices, GARCH frameworks (volatility 
spillover), cointegration, and probit models. Our first empirical chapter applies the 
approach analysing correlations between markets (stock returns, interest rate, 
exchange rate, market indices). According to this approach, a significant increase in 
correlations may be considered proof of contagion. The second empirical chapter 
looks at volatility spillover using the GARCH framework, by focusing on changes in 
correlations/covariances.  
A limitation of the existing literature is that many papers assume that transmission 
from one market to another is a one-way process. They are therefore unable to 
account for the direction of causality. However, price adjustment could happen in 
one of the two markets concerned, and lead to changes in the other. The concern of 
this thesis is not the factors affecting such interaction, but revealing the direction of 
price information transfer (the direction of causality). Furthermore, models using 
returns, a first differenced variable, lose information on a possible linear combination 
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between level variables. The use of the cointegration technique can overcome the 
problem of non-stationary relations and support the investigation of two-way 
relations, in both first difference and level.   
In one of the most relevant contagion studies to have used the cointegration approach, 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003) extended the conventional measures of contagion by 
investigating changes in the existence and direction of causality on sovereign bond 
spreads in four crises. They found support for regional contagion for the Asian crisis, 
and global contagion for the Russian crisis. Hassene and Kais (2011), using the 
restrictive definition of contagion, tested contagion through the foreign stock 
exchange markets of developed countries during 2006-2009. They also chose 
cointegration and the VAR approach to examine correlation and causality between 
these countries. Although Alter and Schuler (2012) use the broad definition of 
contagion, their research question and methodology were related to the present thesis. 
They investigated the interaction between government and bank spreads using 
causality and cointegration analysis, for four of the five PIIGS (not Greece), 
Germany, France and the Netherlands. They found that, before bank bailouts, 
contagion moved from banks to sovereigns. After bailouts, sovereign CDS spreads 
were more strongly affected in the short run by financial sector shock, but the impact 
became insignificant in the long term. 
2.3 Spillover from sovereign credit ratings 
Foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings assess the ability and willingness of a 
government to meet its debt obligations. Changes in rating are perceived to reflect an 
external assessment of risk associated with economic fundamentals or political risk, 
which should have impact on sovereign CDS spreads. The global financial crisis 
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attracted public attention to the role of rating agencies. Sovereign credit risk was 
evaluated as the most urgent risk in the global economy according to the IMF (2010). 
The crisis shook confidence in the strength of public and private sectors in the 
healthiest QDWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ )UDQFH *HUPDQ\ DQG WKH 8. :KHQ 0RRG\¶V
GRZQJUDGHG *UHHFH¶V ORQJ-term foreign currency debt from B1 to Caa1 with 
negative outlook on 1 June 2011, the bond prices for Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
were pressed down.  
As one of the importaQW PHDVXUHV RI D FRXQWU\¶V FUHGLW ULVN WKH VRYHUHLJQ FUHGLW
rating directly impacts the borrowing cost of a government. International investment 
inflows increase as the creditworthiness of countries improve, while foreign capital 
flees from countries whose credit quality worsens5. The influence of credit rating is 
stronger for emerging economies with lower financial transparency. Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2009) suggest that credit ratings provide opportunities for the private sector 
and government to access global capital and foreign direct investment.  
However, the extensive downgrades after crises are considered as signs of the failure 
of the ratings agencies to anticipate crises and alert investors. Furthermore, during 
WKH UHFHQW *UHHFH GHEW FULVLV WKH GRZQJUDGLQJ RI WKDW FRXQWU\¶V GHEW UDWLQJ ZDV
criticized not only for increasing the cost of government funding but also for helping 
preciSLWDWH*UHHFH¶VGHIDXOWLQDVHOI-fulfilling prophecy. 
  
                                                          
5
 Kim and Wu (2011) support this by finding a positive relation between credit quality and 
international bank flow from developed to emerging markets.  
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Table 1 Literature on rating impacts 
Strand Researcher Finding 
Impact across markets: 
rating on local stock, 
bond, FX and volatility 
Hull et al. (2004) Stock, bond and CDS markets react and help to 
anticipate rating changes Norden and Weber (2004) 
Afonso et al. (2012) Bond reacts to rating and outlook changes, but 
not anticipate 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) Foreign exchange market reaction to rating 
Reisen and Von Maltzan 
(1999) 
Negative events are more informative Sy (2004)  
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010)  
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) Positive rating events have more impact on CDS spread 
Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) 
Outlook and watch announcements contain 
more information than rating 
Goldstein et al. (2000), Sy 
(2004) 
Rating agencies are still criticized for failing to 
anticipate financial crisis 
Kräussl (2005) 
Sovereign credit rating have significant impact 
on market volatility 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) 
Heinke (2006) 
Jones et al. (1998) 
Impact across countries 
Fender et al. (2012) CDS spreads of emerging nations are strongly 
affected by international spillover effects 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000, 
2003) 
Summarize three potential transmission 
channels explaining the rating news spillover 
Gande and Parsley (2005) Rating spillover on sovereign bond markets of 
other countries 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) Negative rating spillover into other QHLJKERXULQJFRXQWULHV¶VWRFNDQGERQG
markets Li et al.(2008) 
Arezki et al. (2011) Contagion effects from sovereign rating news 
to the European financial market Afonso et al. (2012) 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) 
Regional spillover effect 
Christopher et al. (2012) 
This table summarizes the literature on the impact of sovereign credit ratings; the studies listed are 
reviewed in the following sections.   
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2.3.1 Rating impact across financial markets 
There are several studies in the literature on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
domestic markets for bonds, stocks and foreign exchange (Cantor and Packer, 1996, 
Brooks et al., 2004, Hull et al., 2004, Norden and Weber, 2004, Hooper et al., 2008, 
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012). These find significant 
relationships between credit rating downgrades, stock return, bond and CDS spreads.  
Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) analyse the links between rating 
announcements and stocks, bonds and CDS spreads, and suggest that stock/bond and 
CDS markets not only respond to rating events but also anticipate rating changes. 
However, Afonso et al. (2012), using event study and panel analysis of daily data for 
EU countries from 1995 to 2010, find that bond yield spreads respond to rating and 
outlook. Their results suggest a bi-directional causality between bond ratings and 
spreads but reject anticipation of announcements. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) analyse the reaction of the foreign exchange spot 
PDUNHW WR FUHGLW VLJQDOV IURP WKUHH DJHQFLHV )LWFK 0RRG\¶V DQG 6	3 VHSDUDWHO\
using data from 1994-2010. They find credit signals could affect both own-country 
exchange UDWH DQG RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ H[FKDQJH UDWHV VSLOORYHU DFURVV FRXQWULHV ,Q
addition, they suggest that credit outlook and watch notation changes have more 
impact than rating changes. 
Reisen and Von Maltzan (1999) find a two-way causality between sovereign credit 
ratings and government bond yield for 29 emerging markets. If a country were listed 
as under review for downgrade, its bond yield would be strongly affected. Sy (2004) 
VXJJHVWV WKDW 6	3 DQG 0RRG\¶V UDWLQJ FKDQJHV DQG QHJDWLYH RXWORRN DQG ZDWFK
could help to predict debt events. Contrarily, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find that 
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positive rating events have more explanatory power on CDS markets than negative 
events after examining the impact of sovereign rating announcements on CDS 
spreads for emerging countries during 2001±2008.  
Comparing the impact of positive and negative announcements, researchers (Brooks 
et al., 2004, Hooper et al., 2008, Hill and Faff, 2010) have found that negative events 
are more informative than positive changes. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) explain 
WKLVDVFUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRLVVXHGRZQJUDGHV*RYHUQPHQWVDUHPRUH
willing to release positive news to the market early and there is less incentive to leak 
negative news until exposure by credit rating agencies, which leads to negative 
signals being more informative and influential.   
Investigations of the reactions of stock and bond market in emerging markets to 
GLIIHUHQW W\SHVRIFUHGLW UDWLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWV IURP0RRG\¶V6	3DQG)LWFKKDYH
found that the influence of outlook and watch announcements are stronger than 
rating changes. This could be because the information contained in rating changes 
has been already exposed in the previous outlook and watch status, such that the 
market does not react as significantly as might otherwise be expected.  
Nevertheless, rating agencies are still criticized for failing to anticipate financial 
crisis (and instead simply adjust after the event)  (Goldstein et al., 2000, Sy, 2004). 
One of the explanations for their poor performance is that agencies lack sufficient 
accurate information on the credit status of the issuers. Moreover, the mechanism of 
rating announcement makes the agencies prefer not to change their ratings until the 
situation is stable, rather than be forced to revise ratings shortly after an 
announcement. Furthermore, the agencies might be paid by issuers not to predict a 
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crisis before it actually happens (which would further increase government funding 
costs). Therefore, credit rating represents a lagged indicator of crisis.  
Moreover, market volatility is found to be strongly affected by sovereign credit 
rating. Kräussl (2005) investigates the impact of soYHUHLJQUDWLQJVIURP0RRG\¶VDQG
S&P on long-term foreign currency debt between 1997 and 2000. He finds rating and 
outlook changes (especially for negative signals) do have a significant impact on the 
size and volatility of lending in emerging markets. Heinke (2006) suggests that credit 
ratings for German Eurobonds are ranked according to bond spread volatility, 
whereby lower-rated bonds show higher volatility. Hooper et al. (2008) investigate 
42 countries from 1995 to 2003 and find that rating upgrades seem to lower 
corresponding stock market volatility, while downgrade increases volatility. Their 
findings are supported by Ferreira and Gama (2007), who analyse 29 countries over 
1989-2003.  
The effect of macroeconomic news on bond and stock market volatilities is studied 
by Jones et al. (1998). They examine the impact of US macroeconomic news on 
daily T-bond prices, and find no persistence in announcement-day volatility.  
2.3.2 Rating impact across countries 
Other studies have focused on the rating spillover effects across countries. Fender et 
al. (2012) find that CDS spreads of emerging nations are strongly affected by 
international spillover effects, more so during stress periods. Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000, 2003)  summarize three potential transmission channels explaining the rating 
news spillover: trading, geography and commonalities among lenders. They suggest 
that financial centres play a crucial role in international spillover. Countries holding 
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the debts of countries whose rating has been downgraded are exposed to higher risk, 
which in return levers up their own credit risk.  
In addition, Gande and Parsley (2005), using a sample of 34 developed and emerging 
countries from 1991 to 2000, find that rating changes have a significant spillover 
effect on the sovereign bond spreads of other countries. Furthermore, negative rating, 
RXWORRN DQG ZDWFK DUH IRXQG WR VSLOORYHU LQWR RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ VWRFN DQG ERQG
markets, especially in emerging markets, during crisis periods (Ferreira and Gama, 
2007, Li et al., 2008).   
More recently, Arezki et al. (2011) examine contagion effects from sovereign rating 
news to the European financial market during 2007-2010. Using the vector 
autoregressive (VAR) framework of Favero and Giavazzi (2002), they find rating 
downgrades have significant spillover effects across countries. Likewise, Afonso et 
al. (2012) find spillover effects from lower-rated EMU countries to higher-rated 
EMU countries. In addition, there is bi-directional causality between ratings and 
spreads within 1-2 weeks.  
The regional spillover effect from credit rating signals is studied by Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2012) in the foreign exchange market. They find rating signals affect 
own-country exchange rate and produce strong regional spillover, especially in 
developed and integrated capital markets. Moreover, the impact of outlook and watch 
is stronger than rating changes, especially during periods of crisis. Moreover, 
Christopher et al. (2012) investigate both the permanent and the transitory effects of 
ratings on stock and bond market co-movements with a regional index, using ECM 
models for a sample of 19 emerging countries. Their results show rating spillover 
effects in regional stock and bond markets.  
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2.4 Spillover and contagion in credit derivative markets 
The strand of literature most related to the present study concerns spillover in 
financial markets; some of these studies have further attempted to capture any 
contagion effect, although there is little consensus on the definition of contagion. 
Spillover reflects co-movement of market returns; contagion is essentially an 
extreme case of spillover. Interdependence is the stable co-movement (or links) 
between markets, during tranquil and stress periods, which is associated with 
fundamentals. Referring to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and World Bank 
classification, we can distinguish three definitions of contagion (discussed in section 
2.2). Corresponding to the different concepts used, four major categories of tests 
have been utilized to examine evidence of contagion and information transmission: 
correlation of asset prices, GARCH frameworks (volatility spillover), cointegration, 
and probit models. 
The government CDS spread is affected by various factors. Spillover from neighbour 
countries is one of the most significant influences. Research on the links between 
sovereign credit risks in financial crisis is rather limited but started growing once the 
Eurozone debt crisis occurred. The contagion effect from Greece to Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain has been studied by Missio and Watzka (2011) using a dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC) model. Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) analyse the 
CDS spreads of PIIGS, France, Germany and the UK during the period 2005-2010 
using EWMA correlation analysis. They argue that the correlations and 
interdependencies increased during the crisis, with Spain and Ireland having the 
largest impact on others, while the core countries were more likely to trigger 
contagion. Acharya et al. (2011a) find empirical evidence of two-way interactions 
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between credit risk in banks and sovereign states. After examining the co-movement 
of government and bank CDS spreads, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) argue that 
government bailout leads to more sensitivity of sovereign CDS to future shocks. 
Dieckmann and Plank (2012) suggest a private-to-public risk transfer after 
government intervention. Alter and Schuler (2012) study a similar research question 
by focusing on difference in performance before and after government interventions. 
They find that, after bailout, the impact from the financial sector is stronger in the 
short run but insignificant over the long run. However, there has been no full-scale 
empirical study on changes in the interdependence of sovereign credit risk for EU 
countries before and after bailouts. 
One of the most important incentives for providing financial support to the PIIGS 
countries, especially Greece, is the fear of contagion to highly exposed countries like 
France and Germany (Constâncio, 2012). Wolfgang Schauble, the German minister 
of finance in 2010, suggests that the systemic importance of Greece acts as a major 
EDQN DQG WKDW EDQNUXSWF\ ZRXOG KDYH LQFDOFXODEOH FRQVHTXHQFHV VLQFH ³LW LV QRW
FOHDUZKRKROGVKRZPXFKRIWKHVHGHEWGHQRPLQDWHGLQHXURV´(Mink and de Haan, 
2013). If EMU countries fail to undertake structural reforms, they could face rising 
risk. Investors are concerned about  the deterioration of fiscal balances and fear of 
contagion from the periphery countries (Metiu, 2012). He finds a significant 
contagion effect on long-term bond yield.     
Thus, various forms of spillover have been studied by previous researchers. Those 
most closely related to the present research are: spillover between sovereign states, 
spillover between sovereign states and financial sectors, and spillover across markets 
(especially for CDS and bonds).   
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Table 2 Literature on Spillover 
Stand Researcher Finding 
Interaction 
between 
sovereigns 
Missio and Watzka (2011) Contagion from Greece in the Euro area 
Metiu (2012) Significant contagion effect in long-term bond yield in the Euro area 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski 
(2012) PIIGS countries have stronger sovereign risk 
contagion Caporin et al. (2013) 
De Santis (2012) 
Contagion effect from Greece rating 
downgrade on other PIIGS, Belgium and 
France 
Aizenman et al. (2013) 
Contagion from rating downgrades in PIIGS to 
other euro countries, but after controlling for 
own-country credit rating changes, it is not 
evident.  
Hauner et al. (2010) Creditworthiness of old EU members helps to lower the borrowing cost of new-comers 
Cochrane (2010) 
Contagion is believed to be over-exaggerated Caceres et al. (2010) 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013)  
Interaction 
between 
sovereign and 
financial sector 
Alter and Beyer (2014)  
Co-movement between sovereign and bank 
CDS, support private-public risk transfer 
Alter and Schuler (2012)  
Acharya et al. (2011a)  
Ejsing and Lemke (2011)  
Dieckmann and Plank (2012)  
Burnside and Eichenbaum 
(2001) 
Interaction 
between CDS and 
other markets, 
lead-lag analysis 
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004)  Mixed relation for CDS, bond and stock index 
in price discovery Norden and Weber (2004) 
Blanco et al. (2005) 
CDS leads bond market 
Zhu (2006) 
Ammer and Cai (2011) 
Delatte et al. (2012) 
Three strands of literature on spillover are summarized in the table, and these are reviewed separately 
in the following section.  
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2.4.1 Interaction between sovereign states  
In the European context, there are several recent papers investigating interactions 
across countries. Missio and Watzka (2011) examine the time-varying correlations 
and find contagion within the Euro area from Greece to Belgium, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain during the summer of 2010, using a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
model, and document effects generated by rating announcements.  
Furthermore, Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) compare spillover effects by analysing 
the CDS spreads of the PIIGS, France, Germany and the UK during the period 
2005-2010 using exponentially weighted moving average correlation analysis. They 
find increased correlations and interdependencies after August 2007. More 
importantly, the Spanish and Irish CDS markets have the greatest impact on the 
European CDS market, contrasted with the British CDS market, which does not 
cause distress in the Eurozone. Their adjusted correlation analysis confirms that the 
PIIGS have a lower capacity to trigger contagion than core EU countries. They find 
Portugal the most vulnerable country in the sample and the UK the most immune to 
shocks. Similarly, Caporin et al. (2013) use a Bayesian quantile regression approach 
in order to analyse sovereign risk contagion across EU countries. They find that, 
although the periphery countries were heavily affected in the crisis, propagation of 
shocks in Europe's CDS was remarkably constant for the period 2008-2011, leading 
them to argue that the interdependence among different countries was stable and the 
risk spillover was not affected by the size of shock and that, thus far, contagion 
remained subdued.  
Aizenman et al. (2013) investigate the impact of credit rating changes on sovereign 
spreads in the European Union. They find that the association between credit rating 
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changes and spreads shifted markedly between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
European countries had quite similar CDS responses to credit rating changes during 
the pre-crisis period, but that large differences emerged during the crisis period 
between the now highly-sensitive GIIPS group and other European country 
groupings. They find evidence of contagion from rating downgrades in GIIPS to 
other euro countries, but after controlling for own-country credit rating changes, the 
relationship was no longer apparent. This provides further motivation for our 
research to control the credit rating variables.  
Hauner et al. (2010) examine whether the sovereign risk of certain regions is 
perceived differently from other regions, by focusing on the perceived sovereign risk 
of new EU members. They compare new EU members with other emerging markets 
and find that the higher policy credibility of EU membership helps to lower the 
perceived sovereign risk of these newcomers. 
Nevertheless, the threat of contagion is believed to be over-exaggerated, according to 
Cochrane (2010), whRDUJXHVWKDWFRQWDJLRQLV³VHOI-LQIOLFWHG´DQGZRXOGQRWDULVHLI
everyone knew there would not be any bailout; the only thing that investors care 
DERXWLVZKHWKHURWKHU3,,*6FRXOGEHEDLOHGRXWWRRDIWHU*UHHFH¶VGHIDXOWCaceres 
et al. (2010) examine 10-year Euro area sovereign CDS spreads from mid-2005 to 
early 2010 and find high volatilities in the final year of their sample. They report that, 
earlier in the crisis, increasing global risk aversion influenced sovereign spreads 
while, latterly, country-specific factors began to play a more important role. Also, 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) argue that contagion is not the main force driving CDS 
spreads during times of financial crisis. They find deterioration in the fundamentals, 
and rising sensitivity of financial markets to fundamentals is the main explanation for 
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the rising sovereign CDS and yield spreads after the crisis. Moreover, regional 
spillover becomes less important, even for the euro area. Their study also finds 
HYLGHQFH IRU ³KHUGLQJ FRQWDJLRQ´ ZKLFK LV D VKDUS DQG VLPXOWDQHRXV LQFUHDVH LQ
many countries, although concentrated in duration and among certain countries. 
2.4.2 Interaction between sovereign sector and financial sector 
Another form of spillover is from the financial sector to the sovereign sector. 
Financial institutions in the US and Europe have suffered huge losses from subprime 
mortgages, credit tightening and damaged investor confidence. In order to stabilize 
the domestic economy, governments and central banks of affected nations have given 
financial aid to financial institutions. These stabilization programmes, using public 
funds to rescue the private sector, raise concerns over sovereign credit risk, which 
has pushed up the CDS spreads since 2009. Specifically, governments extend loans 
to local banks or even recapitalize these banks by taking stock. These guarantees on 
the liabilities of the financial sector increase government debt. Shortly after their 
implementation of such bank rescue programmes, several EU members asked for a 
bailout.  
Recent empirical studies have focused on the financial sector and sovereign credit 
risk in the sovereign debt crisis. The study most closely related to the present one, 
Alter and Beyer (2014), examines spillover between sovereigns and banks in the 
Euro area, between October 2009 and July 2012, using a vector autoregressive model 
of daily CDS spread changes. They find growing interdependencies between 
sovereigns and bonds, while mixed impacts on spillover are found for different 
policy interventions. They find that a shock in Spanish sovereign CDS has a greater 
impact on both euro area sovereigns and banks during the first half of 2012, 
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compared with 2011, and the systemic contributions of Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
decrease notably after the implementation of IMF/EU programmes. Furthermore, 
Alter and Schuler (2012) investigate the interaction of sovereign and bank spreads, 
using CDS data, during the period June 2007 to May 2010 for four of the five PIIGS 
(excepting Greece), Germany, France and the Netherlands. They show that, before 
bank bailouts, contagion as shown by CDS spreads moves from banks to sovereign 
states. Following bailouts, sovereign CDS spreads are more strongly affected in the 
short run by financial sector shock but the impact becomes insignificant in the long 
WHUP *RYHUQPHQW &'6 WKHQ EHFRPH DQ LPSRUWDQW GHWHUPLQDQW RI EDQNV¶ &'6V
They find the spillover of credit risk is consistent across countries and rescue plans 
after intervention.  
In now well-known research on private-public risk transfer, Acharya et al. (2011a) 
use Eurozone CDS data for 2007-10 to demonstrate feedback between credit risk in 
banks and sovereign states. Announcements of bailouts were associated with an 
immediate and unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of 
bank CDS spreads. Following the bailouts, significant co-movement emerged 
between bank CDS and sovereign CDS. They note the emergence of a sizeable 
sovereign credit risk as a cost of bank bailouts, possibly rendering the immediate 
stabilization of the financial sector a pyrrhic victory and one that has received little 
theoretical or empirical attention.  
Dieckmann and Plank (2012) examine CDS spreads in 18 advanced economies and 
document co-movements, finding that Euro area countries exhibit higher sensitivities 
to the health of the financial system and also noting private-to-public risk transfer 
after government intervention. Burnside and Eichenbaum (2001) argue that the cause 
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of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was the deficits associated with bailouts for their 
failing domestic banks.  
2.4.3 Interaction between CDS and other markets 
In terms of the links of CDS markets and other markets, Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) 
reveal mixed relations in price discovery. They use JPMorgan EMBI+ spreads, daily 
CDS spreads and daily MSCI equity indices for 8 emerging markets in 2001-2003 to 
examine the lead-lag relationship between stock, CDS and bond markets. Their 
cointegration, causality test and VECM analysis for the three markets show mixed 
results in price discovery and causality. For example, the CDS market leads to price 
discovery in Russia and Colombia, while bond markets are as important as the CDS 
market in Brazil and Bulgaria. Similarly, Norden and Weber (2004) analyse the 
lead-lag relation between stock, bond and CDS markets, using a sample of 58 firms 
over 2000-2002, mainly in the EU and the US. They conclude from a VAR model 
that changes in stock prices lead the CDS and bond markets, and the cointegration 
relation holds for most companies. Moreover, the CDS market leads bonds in price 
discovery for US firms, while bonds lead CDSs for European entities. 
On the other hand, Blanco et al. (2005) find a constant lead role for CDS contracts, 
after studying 33 US and EU investment-grade companies from 2001 to 2002. They 
find two key factors in explaining the deviation from CDS-bond parity. Their results 
show a stable cointegration relation for most of the entities, while CDS lead bonds in 
price discovery. This lead role of CDS results in a deviation from parity in the short 
run. Furthermore, Zhu (2006) assesses the equilibrium relationship between CDS and 
bond markets by analysing daily data from 1999-2002 for 24 corporate entities. Zhu 
finds stable long-term relationships between them and the short-term deviation is due 
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to the high responsiveness of CDSs to changes in creditworthiness, while CDSs lead 
price discovery. In addition, Zhu suggests that credit and liquidity conditions are the 
main driving force affecting the CDS-bond basis. Similarly, Ammer and Cai (2011) 
emphasise the importance of the cheapest-to-deliver option in sovereign CDSs. They 
examine daily data in 9 emerging markets from 2001 to 2005 and find that CDS 
spreads lead bond spreads, which are represented by EMBI+ spreads.   
Delatte et al. (2012) analyse the CDS premiums on underlying bond spreads for 
PIIGS and five core European nations, and find that CDS spreads are a good 
indicator of possible default during a period of crisis. Palladini and Portes (2011) 
also suggest the CDS market moves ahead of the bond market in price discovery, 
after analysing sovereign CDS and bond pricing in the Eurozone.  
2.5 Spillover of volatility 
Co-movement of both means and volatilities across national boundaries and asset 
classes are observed in financial crises (Bollerslev et al., 1988). Evidence of an 
international volatility contagion effect is also documented by King and Wadhwani 
(1990). They find that the correlation between market movements in different 
countries and volatility are positively related, which is fundamental to establishing 
the limits of diversification, pricing and asset allocation. In addition, Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) investigate cross-market correlation coefficients and show that these 
estimation are biased and inaccurate with the existence of heteroscedasticity. They 
suggest that increased co-movements of different markets in crisis period could be 
caused by increased market volatility, which raises concern on the usual implicit 
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A number of studies have examined the interdependence of market volatility, using 
the framework of generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
time series models. For example, Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2008) reveal that 
shock to the volatility of the financial market in one country could influence both the 
conditional volatility and conditional mean in another country. Most of the these 
studies modelling volatility spillover assume conditional time-invariant correlations 
in order to simplify the estimation procedure (Juselius, 2006, WSJ, 2013).  
Nevertheless, several studies (Hong, 2001, Engle, 2002, Chiang et al., 2007) examine 
the time-variability of correlation. Hong (2001) document increases in correlations 
DPRQJ(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV¶HTXLW\PDUNHWV VLQFH WKHVAndersen et al. (2001) 
emphasize that covariance and correlation increases during periods of high volatility, 
which is generally during crisis period. Based on the multivariate constant 
correlation/covariance GARCH model of Bollerslev (1990), Chiang et al. (2007) 
apply a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model and find increased 
correlation and persistent high covariance during the 1997 Asian crisis.  
Johansen and Juselius (1994) examines the dynamic linkages among European bond 
markets, by modelling the price and volatility spillover from the US bond market and 
the aggregate Euro bond market to 12 European bond market. The EGARCH model 
they apply allows for a dynamic correlation structure. Their results suggest strong 
such volatility spillover, which is further strengthened by the introduction of the 
euro.  
Steeley (2006) provides a theoretical link between stock and bond market volatility, 
which indicate a volatility spillover effect from the short-term interest rate market to 
the bond and stock market. In addition, past bond market volatility is found to be 
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able to feeds back into the short-term yield volatility. These findings in the 
time-varying correlation structure between volatility in stock and bond markets have 
important implications for portfolio selection.  
In the CDS markets, Corsetti et al. (2011) investigate volatility transmission among 
the CDS, equity, and bond markets, using MGARCH model. They failed to support 
their hypothesis that the volatility spillover from CDS market to bond and equity is 
caused by potential insider trading and private credit information. But strengthened 
links across asset classes were evident, and volatility in any of these three markets 
could easily be transmitted into other two markets.  
More recently, Missio and Watzka (2011) focus on the links in bond markets during 
the sovereign debt crisis, using the DCC approach. They explain why the Engle 
(2002)¶V PRGHO DPRQJ RWKHU PXOWLYDULDWH JHQHUDOL]HG DXWRUHJUHVVLYH FRQGLWLRQDO
heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) models, is suitable for estimation of the conditional 
correlation/covariance. Furthermore, Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2008) provide a 
comprehensive summary of the literature on MGARCH models.  
Alter and Beyer (2014) analyse the pairwise relationships between securitized real 
estate markets, but also between securitized real estate and common stock markets, 
using data from the US, the UK and Austria from 1990 to 2010. They examine the 
volatility transmissions across markets using an asymmetric t-BEKK 
(Baba-Engle-Kraft-Kroner) specification of their covariance matrix. In addition, the 
market contagion is also tested for structural changes. They find support for volatility 
spillover by showing strong domestic and international spillover in the US. Also, 
they find evidence of market contagion between the US and the UK markets during 
the subprime crisis.  
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Furthermore, in some very relevant research, Beine (2004) applies a VEC model to 
look at the impact of central bank intervention on the variances and covariance 
dynamic of yen-dollar and euro-dollar exchange rates. He suggests that increases in 
the covariance are associated with concerted interventions. 
2.6 Bailout and the sovereign debt crisis 
There is limited research investigating the influence on euro area markets of bailout 
during the sovereign debt crisis. Of relevance here are the consequences of sovereign 
default. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) undertook a study on the ex-post costs of 
sovereign default on external debt. Broner and Ventura (2011) and Gennaioli et al. 
(2012) discuss the collateral damage to the market ensuing from sovereign default.  
The literature mainly focuses on bank bailouts6. Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and Attinasi 
et al. (2009) focus on the effect of bank bailout announcements on sovereign credit 
risk. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) study the stock prices and CDS spreads 
around bank bailout announcements for international markets. They find that some 
large banks are too large to save rather than too big to fail.  
In addition, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) examine the co-movement between sovereign 
and bank CDS spreads for 10 EU countries. They find that government bailout 
packages lower bank CDS spreads but increase government CDS spreads. The 
sensitivity of sovereign risk spreads to any further crisis events increased, while 
simultaneously the sensitivity of bank credit risk decreases and becomes more 
sovereign-like, reflecting government guarantees for banking sector liabilities. 
                                                          
6
 Theoretical literature on bank bailouts includes Penati and Protopapadakis (1988), Mailath and 
Mester (1994), Aghion et al. (1999), Gorton and Huang (2004), Diamond and Rajan (2002, 2005), 
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008), Acharya et al. (2011b), Veronesi and Zingales (2010), Brown and 
Dinc (2011), Panageas (2010).  
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In terms of the impact of sovereign bailout on other markets, Mink and de Haan 
(2013) examine the impact of news about Greece and Greek bailout news on bank 
stock prices in 2010 using data for 48 banks included in the European stress tests. 
They find that news about Greece did not lead to abnormal returns, while news about 
a bailout did, even for banks not exposed to Greece or other highly indebted Euro 
countries. Moreover, the sovereign bond markets of Portugal, Ireland and Spain 
actively responded to all news about Greece, general news and bailout news, 
showing significant sensitivity to it. They suggest that the bailout acts like a general 
signal showing a willingness to use public funds to fight the crisis. Grammatikos and 
Vermeulen (2012) test the transmission of the 2008 financial crisis and the sovereign 
debt crisis in 15 EMU members, in terms of stock, CDS spreads and exchange rates. 
They divide EMU countries into 3 groups, North, South and Small, using daily data 
on financial and non-financial stock indexes in 2003-2010. They find that the small 
countries are more isolated from international events. Moreover, they find evidence 
of crisis transfer from the US non-financial sector to EU non-financials. Financials 
become more reliant on changes in difference between the Greek and German CDS 
VSUHDG DIWHU /HKPDQ¶V FROODSVH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH HXUR DSSUHFLDWHV DORQJ ZLWK
European stock market decreases, pre-crisis, while the relation reverses afterwards.  
More studies focus on policy interventions during the crisis. Arellano et al. (2012) 
provide an appealing explanation for why the threat of sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe has been present for a long time, which leaves a couple of other major issues. 
Based on the study of Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000) and Conesa and Kehoe (2012), 
they develop a theory to analyse the impact of rescue packages from 1992 to 2012. 
7KH\ILQGWKDWLQDGHHSUHFHVVLRQJRYHUQPHQWVSUHIHUWR³JDPEOHIRUUHGHPSWLRQ´
and bet the recession will end soon - which means selling more bonds in order to 
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smooth government spending, rather than controlling it. The policy interventions, 
bailout and Securities Market Programme, aiming to lower borrowing costs, 
encourage Eurozone governments to gamble. They further suggest two reasons why 
other countries with large public debt and recent experience of recession, such as 
Japan, the UK and the US, are not threatened by these debt crises: central 
governments raise funds, and currencies fluctuate freely in response to economic 
conditions. Moreover, Arellano and Bai (2012) argue that the reason for the EU 
becoming a major lender, by creating European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 
is to be lenient with borrowers and try to avoid more default from other borrowers.  
Moreover, Lane (2012) discusses the fiscal dimensions of the European sovereign 
debt crisis from an economic perspective. He argues that the creation of the euro: (1) 
grants a national government the ability to borrow in the common currency, which 
generates a free-rider problem (Buiter et al., 1993, Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999); and (2) 
means that national fiscal policies also serve as counter-cyclical policy (Wyplosz, 
1997, Gali and Monacelli, 2008). He suggests three phases in the development of the 
debt crisis: first, the initial design of the euro area increased the fiscal risk in the 
pre-crisis period; second, these design flaws amplified the impact of crisis when it 
came; and third, the restrictions imposed by EMU and the ensuing political chaos 
shaped the duration and tempo of the post-crisis recovery period. 
2.7 Transmission channels 
There are various channels linking sovereign CDS spreads of different markets. 
Different authors emphasize different channels for contagion transmission. Generally, 
there are two main classes of channels (Trevino, 2014, Eichengreen et al., 1996, 
Kaminsky et al., 2003). One is a fundamentals channel, based on real financial links 
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between markets. A crisis spreads across countries because their fundamentals are 
directly linked, through common lenders, financial markets, financial institutions or 
interactions between any and all of these (Pritsker, 2001).  
The other is a social learning channel related to investor behaviour. Even where two 
countries have only weak or no fundamentals links but share similar characteristics 
(macroeconomic similarities), investors might fear an imminent crisis in one country 
after a crisis has happened in the other. This channel is considered to reflect some 
VRUWRIFROOHFWLYH³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´ LQFOXGLQJSDQLFKHUGEHKDYLRXU DQG ULVNDYHUVLRQ
although it could be individually rational. This channel can also be seen in terms of a 
liquidity and incentives problem, information asymmetries and market coordination 
problems, multiple equilibrium and changes in the international system resulting in 
changes in investor behaviour after the crisis (Dornbusch et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
it is related to the fear of contagion, which is a significant cause for sovereign risk 
contagion (Metiu, 2012). When macroeconomic fundamentals are not strong enough 
to defend a speculative attack, shift in expectations (loss of investor confidence) 
could lead to a self-fulfilling wave of cross-border portfolio rebalance.   
These two channels are not mutually exclusive: it is reasonable to follow the actions 
of others in foreign market if they are linked through fundamentals. In a sovereign 
debt crisis, through the fundamentals channel, one country may defaults on its debt 
due to the default of another country that has already failed to honour its debt. 
Through the latter channel, a default is caused by the illiquidity following massive 
withdrawal based on speculation, after seeing others withdraw their funds in similar 
markets.  
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Moreover, the liquidity of the CDS market is significantly increased after a crisis, 
allowing investors to leverage their opinion on sovereign credit risk. Interdependence 
through balance sheets is one of the most important factors during a crisis. That is, 
over-spending leads to higher debt and deficit, this simultaneously causes a 
VRYHUHLJQVWDWH¶VFUHGLWULVNWRLQFUHDVHDQGFUHGLWUDWLQJWREHGRZQJUDGHG7KLVWKHQ
in turn increases borrowing costs (bond yield spreads) and insurance costs (CDS 
spreads). Moreover, when the increased debt and deficit partly result from the rescue 
of failing domestic banks, there will be a private-to-public risk transfer, as happened 
in the 2008 financial crisis. Alternatively, when the increased debt and deficit partly 
result from assisting other troubled nations, as happened in the Eurozone debt crisis, 
a public-to-public risk transfer occurs. Here, though, there is the potential for a 
feedback mechanism, as any deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness of the 
healthy countries could further transmit back to the bailed-out countries, as the 
UHVFXHSODQLVDIRUPRIFUHGLWJXDUDQWHH³7ZR-ZD\IHHGEDFN´LVXVHGE\$FKDU\DHW
al. (2011) to describe this interdependence between sovereign and banks, which can 
also be used for interdependence between sovereign states.   
As financial instruments with the same fundamentals, sovereign CDS and credit 
rating are expected to have a long-run and short-run causal relationship. Since they 
are traded in structurally different markets, though, there could be differences in the 
speed of response to respective market changes in the underlying credit conditions.   
2.8 Determinates of pricing sovereign risk 
The macroeconomic studies analysing the determinants of pricing sovereign risk is 
reviewed in this section to help explain the transmission channels of spillover and 
contagion. Here also the different behaviours are explained of different spillover 
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effects across countries facing a common shock. These studies have different views 
on which is the dominant factor: the global market or the local fundamentals. These 
correspond to the two transmission channels for contagion discussed above: 
fundamentals and investor behaviour.  
The pricing of sovereign credit risk can be categorized into two methodologies: 
regression and no-arbitrage models.  The first type runs a regression of credit 
default spreads of a certain maturity on several macroeconomic or financial variables 
and examines the significance and magnitudes of those variables in explaining the 
spreads (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010, Longstaff et al., 2011). The second type uses 
latent factors to value CDS contracts in a risk-neutral world and explains credit 
default term structure movements based on a no-arbitrage argument (Duffie et al., 
2003, Houweling and Vorst, 2005). 
Longstaff et al. (2011) conduct the most influential study in this area. They analyse 
the determinants of sovereign credit risk by comparing local economic variables, 
global financial market variables, global risk premium and net investment flow into 
global funds. They find that sovereign credit risk is mainly driven by global financial 
market variables and global risk premium, rather than local macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  
Ang and Longstaff (2013) show that sovereign credit risk is more related to financial 
markets than country-specific macro-characteristics. Pan and Singleton (2008b) find 
that sovereign credit risk is more related to global factors than country-specific 
factors, especially the US stock and high-yield markets. 
In contrast, domestic macroeconomic fundamentals are argued to be more closely 
related to sovereign credit risk. Edwards (1984) looks into factors driving 
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government bond yield, and finds domestic macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. 
public debt, foreign reserves, inflation) are important determinants. Recent 
researchers, including Amato (2005), Packer and Zhu (2005), Cecchetti et al. (2010) 
and Aizenman et al. (2013), suggest that the pricing of CDS spreads is based on a set 
of macroeconomic fundamentals comprising public debt, fiscal balance, trade 
openness, external debt, inflation and TED spread. Von Hagen et al. (2011) find that 
bond yield spreads in the EU before and after the financial crisis could largely be 
explained by fundamentals. The market reacted to fiscal imbalances more 
significantly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) 
SURSRVH WKDW µIOLJKW WR OLTXLGLW\¶ HIIHFWV DQG OLPLWV WR DUELWUDJH FRXOG H[SODLQ ZK\
CDS spreads exceed bond spreads. 
De Santis (2012) examines sovereign spreads during the period September 2008 to 
August 2011 and suggests three factors to explain developments in sovereign spread: 
aggregate regional risk factor, country-specific credit ratings and spillover from 
Greece. He ascribes the key role of country-specific credit ratings to the 
developments in the spreads for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, and finds the 
rating downgrade of Greece contributed to developments in the spreads of the other 
four PIIGS, Belgium and France.  
A study by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) attempts to answer the question of to what 
extent the price of sovereign risk reflects macroeconomic fundamentals after the 
sovereign debt crisis. They analyse the drivers of sovereign risk for 31 emerging and 
developed economies in the European sovereign debt crisis. Their results suggest 
GHWHULRUDWLRQ LQ FRXQWULHV¶ IXQGDPHQWDOV DQG IXQGDPHQWDOV FRQWDJLRQ 7KH ULVLQJ
sensitivity of financial markets to fundamentals is the main explanation for the rising 
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sovereign CDS and yields spreads after the crisis. Moreover, regional spillover 
becomes less important compared to fundamentals, even for the euro area. Their 
study also finds evidence for herding contagion (as defined above). In the tranquil 
period, the fundamentals are not fully reflected in sovereign risk.   
In terms of determinants of sovereign credit ratings, another indicator of sovereign 
credit risk, Cantor and Packer (1996) find that ratings can be explained by per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, economic development, and default 
history. Afonso et al. (2007) assess the determinants of sovereign credit ratings from 
1995-2005, under a panel framework and probit model. They find that GDP per 
capita, GDP growth, government debt, government effectiveness indicators, external 
debt, external reserves, and default history all contribute to the construction of credit 
ratings.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Data 
3.1 Sovereign CDS spreads 
Different datasets are used to examine the two principal research questions. Chapter 
4 uses both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 to examine the correlation between markets, 
which could be further classified into two sub-research questions. Dataset 1 is used 
to study interactions between sovereign CDS and credit ratings, as well as 
international spillover, during the 2008 global crisis, while dataset 2 is used to 
analyse the spillover in Eurozone countries during the debt crisis and the contagion 
effect. The first study paves the way for the analysis of contagion by solving the 
omitted variables issue by controlling the rating variables. Furthermore, Dataset 2 is 
also used in Chapter 5 to examine the correlation between variances for EU 
countries.  
3.1.1 Dataset 1 
We divide 37 countries into four groups: Asia (8 countries), Latin America (8), 
Europe (16) and Middle East & Africa (5). The countries included in our dataset 
meet two criteria. They must have US dollar denominated sovereign CDS, and 
experience rating changes in long-term foreign currency debt by three major rating 
DJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFKEHWZHHQ1RYHPEHUDQG-XQH 2012.  The 
geographical distribution of our sample is summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3 List of sample countries 
Region Countries Total  
Asia 
China 
8 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
   
Latin America 
Argentina 
8 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
Venezuela 
   
   
Europe 
Austria 
16 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
France 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovak 
Spain 
Ukraine 
   
Middle East & Africa 
Israel 
5 
Lebanon 
Qatar 
South Africa 
Turkey 
   
Total   37 
This table show the geographic distribution of all the sovereign CDS markets in this study. These 
countries must have daily 5-year sovereign CDS spreads USD denominated ranging from November 
2004 to June 2012, and long-term foreign currency debt rating changes announced by three major 
rating agencies.  
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Sovereign CDS are contracts designed to protect sovereign debt investors from loss 
in extreme credit events, such as bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring, default, 
acceleration and repudiation. CDS spreads are the premium, as a percentage of 
notional amounts of contract, paid by the buyer in exchange for compensation in 
default (or other credit events).  
We use daily CDS spreads collected from DataStream and Bloomberg 7 .  
Lower-frequency (e.g. monthly) data can result in higher correlations (Fender et al., 
2012). These CDS spreads are for 5-year CDS contracts denominated in USD. The 
5-year CDS contract is the most actively traded and liquid segment in the credit 
derivative market. In the following econometric analysis, we apply a logarithmic 
transformation of the CDS spreads. The sample period starts at November 2004 and 
ends at June 2012, covering the 2008 global financial crisis and the most recent 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, during which there were numerous changes in 
sovereign credit ratings, giving a rich dataset for analysis of the impact of these 
ratings. Table 4 lists descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads, 
illustrating considerable differences across countries. Japan shows the smallest mean 
and standard deviation (SD), at 42 bp and 40.724 bp, respectively, while Ukraine is 
the most volatile country, with the highest mean, at 676.7 bp, and second highest SD, 
at 830.217 bp. Greece has the highest SD, at 1079.281 bp, and a mean at 609.2 bp. 
Eight countries have CDS spreads over 1000 bp: Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Argentina, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Russia and Ukraine. The maximum CDS spread is from 
Ukraine, 5300.4 bp, and Greece peaks at 5047.4 bp. Figure 1 shows the time series 
plot of sovereign CDS spreads for four countries, China, Brazil, Spain and Turkey, 
from different regions. These series peak at November 2008, and start an upper trend 
                                                          
7
 The CDS data from Datastream and Bloomberg are provided by Credit Market Analysis (CMA). 
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from 2011, corresponding to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Figure 1 Time series plot of sovereign CDS spreads for four countries in 
different regions 
 
This figure plots the sovereign CDS spread for four countries from different regions in bps. They peak 
at November 2008, and start climbing again from 2011.  
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for sovereign CDS spreads 
Countries Mean Standard Deviation Min Median Max Observations 
China 66.69 52.413 9 63.49 296.7 1974 
Indonesia 230 140.931 91.4 193.5 1256.7 1974 
Japan 42.94 40.724 2 23.55 157.21 1974 
Kazakhstan 219.82 234.33 33.3 172.26 1646.32 1974 
Korea 97.62 91.451 14 86.19 700 1974 
Malaysia 81.22 65.213 12 77.09 520.2 1974 
Philippines 223.3 105.825 91.9 186.3 870 1974 
Thailand 99.06 67.433 24 96.31 524.2 1974 
Argentina 844.4 898.804 2.5 597.2 4570.4 1974 
Brazil 174 94.287 61.1 132.3 600.8 1974 
Chile 68.84 57.472 12.5 63.05 315 1974 
Colombia 180.4 88.444 64.7 149.2 613.3 1974 
Mexico 121.71 81.764 28.17 108.36 601.21 1974 
Panama 154.5 77.925 61.9 134 613.8 1974 
Peru 160.1 72.864 59.9 139.3 611.2 1974 
Venezuela 779.7 605.372 120 646.9 3275 1974 
Austria 54.665 62.448 0.5 12.3 273 1974 
Belgium 71.66 90.539 1 25.5 406.12 1974 
Bulgaria 180.1 152.975 13 183.5 698.2 1974 
Croatia 183.2 161.616 15 125 601.4 1974 
France 46.41 60.328 0.5 13.55 249.62 1974 
Greece 609.2 1079.281 4.4 57.9 5047.4 1974 
Hungary 202.84 188.243 9.667 163.775 738.597 1974 
Ireland 205.27 264.315 1 35.5 1191.5 1974 
Italy 113.37 140.889 5.3 44.75 591.54 1974 
Poland 99.257 92.155 7.667 48.75 421 1974 
Portugal 232.1 366.459 1.9 41.1 1527 1974 
Romania 206.46 174.029 17 200 767.7 1974 
Russia 173.45 162.985 37 135.1 1116.7 1974 
Slovak 69.456 78.737 5.333 24.5 328.246 1974 
Spain 115.16 143.005 1.05 39.95 603.602 1974 
Ukraine 676.7 830.217 1 311.9 5300.4 1974 
Israel 92.82 64.315 15 91.15 285.41 1974 
Lebanon 382.7 105.511 166.3 358.7 955.5 1974 
Qatar 78.35 65.616 7.8 75.61 379.6 1974 
South.Africa 132.9 98.877 23.8 126.2 683.3 1974 
Turkey 227.4 83.844 116.9 203 849.2 1974 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads for our 5-year US 
denominated CDS spread, in basis points (bp), from November 2004 to June 2012.  
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3.1.2 Dataset 2 
We use daily CDS spreads collected from DataStream8 for 10 European countries: 
the United Kingdom (UK)9 and 9 in the Eurozone: Austria (AT), Belgium (BG), 
France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT), 
and Spain (SP). These countries are classified into two groups: Cores and PIIGS, 
according to their role in the financial crisis10. Their government debt to GDP ratio 
(%) and budget deficit to GDP ratio (%) are shown in Table 5, from 2007 to 2012. 
The sample includes major sovereign CDS reference entities, including the top four 
contracts: Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic, Republic of Italy and 
Kingdom of Spain, according to Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
(2013). The selection of European sovereign CDS spreads series are restricted by 
data availability. The data for the CDS series are for 5-year CDS contracts 
denominated in USD. The 5-year CDS contract is the most actively traded and liquid 
segment in the sovereign CDS market. We note that lower-frequency data can result 
in higher correlations (Fender et al., 2012). The sample period starts at April 2009 
                                                          
8
 The CDS data from DataStream is provided by Thomsen Reuters.   
9
 Considering that it is more exposed to Irish banks, UK did voluntarily contribute to the Irish bailout, 
which makes it a contributor, just like the Eurozone core countries, despite its zero contribution to 
ESM, EFSF. Moreover, British banks have direct risk exposure to France and Germany banks, which 
makes UK government credit risk indirectly related to the troubled PIIGS. Moreover, over 50% of UK 
total trade is with the EU, accounting to 5%-6% GDP. Deep recession in the EU would be a direct hit 
WRWKH8.¶VH[SRUW8.KDVSDUWRIWhe feature of core countries and a unique case between the core 
and PIIGS, which is worth investigating. Its interaction with the bailed-out countries is our particular 
interest, therefore it is classified into cores. 
10
 The classification of PIIGS and Core follows Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012). They represent two 
sets of European countries, those that needed bailout packages and those that did not. As shown in 
Table 5, PIIGS countries have a high debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios, while the core countries have 
relatively healthy fundamental. While Austria has the lowest Debt-GDP ratio, France, Germany and 
the UK own large shares of the debt of PIIGS. Belgium has the worst fundamental in the cores, but 
these is only small increase in Debt-GDP from 2007-2012. Spain is included in the PIIGS because of 
its high deficit-GDP and unemployment rate (over 20% in 2011). Using the euro as their currency, 
they are unable to deploy independent monetary policy to battle economic downturn. 
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and ends at February 201311, covering the sovereign debt crisis, during which the 
credit risk of most European countries was increased, led by Greece.  
Table 5 Government Debt-GDP and Deficit-GDP, 2007-2012 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A  Debt-GDP (%) 
     Austria 62.8 60.7 63.8 69.2 72 72.5 
Belgium 88.1 84.2 89.2 95.7 95.5 97.8 
France 63.7 68.2 79.2 82.4 85.5 90.2 
Germany 67.6 64.9 66.8 74.5 82.4 80.4 
UK 43.4 44.5 52.3 73.9 80 86.4 
Greece 106.1 105.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 
Ireland 24.8 25 44.5 64.8 92.1 106.4 
Italy 106.6 103.6 106.1 116.4 119.3 120.8 
Portugal 63.9 68.3 71.7 83.7 94 108.3 
Spain 39.6 36.1 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 
 
      Panel B  Deficit-GDP (%) 
    Austria 1 1 4.1 4.5 2.4 2.5 
Belgium 0.1 1.1 5.6 3.9 3.9 4 
France 2.7 3.3 7.6 7.1 5.3 4.9 
Germany 
-0.2 0.1 3.1 4.2 0.8 -0.2 
UK 2.7 4.9 10.8 10 7.9 6.5 
Greece 6.8 9.9 15.6 10.8 9.6 10 
Ireland 
-0.1 7.4 13.9 30.8 13.3 7.5 
Italy 1.6 2.7 5.4 4.3 3.7 2.9 
Portugal 3.2 3.7 10.2 9.9 4.4 6.4 
Spain 
-1.9 4.5 11.2 9.7 9.4 10.6 
This table shows the government debt to GDP ratio (%) and budget deficit to GDP ratio (%) for the 10 
sample countries, from 2007 to 2012. Source: Eurostat and the European Commission 
 
Our sample time span starts from 28 April 2009 (shortly after the bank bailout 
programme began but before Greece announced its 12.5% deficit) and ends at 17 
February 2013. Table 6 lists descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads in 
                                                          
11
 In the case of Greece, its time span ends at 21 Feb 2012, when the Greek government reformed its 
debt - viewed as default by the rating agencies.  
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level and log-transformed12, illustrating considerable differences across countries. 
Germany shows the smallest mean and standard deviation (SD), at 34.318 bp and 
13.033 bp in level, respectively, while Greece is the most volatile country, with the 
highest mean, at 1799.441 bp, and SD, at 2625.636 bp in level. The PIIGS have CDS 
spreads over 200 bp while the five core nations, do not. The UK, the only 
non-Eurozone country in the sample, has the second most stable CDS spreads, at 
61.161 mean and 15.794 SD.   
Figure 2 shows the sovereign CDS spreads over time for these two groups of 
countries. These series peak between the end of 2011 and the start of 2012, and 
afterwards start dropping, corresponding to the end of the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 Log-transform CDS spreads is to help induce homoscedasticity and normally distributed errors and 
ease of interpretation.  
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics 
Countries 
variables in levels variables in ln 
Period No. Obs Mean SD Min Median Max Skew Kurtosis Mean SD Min Median Max Skew Kurtosis 
Austria 70.632 30.787 21.390 65.109 159.230 0.563 -0.480 4.157 0.461 3.063 4.176 5.070 -0.327 -0.436 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Belgium 113.134 67.163 30.000 101.064 341.980 0.828 -0.126 4.548 0.613 3.401 4.616 5.835 -0.033 -1.115 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
France 70.151 35.099 21.000 61.590 171.560 0.757 -0.248 4.123 0.516 3.045 4.120 5.145 -0.162 -0.671 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Germany 34.318 13.033 12.350 31.389 79.290 0.942 0.329 3.468 0.365 2.514 3.446 4.373 0.158 -0.430 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Greece 1799.441 2625.636 88.000 817.745 14911.740 2.195 4.219 6.636 1.326 4.477 6.707 9.610 0.220 -0.736 28/04/2009 - 22/02/2012 737 
Ireland 387.707 233.447 96.925 374.780 1191.158 0.472 -0.772 5.753 0.669 4.574 5.926 7.083 -0.108 -1.524 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Italy 204.165 123.738 48.000 154.790 498.660 0.723 -0.779 5.131 0.622 3.871 5.042 6.212 0.038 -1.145 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Portugal 506.337 385.961 37.000 397.871 1521.450 0.559 -1.010 5.811 1.039 3.611 5.986 7.327 -0.602 -0.784 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
Spain 215.493 107.113 47.000 207.105 492.070 0.323 -0.708 5.224 0.583 3.850 5.333 6.199 -0.575 -0.662 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
UK 61.161 15.794 24.210 61.255 102.000 -0.140 -0.415 4.076 0.288 3.187 4.115 4.625 -0.915 0.900 28/04/2009 - 07/02/2013 988 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads for our 5-year US denominated CDS spread, in basis points (bp). Variables in 
levels and in logarithm are reported separately.   
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Figure 2 7LPHVHULHVSORWRI&'6VSUHDGVIRU³&RUH´DQG³3,,*6´FRXQWULHV 
 
The figures present the GHYHORSPHQWRIVRYHUHLJQ&'6VSUHDGVIRUWKH³&RUH´FRXQWULHVDQG³3,,*6´
countries, Apr 2009 ± Feb 2013. The vertical lines mark the events of: Greece 1st bailout; Ireland bailout; 
Portugal bailout; Greece 2nd bailout; Greece 2nd bailout finalized; Spain bailout. According to the events, 
the time period is divided into sub-SHULRGVIRUDQDO\VLV³&RUHV´$XVWULD$7%HOJLXP%*)UDQFH
)5 *HUPDQ\ '( DQG 8QLWHG .LQJGRP 8. ³3,,*6´ *UHHFH *5 ,UHODQG ,5 ,WDO\ ,7
Portugal (PT), and Spain (SP). 
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3.2 Sovereign credit ratings 
There are six types of rating announcement from the agencies: downgrades, upgrades, 
watch/review for downgrade, watch/review for upgrade, positive outlook and 
negative outlook. Outlook and watch/review come under the same category of 
announcement by rating agencies. Outlook assesses the potential direction of credit 
rating over the longer term, typically six months to two years. Watch/review, as a 
VSHFLDO W\SH RI RXWORRN UHSUHVHQW DQ DJHQF\¶V RSLQLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH SRWHQWial 
direction over the shorter term.  
For present purposes, outlook and watch/review are hereafter combined and simply 
FDOOHG RXWORRN D YDULDEOH WKDW UHSUHVHQWV WKH DJHQF\¶V RSLQLRQ RQ IXWXUH FKDQJHV
Nevertheless, a country receiving a particular outlook and having these prior ratings 
confirmed months later are considered as two events. Therefore, we do not mix credit 
rating and outlook together (Gande and Parsley, 2005) but consider them as 
individual variables, following Kim and Wu (2011) and Christopher et al. (2012)13. 
The sovereign credit rating and outlook for both upgrades and downgrades in 
sovereign CDS and bond spreads are provided by three major rating agencies: 
6WDQGDUGDQG3RRUV 6	30RRG\¶V DQG)LWFK:HHPSOR\ WKHLUKLVWRULFDO IRUHLJQ
currency long-term sovereign debt ratings and outlook. The reason for choosing 
foreign currency ratings instead of local currency ratings is that the former generally 
have a greater influence on asset return (Brooks et al., 2004). Table 7 shows the 
sovereign ratings and outlooks for long-term foreign currency debt in our sample 
from 15 November 2004 to 7 June 2012. Across ratings and outlooks, the numbers of 
upgrades and downgrades are well balanced (379 upgrades and 401 downgrades) but 
                                                          
13
 Credit rating, outlook and watch have different influences on the market. Hull et al. (2004) and 
Norden and Weber (2004) find review exhibits the most impact on the market. Christopher et al. 
(2012) find outlook have a greater market impact than actual rating changes.  
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there are more outlook events than rating events (282 ratings and 498 outlooks). Of 
the four regions, Europe takes the largest share of sample countries and credit events 
(384 events from Europe out of 780 events). Across the three rating agencies, S&P is 
the most active agency, announcing 287 credit events.  
Table 7 Summary Description of Sovereign rating events 
 
Countries Ratings 
 
Outlooks 
 
Total 
 
Upgrades Downgrades 
 
Upgrades Downgrades 
 
S&P 37 60 53 
 
78 96 
 
287 
Asia & Pacific 8 14 3 
 
13 14 
 
44 
Latin America 8 21 5 
 
19 17 
 
62 
Europe 16 17 44 
 
36 53 
 
150 
Middle East and Africa 5 8 1 
 
10 12 
 
31 
 
   
 
  
 
 
Moody's 36 47 30 
 
76 96 
 
249 
Asia & Pacific 8 12 3 
 
17 23 
 
55 
Latin America 8 16 0 
 
19 17 
 
52 
Europe 15 9 26 
 
29 45 
 
109 
Middle East and Africa 5 10 1 
 
11 11 
 
33 
 
   
 
  
 
 
Fitch 36 50 42 
 
68 84 
 
244 
Asia & Pacific 8 11 3 
 
16 17 
 
47 
Latin America 8 18 2 
 
14 16 
 
50 
Europe 16 16 37 
 
31 41 
 
125 
Middle East and Africa 4 5 0 
 
7 10 
 
22 
 
       
 
Total 37 157 125 
 
222 276 
 
780 
This table presents the summary statistics of ratings and outlooks events for international markets 
grouped by region. The rating and outlook are for foreign currency denominated sovereign credit ratings 
DQGRXWORRNHYHQWVSXEOLVKHGE\6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK7KHFUHGLWVWDWXVRIVRPHFRXQWULHVKDVQRW
been adjusted by all three agencies in our sample period.  
 
Similar to Afonso et al. (2012), Ferreira and Gama (2007), Gande and Parsley (2005) 
and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), we transform the sovereign credit ratings into 
a discrete variable, as shown in Table 35 7KH WKUHH DJHQFLHV¶ UDWLQJV DUH PDSSHG
RQWR D  JUDGH VFDOH $$$$DD  $$$D  « &&&  DQG EHORZ 
Correspondingly, the outlooks are mapped onto a scale between -1 (negative) and +1 
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(positive); -0.5 (watch positive) and +0.5 (watch negative). The rating and outlook 
variables are considered as the average across three agencies14: 
  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ௌ௉ ൅  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ெ ൅  ? ? ? ?௜௧ி  (1) 
  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ ൌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ௌ௉ ൅  ? ? ? ?௜௧ெ ൅  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ி ? (2) 
where  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ௌ௉,  ? ? ? ?௜௧ெ  and  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧ி stand for sovereign credit ratings from 
S&P, Moody and Fitch, respectively. Credit outlooks from S&P, Moody and Fitch 
are defined in the same way.    
The Rating and Outlook event distribution is shown in Figure 22. Over the sample 
period, there were 780 rating announcements from the three agencies, with the 
majority being outlook changes. There is a higher weight of rating events in Europe; 
smaller for Asia, Latin and Africa & Middle East. The frequency of events increases 
after 2008; multiple credit rating and outlook events occur on single days, reaching a 
peak in 2011.  
In our analysis of the Eurozone debt crisis, we generate the credit rating and outlook 
variables using the same method. The only difference is that we expand the credit 
rating data from April 2009 to February 2013 for the 10 EU countries. 
3.3 Bailout  
The timeline of the bailouts during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is summarized 
in Table 815. Each of the rescue packages is examined separately. We divide the 
                                                          
14
 Since the number of countries reported by these three rating agencies is slightly different, causing 
that there might be no rating events for some countries in our sample period, we take the average of 
reported agencies.  
15
 Detail of bailout packages is collected from Bloomberg News.  
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whole sample period into sub-periods for each intervention: before and after 
implementation of the rescue packages16.  
For example, there are two bailout packages for Greece, ¼110 bn on 2 May 2010 and 
¼130 bn on 21 July 2011. In order to examine the effects of these bailouts on the 
bilateral relations between Greece and other countries, we divide the sample period 
into three sub-periods: 28 April 2009 ± 1 May 2010 (Stage 1); 2 May 2010 ± 21 July 
2011 (Stage 2); 22 July 2011 ± 21 February 2012 (Stage 3). We next describe how the 
time span of each bailed-out country is defined in our analysis.  
)RU,UHODQGWKHEDLORXWSODQRI¼EQZDVDQQRXQFHGRQ1RYHPEHUIXQGHG
by the IMF, the European bailout fund and the EFSF. Thus, the sample is divided into 
two sub-periods, 28 April 2009 ± 28 November 2010 and 29 November 2010 ± 7 
February 2013. Econometric analysis is undertaken to compare the interdependencies 
of credit risk of Ireland and other countries in each of the sub-periods. 
$VIRU3RUWXJDO WKH(8DQG,0)DSSURYHGD¼EQEDLORXWRQ0D\7KH
pre-intervention stage for this bailout plan began in April 2009 and ended in mid-May 
2011, while the post-intervention stage of the bailout lasted from May 2011 to the end 
of the sample period. This bailout marks the most volatile period of the sovereign debt 
crisis.  
The last bailout plan assisted Spain after the nationalization of Bankia SA in May. 
This ¼100 bn bailout package was announced on 9 June 2012, when the European 
                                                          
16
 This setup for investigating impact of bailout has a limitation of possible contamination from other 
SROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQVOLNHWKH(&%¶V6HFXULWLHV0DUNHW3URJUDPZKLFKLVDOVRGHVLJQed to stabilize the 
debt markets and introduced in similar date. It is further discussed in Appendix 10.  
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economy started to recover. In order to analyse the impact of this bailout, we divide 
the time span into pre- and post- bailout stages17.  
Table 8 Timeline of important events during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
Type Country Date Event 
Average ln-CDS spreads in 30 days 
Before event After event 
Bailout 
Greece 
02/05/2010 
EU agrees on a 110 billion euro 
rescue package for Greece 6.245 6.518 
21/07/2011 
EU agrees the second bailout package 
for Greece, worth 109bn-euro 7.742 7.535 
21/02/2012 
EU finance ministers finalize the 
detail of the second bailout package 
of 130bn euro, along with 50% hair 
cut 9.050 - 
Ireland 28/11/2010 
Ireland takes a bailout from the IMF, 
the European Commission and EFSF 
(about 85 bn euros) 6.195 6.264 
Portugal 16/05/2011 
The EU and the IMF approve a 
78bn-euro bailout for Portugal, 
funded by the EFSM, EFSF and IMF. 6.342 6.456 
Spain 09/06/2012 
Spain needs a 100 bn euro bailout in 
order to help its failing banks, after 
Bankia SA is partly nationalized in 
May 6.034 6.079 
 The table lists selected events in the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 to 2013. The average ln-CDS 
spreads in ±30 days around event dates are computed as the average changes oI  FDOHQGDUGD\V¶
time windows before and after the event.  
 
                                                          
17
 Since Greece defaulted on its bonds before this rescue package was announced, the relation 
between Spain and Greece is not examined.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and 
the impact of credit ratings 
4.1 Introduction 
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis 
highlight the importance of sovereign credit risk. During the crises, we observe 
widening sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads and extensive sovereign credit 
rating downgrades for emerging markets as well as developed economies. Sovereign 
CDS spread is a natural PHDVXUH RI D FRXQWU\¶V FUHGLW ZRUWKLQHVV ZKLFK VKRXOG
reflect changes in sovereign credit risk and be of especial interest during periods of 
crisis. Likewise, ratings published by ratings agencies are supposed to reveal the 
credit qualities of sovereign states. However, extensive downgrades after crises have 
been held up as signs of failure by the ratings agencies to anticipate crises and to 
alert investors. Conversely, during the recent Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of 
WKDW FRXQWU\¶V GHEW UDWLQJ ZDV criticized not only for increasing the cost of 
JRYHUQPHQW IXQGLQJ EXW DOVR IRU KHOSLQJ WR SUHFLSLWDWH *UHHFH¶V GHIDXOW LQ D
self-fulfilling prophecy. Similar criticisms have been made of the rating agencies for 
their treatment of other countries during the Eurozone debt crisis.  
Ensuring that European Union (EU) member states can endure financial shocks has 
been considered a major task for the success of euro since its birth (Feldstein, 1998, 
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Wyplosz, 1997, Lane, 2006)*UHHFH¶VVRYHUHLJQGHEWFULVLVDFWHGOLNHDVSDUNRQD
stack of tinder; it triggered the fear of contagion of sovereign debt crisis in other 
Eurozone members, especially the other PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In 
addition, although the causes of the crises varied for different nations, massive 
downgrades on the credit ratings for government debt further increased the cost of 
funding for these heavily indebted countries, and established a new set of 
self-fulfilling prophecies of the type mentioned above. To prevent the crisis from 
spreading and threatening the entire region, the EU and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) stepped in and introduced various bailout packages for these troubled 
countries. However, credit risk is not simply eliminated by these rescue plans. 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) argue that bailout plans transferred the risk from 
3,,*6 FRXQWULHV WR RWKHU (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV HVSHFLDOO\ WR WKH ³&RUH´ (XURSHDQ
countries, which now own large shares of the debt of the PIIGS. A full-scale 
empirical study is missing on the interdependence of sovereign credit risk for EU 
countries, and the impact of the bailouts. It is particularly important for regulators 
and policy makers to understand the default risk interdependence between states, the 
mechanism of the transmission of risk and the impacts of policy interventions, in 
order to avoid similar crises and to preserve the financial and monetary stability of 
EU.  
Literature on the impact of sovereign rating announcements on CDS markets 
generally focuses on the short-term impact of credit rating events on stock, 
government bonds or foreign exchange markets around event dates, especially for 
domestic markets. Literature on the spillover of credit events focuses on the 
transmission channels or determinants of spillover effects, especially for developing 
markets. Studies on the European economies and their reaction to rating 
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announcements following the start of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis are still in 
progress. However, little attention has been paid to lead-lag relations between 
government CDS spreads and credit ratings over the long run or even short run and, 
furthermore, the spillover effects before and during financial crises.   
We contribute to the literature by investigating bilateral linkages between sovereign 
CDS spreads in international markets and creditworthiness, as well as 
interdependence between states in this regard. We use an extended sample in terms 
of both time span and sample nations (November 2004-June 2012 for 37 countries). 
We differentiate between types of rating event (ratings, outlook and watch revisions) 
IURP WKUHH VHSDUDWH DJHQFLHV 6	3 0RRG\¶V )LWFK  :H DOVR LQYHVWLJDWH
cross-border spillover effects by focusing on events originating from different 
regioQVLQGLIIHUHQWEXVLQHVVF\FOHVGXULQJµWUDQTXLO¶DQGµFULVLV¶SHULRGV:HFKHFN
for asymmetries in the transmission of spillover effects in terms of geography and 
business cycle.   
Second, after examining the impact of credit ratings on sovereign CDS spreads, this 
study focuses on the impact of the bailout plans implemented by the EU and the IMF. 
Our dataset includes 10 major sovereign CDS reference entities during the period 
from 28 April 2009 (shortly after the bank bailout programme was activated but 
before Greece announced its 12.5% deficit) to 17 February 2013. This allows us to 
H[DPLQH DOO WKH PDMRU SROLF\ LQWHUYHQWLRQV GXULQJ WKH FULVLV *UHHFH¶V ILUVW DQG
second bailout, the Ireland bailout, the Portugal bailout, and the Spain bailout. 
Moreover, we examine the impacts of financial aid on the sovereign credit risk 
interdependence, and explore the pattern in responses to the bailout across countries 
and bailouts. 
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We have five main findings. (1) There are stable long-run cointegration relationships 
and significant short-run reactions between government CDS spreads to rating and 
outlook changes, with rating and outlook leading CDS spreads. (2) Over the 
short-run, rating and outlook announcements originating from different countries 
have a strong spilloveUHIIHFWDFURVVFRXQWULHVEXWQRWDFURVVUHJLRQVZKLOHFRXQWULHV¶
initial credit status has limited effect on such spillover. (3) The US market is a strong 
source of global spillover to all the countries. (4) After controlling for US factors, the 
international spillover effects are found to be stronger during crisis periods than in 
tranquil periods. (5) Credit outlook changes have a greater impact on sovereign CDS 
VSUHDGV¶ UHVSRQVHV WKDQ UDWLQJ FKDQJH DQQRXQFHPHQWV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW RXWORRN
changes carry more new information. 
In terms of the EU sovereign debt crisis, there are three main findings. (1) Before the 
EU interventions, the spreads of the rescued countries ± Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain (PIGS) ± had strong influence on rate changes in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and the UK (core European countries). (2) After bailout, our results 
underline increased interdependencies between sovereign credit risk in the EU area, 
especially between the rescued country and the core countries. This suggests that 
these bailout plans not only increase the influence of the rescued country on the 
development of the core nations, but also amplify the sensitivity of PIIGS to changes 
in the cores. (3) Different countries will vary in their financial stability and their 
fundamentals will differ, so they will be expected to respond differently to a bailout. 
Indeed, distinctive interaction behaviours across countries, related to country-specific 
characteristics (fiscal outlook), is found for each of the policy interventions. 
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4.2 Hypotheses 
To detect the bilateral linkages (spillover) of sovereign credit markets and to capture 
the presence of a potential contagion effect during the Eurozone debt crisis, we are 
concerned with the bi-directional spillover (interdependence) of credit risk between 
the bailed-out countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the core countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK),18 by examining the changes in the 
relevant interdependence throughout bailouts. Also, the study could further reveal the 
role of policy intervention during sovereign debt crisis. Although there might be 
many inter-linkages between these economies, contagion is more easily understood 
as a bilateral phenomenon¸ spreading from market under distress to other markets. 
When spillover does occur, it can be via one or more of several channels. In terms of 
fundamentals, when a government raises funds to save another state in financial 
distress, as happened in the Eurozone debt crisis, its own public debt and deficit are 
FRQWDPLQDWHG )RU LQVWDQFH LQ WHUPVRI WUDGLQJ OLQNV*HUPDQ\¶VEDODQFHRI JRRGV
and services with the PIIGS countries swung from a significant surplus for Germany 
in 2007, of 33bn euro, into a small deficit, of 1.2bn euro, in 2012. Since these 
Eurozone countries all operate the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System, a large trade imbalance results in a huge 
SD\PHQWGHOD\IURPWKH3,,*6FRXQWULHV¶FHQWUDOEDQNVEQHXURIRU*HUPDQ\
Moreover, inter-holding of government bonds, derivative trading by central banks 
and commodity trading could also represent the contagion channels. Contagion could 
DOVRDULVHWKURXJKOLQNDJHVEHWZHHQERWKIXQGDPHQWDOVDQGLQYHVWRUV¶DWWLWXGHVWKDW
is, if two countries share similar characteristics (macroeconomic similarities) 
                                                          
18
 Belgium is considered as core nation rather than a PIIGS-type member state despite its debt/GDP 
ratio being around 100%, since its government deficit is relatively low and Belgium has not faced 
severe financing difficulty. 
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investors might fear a crisis in one after it has happened in the other. This seems to 
have been the case for spillover between the PIIGS. Fear of contagion is a significant 
cause for sovereign risk contagion (Metiu, 2012).  
Therefore, a public-to-public risk transfer is expected through the aforementioned 
channels during crisis. This assumption is supported by the ratings and outlook 
downgrades in 2012 and 2013 for the relatively healthy countries in the EU, which 
were also the main contributors to the bailouts. This public-to-public risk transfer 
was a cause of spillover (indeed, contagion) across countries, as seen in CDS spreads. 
But then this spillover was intensified by the bailout. When macroeconomic 
fundamentals are not strong enough to defend a speculative attack, any shift in 
expectations (e.g. loss of investor confidence) can lead to a self-fulfilling wave of 
cross-border portfolio rebalancing.  
Prior to any bailout, we suggest that there is significant influence of a bailed-out 
FRXQWU\¶V&'6VSUHDGRQWKHFRUH(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVGXHWRWKHULVLQJFRQFHUQRYHU
the credit risk of core countries and the links between fundamentals (inter-holding of 
government debt and decline in trading surplus) and investor belief (fear of 
contagion). Therefore, we have the following hypotheses.  
H1: before bailout, changes in the assessed credit risk of bailed-out countries affect 
the credit risk of core European countries.  
After bailout, the core nations (financing the bailout) are more exposed to the credit 
risk of the bailed-out countries. The fiscal situation of these core countries will then 
be affected by the dragged balance sheet and possibility of further action, all of 
which leads to a higher sensitivity to FUHGLWULVNLQ3,,*6PHPEHUV,QYHVWRUV¶IHDURI
contagion of further increases the trend.  
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H2: after bailout programs are implemented, any changes in the credit risk of 
bailed-out nations will have even more influence on core countries than before.  
Similarly, the sensitivity of bailed-out CDS spreads to the core countries also 
increases after they have provided financial aid. The financial support provided by 
the EU and IMF, financed mainly the core countries, is supposed to have eased the 
financial stress of the troubled countries. The funds released with a bailout allow the 
receiving country (PIIGS) to lower both the cost of its future borrowing and the 
interest payments on its previously issued bonds, and give that country precious time 
to restructure its domestic economy and to lower government deficit. Nevertheless, 
the support of the core countries (credit guarantees for bailed-out country) makes the 
3,,*6 PRUH VHQVLWLYH WR FRQGLWLRQV LQ WKH FRUHQDWLRQV 6LQFH WKH 3,,*6¶ GRPHVWLF
macroeconomic fundamentals are not good enough for those countries to defend 
themselves from external attack, any worsening of the fundamentals in the core 
countries is likely lead to panic on the part of those investing in PIIGS.  
H3: after bailout, a bailed-RXWFRXQWU\¶VVSreads are more sensitive to changes in the 
credit risk of core countries.  
Different countries will vary in their financial stability and their fundamentals will 
differ, so they will be expected to behave differently in the bi-directional relation 
with the bailed-out countries. Comparing the different behaviour of interdependence 
between the bailed-out countries and others for each bailout, we try to reveal the 
causes for such reactions across countries in crisis period. Corresponding to the two 
transmission channels discussed in the literature chapter, the country-specific 
characteristics of any given national economic crisis is suggested as the possible 
PDLQIDFWRULQFOXGLQJLWVILVFDOVLWXDWLRQGHEWDQGGHILFLWOHYHODQGWKH³LQIRUPDWLRQ´
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contained in LWV&'6VSUHDGLQYHVWRU¶VDWWLWXGHLQYHVWRUV¶EHOLHIVFRQFHUQLQJIXWXUH
credit risk, how informative its spreads, the possibility of a spillover). Specifically, in 
terms of how much a country is affected by the bailed-out countries, the vulnerability 
to external factors of a country depends on its fundamentals. Countries with solid 
fundamentals should be less affected by external shocks. On the other hand, in terms 
of the influence on the bailed-out countries, the influence of a country depends on its 
³LQIRUPDWLRQ´&RXQWULHVZLWKPRUHLQIRUPDWLYH&'6VSUHDGVHJH[SHFWDWLRQWREH
bailed-out) would have a larger impact on the bailed-out country. Moreover, this 
pattern is assumed to be consistent across the five bailouts. 
H4: comparing different interactions across countries, we propose that these 
differences are related to the country-specific characteristic. Solid fiscal 
fundamentals (low debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios) could lead to lower sensitivity 
to external shocks, and more ³LQIRUPDWLRQ contained´ in the CDS spread means more 
influence on other EU members. 7KH ³LQIRUPDWLRQ FRQWDLQHG´ LV EHOLHYHG WR EH
higher if a country is expected to experience a bailout. 
4.3 Methodology 
There is extensive empirical evidence on testing for contagion and the transmission 
mechanism of shocks. Four major categories of tests have been utilized for evidence 
of contagion during a number of financial and currency crises: correlation of asset 
prices, GARCH frameworks (volatility spillover), cointegration, and probit models. 
A flaw of the methodology in most existing literature is that the assumption that the 
transmission from one market to another is one-way. Many of the tests developed 
previously for contagion suffer from a simultaneity bias between correlated asset 
prices. Price adjustment could happen in either of the two markets, leading to 
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
67 
 
changes in the other. The interest of this thesis is not the factors affecting such 
interaction, but revealing the direction of price information transfer.  
Most of these models focus on the linkage between returns in the two markets, 
without considering the relationship between series in levels. One of the most 
important reasons is that these time series are non-stationary, which could cause 
spurious results. However, differencing the variables to calculate returns loses 
information on a possible linear combination between level variables, but the use of 
the cointegration technique can overcome the problem of non-stationary time series, 
allowing us to investigate in both first difference and level.   
In order to analyse causal relationships and interdependence between pairwise 
markets in the long run and short run to examine spillover effects (and thereby 
possible contagion), we employ cointegration approach using the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) and Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) framework, 
following Sander and Kleimeier (2003), Billio and Pelizzon (2003), Hassene and 
Kais (2011). The VECM is to examine individual adjustment towards the long-term 
cointegration relationship. Although there might be many inter-linkages between 
these economies, contagion is more easily understood as a bilateral phenomenon¸ 
spreading from a crisis market to other markets. Therefore, we trace back to the 
bilateral linkages, following &ODH\VDQG9DãtþHN. 
This is conducted in three steps. First, the unit root test is used to see whether or not 
each series is in fact stationary. Second, if a series is found to be non-stationary, 
cointegration tests are performed on whether a long-run equilibrium relationship 
exists for the pairwise markets. Third, VECM is applied to check the short-term 
lead-lag relationship, when the series is shown to be cointegrated, while VAR is used 
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when it is shown not to be cointegrated. In addition, we add Granger causality and 
impulse response to investigate interactions between them. These techniques are able 
to capture changes in the dynamic relation between sovereign CDS spreads, as well 
as sovereign CDS and credit ratings.  
4.3.1 Cointegration 
We perform the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test on each set 
of rating and CDS spreads, trying to provide a parsimonious representation of the 
true data-generating processes. The ADF test is based on estimating the test 
regression: 
 ?௧ ൌ  ? ? ?௧ ൅Ȱ ?௧ିଵ ൅෍Ȳ௝ȟ ?௧ି௝௣௝ୀଵ ൅ ?௧ (3) 
where  ?௧ is a vector of deterministic terms. The p lagged difference terms, ȟ ?௧ି௝, 
are used to approximate the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) structure of the 
errors, and the value of p is set so that the error,  ?௧, is serially uncorrelated. Under 
the null hypothesis,  ?௧ is I(1), which implies thatȰ ൌ  ?. The ADF t-statistic and 
normalized bias statistic are based on the least squares estimates from Eq (3).  
The cointegration test is examined using both the Engle Granger ADF test and 
-RKDQVHQ¶V0D[LPXPWUDFHDQG(LJHQYDOXHWHVW7KHWUHQGVSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKHVHWHVWV
includes a restricted constant. When one cointegration relation is not rejected by any 
of the three tests, these two series are considered as cointegrated and ready to 
proceed to VECM analysis19.  The critical value is decided by the Mackinnon 
critical value. For the VECM estimation, it is processed by the Johansen maximum 
                                                          
19
 This specification is in line with Ammer and Cai (2011), Alter and Schuler (2012) and Aktug 
(2013). 
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likelihood (ML) procedure, while the VAR is estimated via ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  
7KH RSWLPDO ODJ OHQJWK LV FKRVHQ E\ $NDLNH¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ FULWHULRQ $,& IRU WKH
ADF test with up to 12 lags, cointegration test and VECM/VAR. Other information 
criterion, Bayesian information criterion/ Schwarz information criterion (BIC/SIC), 
Final Prediction Error (FPE) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) are 
not preferred in the lag selection. In most cases, BIC/SIC would suggest one lag for 
the underlying VAR, which results in no cointegration relation20. Moreover, AIC, 
FPE and HQIC generally suggest the same lag length. Therefore, we use AIC for 
optimal lag selection. The AIC measure was chosen by Blanco et al. (2005), Zhu 
(2006) and Norden and Weber (2004) as their lag selection measure.   
7KH-RKDQVHQ¶V0/SURFHGXUH9(&0ZLWKS-lags21, is specified as below: 
  ?ଵ ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ  ?ଶ ?௝ǡ௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ (4) 
 ൤ ? ?௜ǡ௧ ? ?௝ǡ௧൨ ൌ  ? ?ଵ ?ଶ ? ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍ ? ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜ ?௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൤ ? ?௜ǡ௧ି௜ ? ?௝ǡ௧ି௜൨ ൅ ?ଵǡ௧ (5)  ?௜ǡ௧and  ?௝ǡ௧represent the series of each market.  ? ?௧ represents the changes in  ?௧.  ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ is the error correction term, corresponding to lag 1 of  ?ଵǡ௧, which is the 
residual of the cointegration of Eq (4). The residual should be stationary when the 
log series are cointegrated, as tested previously.  ?ଵis the restricted constant.  ?ଵǡ௧ are 
non-autoregressive i.i.d. residuals, with zero mean and constant variance.  
                                                          
20
 Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) suggest the one lag proposed by the SIC is not enough to 
investigate the relationship over long periods. Therefore, they choose AIC. 
21
 p lags represent the optimal lags for the underlying VAR model; it has p-1 lags in the 
corresponding VECM model. 
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7KHȕPDWUL[GHVFULEHV WKH ORQJ-UXQUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WZRVHULHV7KHĮPDWUL[
speed of adjustment, measures the speed of each market adjusting to long-run 
HTXLOLEULXP ,I Į LV VLJQLILFDQW DQG KDV WKH RSSRVLWH VLJQ WR FRUUHVSRQGLQJ ȕ LH ?ଵ ൏  ? ?ଵ ൐  ?), the corresponding market would adjust back to the long-run 
equilibrium, driven by the HUURUFRUUHFWLRQWHUPİ:HFDQILQGWKHOHDGLQJPDUNHWLQ
lead-ODJDQDO\VLVE\FRPSDULQJWKHPDJQLWXGHVRIĮ(Ammer and Cai (2011), Blanco 
et al. (2005)) suggest using the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure (GG) to 
investigate price adjustment under the VECM framework. However, this measure 
UHTXLUHV WKH VLJQ RI Į WR EH >-,+] and significant, which is defined as a real 
cointegration relationship, since both markets take part in the error correction; 
otherwise the estimation would be meaningless. Nevertheless, Enders (2004) argues 
that there is more than one way to correct the error. Furthermore, Alter and Schuler 
(2012) provide a detailed interpretation of coefficients in a VECM. When one of the 
ĮFRHIILFLHQWVLVQRWVLJQLILFDQWWKHUHVSHFWLYHPDUNHWVSURYLGHWKHVWRFKDVWLFWUHQGLQ
the long-UXQUHODWLRQ:KHQRQHRIWKHĮFRHIILFLHQWVLVVLJQLILFDQWEXWZLWKWKHVDPH
VLJQ DV ȕ WKH UHVSHFWLYH YDULDEOH LV FRQVLGHUHG DV QRW WDNLQJ SDUW in the error 
correction mechanism.  
The VAR model is defined as follows: 
 ൤ ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ ? ? ?௝ǡ௧൨ ൌ  ? ൅෍൤ ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜൨௣௜ୀଵ ൤ ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ି௜ ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ି௜൨ ൅ ?௧ (6) 
where  ? LVWKHLQWHUFHSWYHFWRUDQGįUepresents the VAR coefficients.  
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4.3.2 Granger causality 
In order to obtain evidence of the lead-lag relationship, we need to apply the pairwise 
Granger causality test. It should be noted that the result is heavily affected by the 
non-normality of underlying residuals. 
The Granger hypothesis is set to test whether one market helps to predict the other 
one, or the other way round. Although it does not represent true causality, Granger 
causality is widely used. If A spread Granger-causes B spread, the past values of A 
should contain useful information to help predict B, which exceeds the information 
contained in the past value of B alone (Palladini and Portes, 2011).    
The null hypothesis is that  ?௜ǡ௧ does not Granger-cause  ?௝ǡ௧,  ?௝ ൌ  ? for all j; if the 
statistic exceeds the 10% critical value, the null hypothesis of absence of Granger 
causality is rejected. We perform the following Granger causality test for series in 
both level and first difference in Eq (7).  
  ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ൅ ෍  ?௜ǡ௠ ?௜ǡ௧ି௠௣௠ୀଵ ൅ ෍  ?௝ ?௝ǡ௧ି௠௣௠ୀଵ  
 ?௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ൅෍ ?௝ǡ௡ ?௧ି௡௣௡ୀଵ ൅෍ ?௝ ?௜ǡ௧ି௡௣௡ୀଵ  (7) 
The lag length, p, is chosen by Information Criteria for up to lag 12. The null 
hypothesis is that the series of country i do not Granger-cause series in countries j. 
4.3.3 Impulse response 
The Impulse Response Function (IRF) shows the response of series to a shock 
introduced by another variable.  IRF is not looking at how one variable affects 
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another variable, which can easily be explained by looking at the coefficients. The 
main task of IRF is to explain how unexpected changes that directly influence one 
series would affect another. In a sense, we are looking at shocks coming from the 
error term related to CDS spreads of one country and how such shocks change CDS 
spreads of others. It helps to understand which CDS market has a bigger impact on 
other sovereigns and how long the impact lasts.  
Ordinary IRF is conducted via Cholesky decomposition, which requires specification 
of the causal ordering of the series. However, it can be difficult to justify such causal 
ordering. Generalized impulse response function (GIRF), developed by Koop et al. 
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), is invariant to the ordering of series. Therefore, 
following Alter and Schuler (2012), we choose to use GIRF to investigate the shock 
impact of one CDS spread on others. A positive shock ± an increase in the credit risk 
of one country of one standard deviation ± is modelled test its impact on the CDS 
spread in each country. Thus the shock not only affects the originating country but 
also countries to which it is related. We would observe the effect of the shock for 22 
trading days (one calendar month). Responses are recorded in basis points. 
The GIRF can be written as follows: 
  ? ?௜௜ ? ? ? ?௜௝ ? ? ? ? ൌ  ? ?௜ǡ௜ ?ିଵȀଶȰ௡ȭ௨  ? ? ? ? 
൥ ?௝௜ ? ? ? ?௝௝ ? ? ?൩ ൌ  ? ?௝ǡ௝ ?ିଵȀଶȰ௡ȭ௨  ? ? ? ? (8) 
where Ȱ௡ is the moving average coefficients measuring the impulse response at 
period n. ȭ௨ represents the variance-covariance matrix of residuals. ɐ ?௝ǡ௝ ?ିଵȀଶ denotes 
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the normalization term, which is the standard deviation related to the error of shock 
variable. A VECM setup is adopted for the period showing the cointegration relation 
between CDS spreads, while a VAR setup is chosen for the period without any 
cointegration relation.   
4.3.4 Limitations 
There are several limitations to the VAR/VECM approach. First, the model has an 
identification problem, which is caused by there being more parameters in the 
structural form than in the reduced form. In the reduced form VAR, there is no 
contemporaneous interaction between variables. To understand the contemporaneous 
relations, we need to study the transmission between structural form and reduced 
form. If the reduced form coefficients are compatible with many different values for 
the structural coefficients then the model is said to be under-identified. If generally it 
is not possible to find any values for the structural coefficients that are compatible 
with the reduced form coefficients then the model is said to be over-identified. If one 
and only one value of each structural coefficient is compatible with the reduced form 
coefficients the model is said to be just identified or exactly identified.  
The VAR model can satisfy OLS and ML estimation results only with relatively few 
variables. By imposing constraints on the parameter to limit the size of estimated 
parameters, various methods are proposed to solve the excessive parameter issue, 
like SVAR. These constraints generally come from economic theory, to demonstrate 
the meaningful long-run and short-run relation between economic variables and 
structural impulses. Over the short run, contemporaneous interactions and correlated 
errors complicate the identification of the nature of shocks and hence the 
interpretation of the impulses. Therefore, Choleski decomposition is used to identify 
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the short-term structure (Juselius, 2006). Over the long run, we need to impose some 
VWUXFWXUHVRQWKHȕFRLQWHJUDWLRQVSDFHRIWKHPRGHO(Johansen and Juselius, 1994).  
The second limitation to the VAR/VECM approach, which is related to correlation 
coefficients, is that if different sub-samples are to determine contagion, biased results 
can be produced if heteroscedasticity is not accounted for. Some researchers suggest 
that the increased correlation could be caused by volatility increase during crisis 
periods. After accounting for heteroscedasticity, there is no significant increase in 
correlation between asset series. This issue can therefore be solved by applying a 
GARCH-type approach to investigate market return volatility, as explained in the 
following chapter. 
Third, in addition to a lagged dependent variable, an omitted variable problem arises, 
because there are no exogenous variables determining CDS spreads. It is 
XQUHDVRQDEOH WR DVVXPH WKDW D FRXQWU\¶V &'6 VSUHDGV UHVSRQG RQO\ WR FKDQJHV LQ
RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ &'6 VSUHDGV 7KLV LV D PHWKRGRORJLFal obstacle in economic 
structural analysis and policy evaluation more generally. In the empirical analysis, 
we add exogenous variables, including ratings and outlook, as well as US factors.  
4.4 Data 
This chapter uses data described in Chapter 3 to examine two sub-research questions 
in correlation between markets. Sovereign CDS Dataset 1 and sovereign credit 
ratings are used to study interactions between sovereign CDS and credit ratings, as 
well as international spillover, during the 2008 global crisis. Sovereign CDS Dataset 
2, sovereign credit ratings and bailout timeline are used to analyse the spillover in 
Eurozone countries during the debt crisis and capture the contagion effect. The 
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impact of bailout is investigated by comparing the interaction before and after bailout 
events.  
4.5 Results of spillover between credit rating and sovereign CDS spreads 
Most empirical research uses event-study techniques to examine whether CDS 
spreads around rating event dates are abnormal.  This approach, though useful, does 
have drawbacks. First, the time window chosen can determine the final conclusion. 
Second, information transmission may be bi-directional rather than one way. 
Moreover, running a regression with first differenced variables may lose long-run 
information, since the first differenced regression results are for short-run 
relationships. We avoid these difficulties by using the vector error correction model 
(VECM); running the regression with cointegrated variables at level can measure the 
long-run dynamic, as well as investigate the short-run revision speed, along with 
Granger causality, as described in Chapter 3. 
Our econometric approach has two main parts. First, we start with a Granger 
causality test to reveal the bi-directional dynamic between sovereign CDS spreads 
and creditworthiness.  Then cointegration and VECM tests are performed in order 
to investigate links between CDS spreads and credit rating and outlook, respectively, 
over both the long run and the short run. In the second part, we investigate spillover 
effects across countries by using explanatory variables under a fixed-effect panel 
regression framework. We focus on whether these spillovers are regional or global 
and whether there are the differences between times of crisis and tranquil periods.  
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4.5.1 Causality  
The major credit ratings agencies are expected to anticipate crises and warn investors 
by revising their ratings. However, they are frequently criticized by observers for 
aggravating sovereign credit risk through unjustified rating revision (Claeys and 
9DãtþHN ). Consequently, it is worth investigating the short-term causality 
between sovereign CDS spreads and ratings, using a bi-directional Granger causality 
test. The Granger hypothesis is to test whether ratings/outlooks help to predict the 
CDS spreads, or the converse. Although Granger causality does not imply true 
causality, it serves as a helpful aid to the VECM.  
Table 9 shows the Granger causality test results, for both level and first difference.  
The lag length, p, is chosen by SIC up to lag 12. Our estimations suggest a mixed 
causality relationship between sovereign CDS and ratings/outlooks for different 
regions of the world. There is a weak form of one-way causality rather than two-way, 
while spread changes in the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, 
Hungary, Ukraine and South Africa are able to Granger-cause their rating changes. 
Ratings in Poland, Slovak, Israel and Qatar could Granger-cause their spread. 
Outlook in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Colombia, Venezuela, Greece, Ireland, 
Poland, Slovak and Turkey is Granger-caused by the government spread. Only a few 
countries show a causality relation in both directions between CDS spreads and 
rating/outlook, and these are mainly in Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania 
and Russia. Thus, our results suggest that the causality relation is rather mixed for 
different countries.  
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Table 9 Granger causality test 
 
cds not GC rating rating not GC cds cds not GC outlook outlook not GC cds 
 
level 1st difference level 1st difference level 1st difference level 1st difference 
Asia         
China 0.14 2.842* 4.944** 2.282 3.521* 0.18 3.768* 4.442** 
Indonesia 0.386 0.038 0.357 0.74 0.317 1.772 0.409 0.296 
Japan 0.955 0.163 0.489 0.281 3.388** 0.468 1.014 0.691 
Kazakhstan 1.125 0.029 1.739 0.745 0.498 0.335 0.667 0.275 
Korea 0.054 3.411* 1.053 3.201* 0.251 2.996* 1.028 1.454 
Malaysia 0.02 0.141 0.886 2.478 0.179 0.288 0.93 1.075 
Philippines 8.011*** 0.052 0.231 0.739 4.238** 0 0.493 1.605 
Thailand 7.062*** 0.068 0.051 0.481 2.536 0.081 0.936 0.007 
 
        
Latin         
Argentina 0.183 0.169 0.08 0.054 0.144 0.053 0.079 0.017 
Brazil 4.867** 0.313 0.087 0.06 0.058 0.073 1.737 1.409 
Chile 1.657 0.008 1.927 0.09 1.196 0.208 0.486 0.035 
Colombia 3.569** 0.304 0.203 0.358 0.829 0.382 1.438 0.354 
Mexico 0.258 0.02 2.106 0.625 6.221*** 1.997 0.022 0.595 
Panama 0.118 0.01 0.017 0.229 0.048 0.012 1.25 0.275 
Peru 0.33 0.059 0.255 0.07 1.582 0.041 0.843 0.589 
Venezuela 6.813*** 7.19*** 2.457* 1.124 2.805* 3.478** 1.458 1.032 
 
        
Europe         
Austria 0.576 0.083 0.202 0.248 0.856 0.375 0.149 0.182 
Belgium 1.719 0.069 0.559 0.484 1.641 0.143 0.228 0.281 
Bulgaria 3.446** 0.492 2.862* 1.159 2.219 0.103 0.006 0.883 
Croatia 5.99** 0 0.04 14.643*** 11.537*** 1.448 4.915** 2.805* 
France 1.116 0.177 0.029 0.057 0.504 0.176 0.072 0.063 
Greece 6.482** 0 0.083 0.007 5.569** 0.475 0.335 0.101 
Hungary 11.549*** 0.001 0.068 0.191 14.688*** 0.175 14.332*** 1.903 
Ireland 0.961 0.039 0.235 0.056 4.018*** 0.063 1.642 0.002 
Italy 2.127 1.629 0.041 0.325 0.868 0.196 0.895 0.83 
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Table 9 (continued)         
Poland 1.168 0.047 4.946** 0.205 2.369* 0.913 0.438 0.958 
Portugal 1.141 0.475 0.422 0.342 2.6 0.065 1.193 1.789 
Romania 7.73*** 2.929* 5.029** 4.332** 0.109 0.895 4.372** 0.026 
Russia 7.089*** 0.041 6.974*** 1.239 8.949*** 0.192 5.173** 2.069 
Slovak 0.646 1.918 3.323* 2.787* 3.224* 0.267 0.845 0.411 
Spain 0.149 0.072 0.114 0.061 0.693 0.088 0.168 0.015 
Ukraine 21.897*** 17.896*** 0.408 0.468 12.306*** 10.924*** 6.685*** 7.591*** 
 
        
Middle East & Africa         
Israel 1.954 0.775 13.06*** 0.078 0.097 0.282 0.088 0.005 
Lebanon 0.134 0.244 0.761 0.714 0.408 0.069 0.253 0.218 
Qatar 0.075 0.406 22.253*** 19.461*** 0.05 0.016 1.335 1.362 
South Africa 31.417*** 31.5*** 0.715 0.688 0.693 0.133 0.901 0.509 
Turkey 1.001 0.257 0.012 0.305 2.707* 1.297 0.217 1.252 
The Granger causality test provides direction of information flows, when the lag is chosen by SIC/BIC. Its F-test results are summarized. The test equation is  ? ?ൌ  ? ൅ ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? ൅  ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? , the null hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y,  ? ?ൌ  ? for all j. if the statistic exceeds the 10% critical value, the null hypothesis of absence 
of Granger causality is rejected. The p-values are shown below while its significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. 
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4.5.2 Dynamic between CDS spreads and rating and outlook 
Table 10 reports the results of the unit root test. For each country, the null hypothesis 
of a unit root is not rejected at the 5% level for both the CDS premium and the credit 
rating series. In order to examine the long-term and short-term dynamics between 
sovereign CDS spreads and credit rating/outlook, we model the CDS spreads and 
rating/outlook using Engle and Granger two-step OLS for estimating VECM, 
specified as below22: 
CDS and Rating 
  ?ଵ ? ? ?௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ  ?ଶ ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ (9) 
 ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧൨ ൌ  ? ?ଵ ?ଶ ? ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍ ? ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜ ?௣௜ୀଵ ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ି௜ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ି௜൨ ൅ ?ଵǡ௧ (10) 
CDS and Outlook 
  ?ଵ ? ? ?௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ  ?ଶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ (11) 
 ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧൨ ൌ  ? ?ଵ ?ଶ ? ?ଶǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍ ? ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜ ?௣௜ୀଵ ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ି௜ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ି௜൨ ൅ ?ଶǡ௧ (12) 
where  ? ? ?௧ are the log forms of government CDS spreads at time t.  ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ are the foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and outlook of the issuer 
at time t, defined in Eq (1)(2).  ? ? ? ?௧,   ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ represent the 
changes of  ? ? ?௧,  ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ and ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ respectively.  ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ and  ?ଶǡ௧ିଵ are the 
error correction terms, corresponding to lag 1 of  ?ଵǡ௧  and  ?ଶǡ௧ , which are the 
residuals of cointegration Eq (9)(11). The residuals should be stationary when the 
                                                          
22
 The lag i, selected by AIC, suggest one lag for all countries. 
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log-CDS and rating and outlook are cointegrated, as tested previously.  ?ଵ and  ?ଶ 
are the restricted constants.  
7KHȕPDWUL[GHVFULEHVWKHORQJ-run relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and 
FUHGLWUDWLQJRXWORRN7KHĮPDWUL[VSHHGRIDGMXVWPHQWPHDVXUHVWKHVSHHGRIHDFK
market adjusting to long-run equilLEULXP ,I Į LV VLJQLILFDQWO\ QHJDWLYH WKH
corresponding market would adjust back to the long-run equilibrium, driven by the 
HUURU FRUUHFWLRQ WHUP İ :H FDQ ILQG WKH OHDG PDUNHW LQ WKH OHDG-lag relation by 
FRPSDULQJ Į Blanco et al. (2005) and Ammer and Cai (2011) suggest using the 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure (GG) to investigate the question under the 
9(&0 IUDPHZRUN +RZHYHU WKLV PHDVXUH UHTXLUHV WKH VLJQ RI Į WR EH >-,+] and 
significant; otherwise the estimation is meaningless. Nevertheless, Enders (2004) 
argues that there is more than one way to correct the error, and suggests three 
scenarios. Further, Aktug (2013) claims that there are five different cases to correct a 
positive error and another five cases to correct a negative error23. Thus, they propose 
a simple measure,  ?ଶ െ  ?ଵ, to check the adjustment, which should be positive to 
make the error correction mechanism work. CDS markets adjust to equilibrium when  ?ଵ is negative. Correspondingly, rating and outlook adjust to the equilibrium when  ?ଶ is positive.   
Table 10 shows the results of the unit root test, suggesting that all the CDS series 
have a unit root, while the rating of Malaysia, Slovak and South Africa is stationary. 
Moreover, the outlook of Israel and Qatar also do not have a unit root, which would 
not proceed to the next step of analysis. Table 37 summarize the cointegration 
                                                          
23
 The five cases are: an increase in A (CDS) and a larger increase in B (rating/outlook); a decrease in 
A and a smaller decrease in B; a decrease in A and an increase in B; a decrease in A and no change in 
B; no change in A and an increase in B.  
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relation between sovereign CDS spreads and rating/outlook. Results of Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Johansen Trace and Max Eigenvalue test statistics with 
restricted constants are reported, along with lags. The cointegration relation of 
spreads and rating is accepted when any test indicates the existence of one 
cointegration at the 10% level, resulting in 21 countries in total: Indonesia, Japan, 
Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, Israel, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. Similarly, for the cointegration between CDS and outlook, we 
find 16 cointegrated countries at the 10% level: China, Japan, Philippines, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Russia, Ukraine, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. Other countries would not proceed to the VECM analysis, 
since there is no long-run equilibrium between them. The results show that more 
CDS spreads are cointegrated with credit ratings than with credit outlooks.  
Table 11 and Table 12 show the VECM estimation results of sovereign CDS spreads 
DQG FUHGLW UDWLQJRXWORRNV 6LJQLILFDQW ȕ VKRZV D VWURQJ ORQJ-run equilibrium 
relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and rating/outlooks. The negative sign 
RI ȕ FRQILUPV WKDW DV WKH FUHGLW TXDlity of a country improves, its CDS spreads 
narrow in the long run, since CDS spread is also a benchmark measuring default risk 
as the credit rating. A positive sign suggests spreads shift in the same direction as the 
rating or outlook. In Table 11RXWRIFRXQWULHVKDYHQHJDWLYHȕ H[FHSWLRQV
include Argentina, Mexico, Russia and Israel), showing the majority of CDS spreads 
DUH QHJDWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR UDWLQJ FKDQJHV $OO FRXQWULHV ZLWK QHJDWLYH ȕ LQ WKH
relationship between CDS spreads and outlooks, support this. Furthermore, CDS 
spreads move with outlook changes more closely than with rating changes, which 
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may be interpreted as the informational effect of rating events being diminished by 
earlier outlook events. Investors become less sensitive to rating changes.  
7KH DGMXVWPHQW VSHHG FRHIILFLHQW PDWUL[ Į VXJJHVWV PDUNHW DGMXVWPHQW IURP
deviation to long-run equilibrium. For the VECM estimation of CDS and rating, the 
Japanese spread adjusts at the rate of  ?ଵ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp, while the rating does not 
adjust significantly. This means that the credit rating leads CDS spreads. For 
FRPSDULVRQ%XOJDULD¶VVRYHUHLJQ&'6PDUNHWOHDGVWKHUDWLQJDW  ?ଶ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp. 
Using the Aktug (2013) measure,  ?ଶ െ  ?ଵǡ is shown in the last column of Table 11 
and Table 12. The majority of   ?ଶ െ  ?ଵ is positive (16 out of 21 for CDS & rating, 
11 out of 16 for CDS & outlook), meaning the error correction mechanism works 
properly. The CDS spreads decrease to correct the error in 16 countries. Thus, ratings 
generally lead the sovereign CDS spreads in price adjustment. Likewise, CDS 
spreads decrease in 11 countries while none of the credit outlooks increase, which 
confirms that outlook leads CDS spread in the lead-lag relation. It may be inferred 
that ratings and outlooks contain important information about the sovereign 
creditworthiness of a country and the informational effects have strong impact on the 
sovereign CDS markets. Particularly when most of the cointegrated countries are 
emerging markets, ratings agencies plays a more essential role in revealing their 
creditworthiness.  
One possible explanation for this result is that getting information on the emerging 
markets is difficult for international investors, due to a lack of transparency. 
However, ratings agencies are able to access crucial information through various 
channels which play an important role in information discovery. Alsakka and ap 
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Gwilym (2009) suggest that credit ratings provide more opportunities for the private 
sector and government to access global capital and foreign direct investment. 
Table 10 Unit root test 
Country 
 
CDS Rating Outlook 
Asia     
China 
 
-1.17 -1.39 -2.34 
Indonesia  -2.3 -0.63 -2.1 
Japan 
 
-2.04 1.15 -1.03 
Kazakhstan  -1.25 -0.88 -1.42 
Korea  -1.41 -1.05 -1.64 
Malaysia 
 
-1.54 -9.87 -1.9 
Philippines  -2.67 -0.49 -1.56 
Thailand 
 
-1.76 -1.42 -1.87 
Latin America     
Argentina  -2.46 -1.81 -2.62 
Brazil 
 
-2.68 -0.9 -2.62 
Chile 
 
-1.18 -1.22 -3.09 
Colombia 
 
-2.83 0.25 -1.91 
Mexico 
 
-1.88 -3.04 -2 
Panama 
 
-2.62 0.57 -2.3 
Peru 
 
-3.01 -0.74 -2.17 
Venezuela  -1.04 -3.33 -2.54 
Europe     
Austria 
 
-1.3 -0.23 1.18 
Belgium 
 
-0.94 1.07 1.05 
Bulgaria 
 
-0.83 -3.06 -1.46 
Croatia 
 
-0.48 -1.74 -1.45 
France 
 
-1.08 -0.23 1.76 
Greece 
 
0.35 2.09 -1.17 
Hungary 
 
-0.94 0.42 -1.86 
Ireland 
 
-2.18 1.82 -0.71 
Italy 
 
-0.37 2.18 -0.13 
Poland 
 
-0.89 -1.41 -1.98 
Portugal 
 
-0.58 2.63 -0.77 
Romania 
 
-0.6 -2.19 -1.49 
Russia 
 
-1.45 -1.25 -1.72 
Slovak  -0.74 -3.69 -2.12 
Spain 
 
-1.05 5.77 -0.61 
Ukraine 
 
-3.22 -0.67 -1.78 
MidEast & Latin     
Israel 
 
-1.05 -0.4 -5.5 
Lebanon 
 
-3.22 0.02 -2.43 
Qatar 
 
-0.87 -2.23 -4.36 
South Africa  -1.4 -3.66 -2.84 
Turkey 
 
-2.86 -0.84 -1.68 
The ADF test indicates the presence of a unit root at the 1% level for all the CDS, rating and outlook 
series. The table repots the t-Statistics for the null hypothesis of a unit root. For ADF test, critical 
values are taken from Mackinnon Critical value, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in 1% are 
emphasized in bold. 
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Table 11 VECM estimation for CDS & Rating 
Country Į1 Į2  ?ଵ ȕ2 const Į2 - Į1 
Asia       
China - -  - - - 
Indonesia -0.004** -0.001 1 -0.069*** 5.895*** 0.003 
Japan -0.007** -0.001 1 -1.876*** 37.203*** 0.006 
Kazakhstan - -  - - - 
Korea - -  - - - 
Malaysia 
  
 
  
 
Philippines -0.005** -0.004*** 1 -0.074*** 5.93*** 0.001 
Thailand - -  - - - 
Latin       
Argentina -0.016*** 0 1 0.379*** 4.761*** 0.016 
Brazil -0.006** -0.003** 1 -0.132*** 6.358*** 0.003 
Chile - -  - - - 
Colombia -0.006*** -0.003** 1 -0.129*** 6.364*** 0.003 
Mexico -0.005** -0.001 1 0.64*** -3.349*** 0.004 
Panama -0.006** 0 1 -0.101*** 5.973*** 0.006 
Peru -0.008*** -0.001 1 -0.007 5.07*** 0.007 
Venezuela -0.001 -0.002 1 -0.171*** 7.528*** -0.001 
Europe       
Austria - -  - - - 
Belgium - -  - - - 
Bulgaria -0.001 -0.001** 1 -0.032 5.044*** 0 
Croatia - -  - - - 
France - -  - - - 
Greece 0 -0.005** 1 -0.395*** 9.497*** -0.005 
Hungary -0.001 -0.003*** 1 -0.818*** 15.208*** -0.002 
Ireland -0.012*** -0.003*** 1 -0.555*** 13.835*** 0.009 
Italy - -  - - - 
Poland - -  - - - 
Portugal - -  - - - 
Romania 0 -0.002*** 1 -0.443*** 9.612*** -0.002 
Russia -0.003* -0.002*** 1 0.144*** 3.106*** 0.001 
Slovak 
  
 
  
 
Spain -0.003 0 1 -1.052*** 23.727 0.003 
Ukraine -0.037*** -0.008*** 1 -0.821*** 11.633*** 0.029 
Middle East & Africa       
Israel -0.014*** -0.002 1 1.496*** -18.125*** 0.012 
Lebanon -0.013*** -0.001 1 -0.092*** 6.409*** 0.012 
Qatar - -  - - - 
South Africa 
  
 
  
 
Turkey -0.007*** -0.002 1 -0.127*** 6.435*** 0.005 
This table shows the coefficient estimates of credit rating and CDS markets co-movement over the 
long run and short run. The VECM model is defined as:  ?ଵ ? ? ?௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ ?ଶ ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ ൤  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൨ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ?െ ?൅෍ ? ? ?ǡ ?  ? ?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ ?  ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ൌ ? ൤  ? ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?െ ?൨ ൅ ? ?ǡ ? 
Where  ? ? ? ? is the log sovereign CDS spreads of a country at time t.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is the average of 
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings of the country at time t of all three agencies.  ? ? ? ? ? and   ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? refer to changes in  ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? at time t,.  ? ?ǡ ?െ ? is the one lag of  ? ?ǡ ?. All 
variables are non-stationary and stationary in I(1). ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. 
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Table 12 VECM estimation for CDS and Outlook 
Country Į1 Į2  ?ଵ ȕ2 const Į2 - Į1 
Asia       
China -0.004** -0.001* 1 -2.76*** 4.893*** 0.003 
Indonesia - -  - - - 
Japan -0.008** -0.002*** 1 -2.246*** 2.892*** 0.006 
Kazakhstan - -  - - - 
Korea - -  - - - 
Malaysia - -  - - - 
Philippines -0.005** -0.003** 1 -0.343*** 5.301*** 0.002 
Thailand - -  - - - 
Latin       
Argentina -0.015*** 0 1 -0.785*** 6.207*** 0.015 
Brazil -0.006*** 0 1 -0.481*** 5.219*** 0.006 
Chile - -  - - - 
Colombia -0.009*** -0.002 1 -0.694*** 5.216*** 0.007 
Mexico -0.003 -0.003*** 1 -1.468*** 4.571*** 0 
Panama -0.006*** 0  -0.01*** 4.948*** 0.006 
Peru -0.008*** -0.003* 1 -0.491*** 5.18*** 0.005 
Venezuela - -  - - - 
Europe       
Austria - -  - - - 
Belgium - -  - - - 
Bulgaria - -  - - - 
Croatia 0.001 -0.002*** 1 -1.941*** 4.165*** -0.003 
France - -  - - - 
Greece - -  - - - 
Hungary 0.002* -0.003*** 1 -2.995*** 2.842*** -0.005 
Ireland -0.018*** -0.002*** 1 -4.246*** 2.881*** 0.016 
Italy - -  - - - 
Poland - -  - - - 
Portugal - -  - - - 
Romania - -  - - - 
Russia -0.001 -0.002*** 1 -0.663*** 4.904*** -0.001 
Slovak - -  - - - 
Spain - -  - - - 
Ukraine -0.041*** -0.008*** 1 -1.826*** 5.943*** 0.033 
Middle East & 
Africa   
 
  
 
Israel 
  
 
  
 
Lebanon -0.013*** -0.004  -0.034*** 5.96*** 0.011 
Qatar 
  
 
  
 
South Africa - -  - - - 
Turkey -0.007*** -0.007 1 -0.143*** 5.805*** 0 
This table shows the coefficient estimates of credit outlook and CDS markets co-movement over the 
long run and short run. The VECM model is defined as:  ?ଵ ? ? ?௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ  ?ଶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧൨ ൌ  ? ?ଵ ?ଶ ? ?ଶǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍ ? ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜ ?௣௜ୀଵ ൤  ? ? ? ?௧ି௜ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ି௜൨ ൅ ?ଶǡ௧ 
Where  ? ? ? ? is the log sovereign CDS spreads of a country at time t.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is the average of 
foreign currency sovereign credit outlooks of the country at time t of all three agencies.  ? ? ? ? ? and   ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? refer to the changes of  ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? at time t.   ? ?ǡ ?െ ?  ? ? the error correction 
term of one lag of  ? ?ǡ ?. All variables are non-stationary and stationary in I(1). Significant level 
denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.  
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
86 
 
4.5.3 Spillover 
The empirical results for cointegration and VECM analysis suggest that credit rating 
DQGRXWORRNKDYHVWURQJLPSDFWRQWKHVSUHDGVRIWKHLURZQFRXQWU\¶V&'6IRUPRVW
of the sample countries. Nevertheless, many other countries show no long-run 
relation nor join the error correction mechanism, which leads us to focus on the 
short-term interaction. One question that arises is whether sovereign CDS spreads 
react to rating changes in other countries. In this section, we extend the previous 
analysis and investigate potential spillover effects across countries. To test for the 
existence of spillover effects, we regress the sovereign CDS spread changes of a 
home country ( ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ? on the aggregate change in the rating/outlook of the other 
countries ( ? ?௜௧௡௛ and  ? ?௜௧௡௛)24. We control for past changes of explanatory variables 
(  ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ௛ ), using one lag25. The fixed effect panel regression is as follows:   
  ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ൌ  ?ଵ ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ௛ ൅  ?ଶ ? ?௜௧௡௛ ൅  ?ଷ ? ?௜௧௡௛ ൅  ?௜ǡ௧ (13) 
where   ? ?௜௧௡௛  and  ? ?௜௧௡௛  are the rating and outlooks changes by any agency 
regarding any other country in the sample. When any country (except for the home 
country) experiences a rating or outlook change, announced by any of the three 
rating agencies,  ? ?௜௧௡௛  or  ? ?௜௧௡௛  is set accordingly to be that change 26 . The 
subscripts i and t stand for the home country and time, respectively. The error term,  ?௜ǡ௧, is an independently distributed random variable with zero mean and variance  ?௜ǡ௧ଶ .  
                                                          
24
 The aggregate rating and outlook change,  ? ?௜௧௡௛ and  ? ?௜௧௡௛, of the other countries is constructed as 
the sum of rating and outlook shift in all other countries. 
25
 This lag specification follows previous literature, such as Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and 
Afonso et al. (2012). 
26
 This is consistent with Kaminsky and Schmuler (2002).  The reason for separating rating events 
from three credit rating agencies is that taking the average of the three agencies would underestimate 
the rating event effect.  
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
87 
 
Table 13 shows significant spillover effects from outlook announcement to sovereign 
CDS spreads. The lagged CDS spread changes are generally negative and 
statistically significant. An outlook upgrade of other countries by one notch on the 
scale decreases local CDS spread changes by 0.5, while the rating changes of other 
countries do not have much impact on local CDS spreads. The negative coefficients 
indicate that improvement in rating and outlook status narrows the CDS spreads. 
These results might be explained as investors responding to overall developments in 
the global financial environment, which is in line with Longstaff et al. (2011), who 
suggest CDS spread is more related to global factors. Moreover, CDS spreads are 
more sensitive to outlook changes than they are to rating changes, which is consistent 
with work suggesting that outlook announcements carry more information than 
rating events (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012, Christopher et al., 2012).   
4.5.3.1 Impact of initial credit quality 
It is argued that spillover effects might depend on the initial credit qualities of the 
home countries (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010): the higher its credit quality, the less 
it is affected by external influences. To test the interaction effect of the credit quality 
of the target countries, we add two variables to Eq (13), the rating quality ( ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ) 
and outlook quality ( ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ), as defined in Eq (1)(2). With such an adjustment, 
the fixed effect panel model becomes: 
  ? ? ? ?௜௧௧ ൌ  ?ଵ ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ௛ ൅  ?ଶ ? ?௜௧௡௛ ൅  ?ଷ ? ?௜௧௡௛ ൅  ?ସ ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௡௛ ൅  ?ହ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௡௛൅  ?଺ ? ?௜௧௡௛  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ൅  ?଻ ௜௧௡௛  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௛ ൅ ௜ǡ௧ (14) 
where the interaction terms ( ? ?௜௧௡௛  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௡௛) and ( ? ?௜௧௡௛  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௜௧௡௛) represent 
the interaction effect with its own credit status. From the results of the second 
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column of Table 13, it can be concluded that the rating level of local government 
does not have much effect on spillover to the CDS market. Nevertheless, outlook 
qualities of the local sovereigns are able to influence these spillover effects at the 10% 
level. The lagged CDS spreads and global outlook changes are still strong 
determinants for the CDS spreads of home countries. Credit rating quality is strongly 
related to changes in CDS spreads, consistent with the VECM analysis. The results 
for interaction terms reveal that the rating quality of the home country does not have 
a significant influence on the spillover effect. This finding rejects the suggestion that 
KLJKHU FUHGLW TXDOLW\ ZRXOG PDNHV D FRXQWU\¶V &'6 VSUHDGV LPPXQH WR JOREDO
influence, but is consistent with Afonso et al. (2012), who find no evidence of strong 
interaction between credit quality and rating events.  
4.5.3.2 Rating and outlook changes by region of origin 
Is the spillover effect is constrained within its own region or globally propagated? 
We next examine the existence of spillover at global level as well as regional level, 
examining for spillover effects of rating/outlook originating from different regions: 
Asia and Pacific, Latin America, Europe and Middle East & Africa in our sample. 
The rating/outlook changes are split into two groups according to their origin ± same 
region or other region. We divide the rating and outlook variables, in Eq (13), into 
the regional and non-regional groups: 
  ? ? ? ?௜௧ ൌ  ?ଵ ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ ൅  ?ଵ ? ?௜௧௥ ൅  ?ଶ ? ?௜௧௡௥ ൅  ?ଷ ? ?௜௧௥ ൅  ?ସ ? ?௜௧௡௥ ൅  ?௜ǡ௧ (15) 
where  ? ?௜௧௥ ,  ? ?௜௧௡௥,  ? ?௜௧௥   and  ? ?௜௧௡௥ are rating/outlook changes at time t by the 
three rating agencies. r represents credit change for a country belonging to the same 
geographic region as country i, while nr stands for credit events for countries in other 
regions.   
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Column 3 of Table 13 summarizes the estimations of rating and outlook spillover 
effects from four regions. Spillover effects are much stronger for credit 
rating/outlook changes within the same region than those from other regions. The 
lagged CDS spreads changes are strong determinants of present CDS spreads. A 
rating changes of one bp within-region leads to a decrease in log CDS spreads of 
0.0023 bp. The out-of-region rating changes are shown to have no explanatory power 
on shifts in CDS spreads. Nevertheless, within-region outlook changes are proven to 
be strong drivers of CDS spread changes. A one bp upgrade in within-region outlook 
is able to trigger a CDS spread decrease of 0.0028 bp, while out-of-region outlook 
changes also have a significant impact on spread changes, -0.0018 bp. In general, the 
sovereign CDS spread changes are affected by within-region rating and outlook 
changes rather than out-of-region influences, and these findings are in line with 
studies on contagion (Corsetti et al., 2000, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, 2003).      
4.5.3.3 Spillover from the US market 
The US market is believed to be a strong driving force in the international market. 
Christopher et al. (2012) UHSRUW WKDW WKH &KLFDJR %RDUG RI 2SWLRQ ([FKDQJHµV
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options (VIX) is useful in explaining the 
intra-country/region stock and bond market co-movement. Longstaff et al. (2011) 
suggest that sovereign CDS spreads are more related to the US market rather than to 
local factors. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) examine the relation between sovereign 
CDS spread changes with trading and debt flow with the US. Pan and Singleton 
(2008a) find credit risk in developing markets is affected by US economic growth. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) find that the interest rate in the US is highly related to 
country risk and stock return in emerging markets.  
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In this section, we investigate the spillover effect from the US market by regressing 
Eq (15RQ WZRH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVIURPWKH86 WKH&%2(¶V9,;DQG WKH\LHOG
VSUHDGEHWZHHQWKH0RRG\¶V-year US Baa corporate bond and 6-month US T-bill.  
 
 ? ? ? ?௜௧ ൌ  ?ଵ ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ ൅  ?ଵ ? ?௜௧௥ ൅  ?ଶ ? ?௜௧௡௥ ൅  ?ଷ ? ?௜௧௥ ൅ ?ସ ? ?௜௧௡௥ ൅  ?ଵ ? ? ? ?௧൅  ? ? ? 㜇? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൅ ? ?ǡ ? (16) 
where the rating and outlook variables are rating/outlook changes at time t by the 
three rating agencies. Similar to Pan and Singleton (2008), VIX is the implied 
volatility of S&P 500 index options as a proxy for financial and economic 
XQFHUWDLQW\ LQ WKH 86 DQG FDSWXUHV LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ ULVN DYHUVLRQ 7KH 86
yield spread reflects US financial market development.  
Table 13 column 4 shows the estimation results for Eq (16). The VIX is highly 
significant for all the countries in our sample, at the 1% level, with the coefficient at 
0.0057. It is positively related to the sovereign CDS spreads; increase in the volatility 
of the S&P 500 leads to wider sovereign CDS spreads. The US yield spreads also 
have a substantial influence on the spreads of other nations. The spillover effect of 
rating and outlook changes from within-region countries remains significant, even 
after adjusting for the influence from the US. However, the weak impact from 
changes in rating and outlook of countries outside the region suggests that they 
contain no important information for determining local CDS spreads. 
4.5.3.4 Before and after crises 
It has been argued that financial markets tend to react excessively to sovereign 
rating/outlook changes during periods of crisis (Fender et al., 2012).  We therefore 
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explore the spillover effect of credit events to sovereign CDS markets in different 
business cycles.  
1%(5¶V %XVLQHVV &\FOH 'DWLQJ &RPPLWWHH DQQRXQFHV WKH 86 EXVLQHVV F\FOH RI
recession starts from December 2007 to June 2009. The subprime mortgage crisis 
became a global financial crisis after affecting almost all markets around the world. 
According to the Business Cycle Dating Committee for the euro area of the Center 
for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), there have been two cyclical periods 
since 2004. The recession periods are 2008Q1 - 2009Q2 (part of the financial crisis) 
and 2011Q3 ± 2012Q4 (the Eurozone debt crisis). Eight out of 17 Eurozone member 
countries have been in recession during this sovereign debt crisis, since the third 
quarter of 2011, led by Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia.  
In order to examine the impact of rating and outlook during crisis times and tranquil 
times, we split the sample into two sub-samples: pre-crisis and crisis period; thus, we 
have the crisis period December 2007 - June 2009 and August 2011 ± June 2012, and 
the pre-crisis period November 2004 ± December 2007 and June 2009 ± August 2011. 
Using panel regression with country-fixed effects, we re-estimate Eq (16) during 
pre-crisis period and crisis periods, separately.  
The last two columns of Table 13 report estimation results for the two sub-samples. 
We find that, consistent with previous findings, past changes in sovereign CDS 
spreads could be used to estimate present changes in both pre-crisis and crisis period. 
The results reveal that CDS spreads are insensitive to changes in rating/outlook shifts 
within the same region, in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, during crisis, CDS 
spreads respond only to regional outlook changes, at -0.0066 bp, rather than reacting 
to regional rating changes or rating/outlook changes outside their own region. One bp 
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
92 
 
within-region outlook upgrade narrows the CDS spreads by 0.0066 bp during turmoil. 
On the other hand, rating and outlook changes from other regions show no 
significant impact on sovereign CDS spreads, in pre-crisis or crisis periods.  
In terms of the US influence, our results suggest a strong positive spillover from the 
US market into CDS markets during both tranquil and turmoil periods. Increases in 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, VIX, levers the CDS spreads by 0.0071 bp 
(pre-FULVLV DQG  ES FULVLV VKRZLQJ WKDW PDUNHW µIHDU¶ FRXOG LQIHFW RWKHU
countries. Moreover, higher US yield spreads decrease CDS spreads by 0.0411 bp 
during crisis periods. In general, the international spillover effect is much stronger 
during a crisis period, while sovereign CDS spreads are affected by regional outlook 
changes and the US market. 
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Table 13 Spillover effect 
  Spillover Interaction Regional spillover US spillover Pre-crisis Crisis 
CDS changes 1st lag -0.2001*** -0.2002*** -0.2001*** -0.1989*** -0.1876*** -0.234*** 
[-55.8379] [-55.8525] [-55.8371] [-55.9421] [-43.7548] [-36.8858] 
Non-target Rating changes -0.0008 -0.0025 
    [-1.504] [-1.4414] 
    
Non-target Outlook changes -0.0024*** -0.0026*** 
   [-3.2118] [-3.3218] 
    
Target Rating  
 
0.0002 
    
 
[0.7766] 
    
Target Outlook  
 
0.0015* 
    
 
[1.8938] 
    
Interaction rating 
 
0.0001 
    
 
[1.0265] 
    
Interaction outlook 
 
0.0005 
    
 
[0.8763] 
    
Rating regional 
  
-0.0023** -0.0019** -0.0017 -0.001 
  
[-2.5267] [-2.0729] [-1.4686] [-0.6742] 
Outlook regional 
  
-0.0038*** -0.0035** -0.0014 -0.0066*** 
  
[-2.6007] [-2.4642] [-0.7156] [-3.0059] 
Rating non-regional 
  
0 0.0003 0.0012 0.0002 
  
[0.0029] [0.4942] [1.468] [0.1426] 
Outlook non-regional 
  
-0.0018** -0.0012 0 -0.002 
  
[-2.0153] [-1.3847] [-0.038] [-1.4377] 
VIX 
   
0.0057*** 0.0071*** 0.005*** 
   
[35.1124] [23.4702] [28.2857] 
US yield Spread 
  
   
0.0096*** -0.004 0.0411*** 
      [2.7018] [-0.8921] [7.3043] 
This table reports fixed effect panel estimates of spillover with rating/outlook status interaction, 
regional effect, US spillover effect and crisis effect, individually. We add variables of credit quality of 
target countries and non-target countries and the interaction with rating changes in other countries to 
examine the credit quality effect on spillover effect. Regional and non-regional variables are 
constructed to capture the influence of region effect for rating and outlook respectively. The US 
spillover variables, VIX and US yield spreads are added to estimate the spillover from US markets. 
Moreover, the sample is separated into two sub-samples to analysis the reaction of CDS spreads to 
rating and outlook events in different business cycles. Significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, 
**=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.   
Changes of rating and outlooks take the values of changes of any agency from any non-target country 
in the sample. When there exists a rating or outlook change announced by any of the three rating 
agencies for any of the non-target countries,  ? or  ? is set to be that change accordingly. The 
subscripts i and t stand for country and time, respectively. The error term, ɂǡ, is independently 
distributed random variable with zero mean and variance ɐǡ ? .  
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4.5.3.5 Tests of robustness  
In the panel regression, we rejected the possibility of reverse causality, as in the 
previous lead-lag relation analysis. Another form of endogeneity applied to the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable  ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ௛  and the error term, 
which introduces biased estimators. To correct for this, we use the IV method or 
2SLS panel regression with fixed country effects, suggested by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982). Further lags of the dependent variable,  ? ? ? ?௜௧ିଵ௛ , is used as instrument. 
In the previous sections, the model is estimated by OLS. Considering that the time 
dimension of the panel has 1,974 observations, OLS estimates are unlikely to be 
biased. Nevertheless, the Anderson-Hsiao instrumental variables method can produce 
less biased estimates. These results could be used in the thesis as a check on the 
robustness of the OLS estimates. 
The generalized method of moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), is generally used to estimate the dynamic panel regression. But the GMM 
dynamic panel model is designed for large numbers of cross-section units (large N) 
and few periods (T). Large T, small N means that the large number of instruments 
used could generate the over-identification problem, as the number of instruments 
produced will be quadratic in T.  
As the table below shows, there is no significant different from the previous results, 
which indicates that the earlier conclusion is robust across regression methods. The 
only difference is that the spillover impact of credit rating is even weaker in this 
estimation. This highlights the persistent influence of credit outlook on international 
spillover. In addition, the rating quality of home country does have an impact on the 
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spillover. Nevertheless, the major results are consistent with the previous analysis. 
Regional outlook and US factors are the most significant influences on international 
spillover, while the credit ratings of the home countries does not have much 
influence on such spillover. Compared with tranquil periods, sovereign CDS spreads 
become more sensitive to external factors ± regional outlook changes and the US 
market ± in crisis periods.  
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Table 14 Robustness test for spillover effects 
  
Spillover Interactio
n 
Regional 
spillover 
US 
spillover 
Pre-crisi
s 
Crisis 
CDS changes 1st lag 
0.194*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.205*** 0.374**
* 
-0.018 
(10.32) (10.29) (10.31) (11.03) (12.48) (-0.91) 
Non-target Rating changes 
0.001 -0.004* 
    
(1.31) (-1.76) 
    
Non-target Outlook 
changes 
-0.004**
* 
-0.004***  
   
(-3.20) (-3.20) 
    
Target Rating   
0.001* 
    
 
(1.68) 
    
Target Outlook   
0.001 
    
 
(0.52) 
    
Interaction rating  
0.000** 
    
 
(2.28) 
    
Interaction outlook  
0.001 
    
 
(0.67) 
    
Rating regional   
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
  
(0.35) (0.34) (1.15) (0.50) 
Outlook regional   
-0.006*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.009**
* 
  
(-2.74) (-2.26) (-0.39) (-2.59) 
Rating non-regional   
0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
  
(1.44) (1.41) (1.84) (0.45) 
Outlook non-regional   
-0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(-1.94) (-1.52) (-0.98) (-1.00) 
VIX    
0.007*** 0.007**
* 
0.006*** 
   
(26.25) (14.93) (20.96) 
US yield Spread 
  
   
0.015** -0.005 0.042*** 
   
(2.24) (-0.46) (4.88) 
This table reports fixed effect panel estimates of spillover with rating/outlook status interaction, 
regional effect, US spillover effect and crisis effect, individually. We add variables of credit rating of 
target countries and non-target countries and the interaction with rating changes in other countries to 
examine the credit rating effect on spillover effect. Regional and non-regional variables are 
constructed to capture the influence of region effect for rating and outlook respectively. The US 
spillover variables, VIX and US yield spreads are added to estimate the spillover from the US market. 
Moreover, the sample is separated into two sub-samples to analyse the reaction of CDS spreads to 
rating and outlook events in different business cycles. Significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, 
**=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.   
Changes in rating and outlooks take the values of changes of any agency from any non-target country 
in the sample. When there exists a rating or outlook change announced by any of the three rating 
agencies for any of the non-target countries,  ? or  ? is set to be that change accordingly. The 
subscripts i and t stand for country and time, respectively. The error term, ɂǡ, is independently 
distributed random variable with zero mean and variance ɐǡ ? .  
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4.6 Spillover and contagion in the Eurozone debt crisis 
We begin by illustrating broad reactions of CDS spread to bailout, at the time around 
the announcement date. As we have shown in the previous analysis, changes in credit 
rating and outlook in the home country, regional creditworthiness, along with 
spillover from the US, significantly affect sovereign CDS spread. We control for the 
spillover impact from credit rating and impact of the US market, and report 
econometric results from Granger causality, VAR/VECM and GIRF, for each 
bailout.  
Our analysis is conducted by examining the effect of each rescue package, separately. 
For each rescue event, we consider the pre- and post-rescue sub-periods. Granger 
causalityˈcointegration tests, VECM/VAR and impulse response analysis are 
reported for both sub-periods Impulse response functions are obtained from VECM 
estimation for cointegrated series and from VAR when there is no long-run relation.  
We perform the following Granger causality test for CDS spreads in both level and 
first difference in Eq (17)(18).  
  ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ൅ ෍  ?௜ǡ௠ ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ି௠௣௠ୀଵ ൅ ෍  ?௝ ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ି௠௣௠ୀଵ  (17) 
  ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ൅෍ ? ? ?௝ǡ௡ ?௧ି௡௣௡ୀଵ ൅෍ ?௝ ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ି௡௣௡ୀଵ  (18) 
The lag length, p, is chosen by AIC for up to lag 12. The null hypothesis is that CDS 
spreads/changes of country i do not Granger-cause CDS spreads /changes in 
countries j. 
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With the results of the section 3.5, we are able to control the ratings and other 
H[WHUQDOLQIOXHQFHVDIIHFWLQJVRYHUHLJQ&'6VSUHDGV7KH-RKDQVHQ¶V0/SUocedure 
VECM and VAR, with p-lags27, is specified as below: 
  ?ଵ ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ െ ?ଵ െ  ?ଶ ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ െ  ?ଵǡ௧ 
(19) 
 ൤ ? ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ ? ? ? ?௝ǡ௧൨ ൌ  ? ?ଵ ?ଶ ? ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍ ? ?ଵǡ௜  ?ଶǡ௜ ?ଷǡ௜  ?ସǡ௜ ?௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൤ ? ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ି௜ ? ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ି௜൨
൅  ? ?ଵଵ  ?ଵଶ  ?ଵଷ  ?ଵସ  ?ଵହ  ?ଵ଺ ?ଵଵ  ?ଵଶ  ?ଵଷ  ?ଵସ  ?ଵହ  ?ଵ଺ ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  㜇? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ ? ? ?
 ? ? ?
൅  ?ଵǡ௧ 
(20) 
where  ? ? ?௝ǡ௧ is the logarithmized CDS spreads of the rescued country at time t.  ? ? ?௜ǡ௧ is the log-CDS spreads of the other country at time t.  ? ? ? ?௧ represent the 
changes of  ? ? ?௧.   ?௜௧௛  and  ? ?௜௧௛  are rating and outlook changes in the bailed-out 
countries,  ? ?௜௧௥  and  ? ?௜௧௥  are changes in rating and outlook for Eurozone region 
countries. As in the previous empirical test, VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 
index options as a proxy for financial and economic uncertainty in the US market 
and captures international invHVWRUV¶ULVNDYHUVLRQ7KH86\LHOGVSUHDGUHIOHFWV86
financial market development.  ?ଵǡ௧ are non-autoregressive i.i.d. residuals, with zero 
mean and constant variance. 
4.6.1 The reaction of CDS spreads to rescue packages  
                                                          
27
 p lags represent the optimal lags for the underlying VAR model; there are p-1 lags in the 
corresponding VECM model. 
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The reactions of CDS spreads are compared before and after each rescue plan, as 
average daily changes of log-CDS spread. Table 15 and Figure 3 show the average 
daily changes in CDS spreads for the bailed-out country and core European countries 
around each bailout.  
7KH &'6 VSUHDGV RI DOO REVHUYHG FRXQWULHV GURS VLJQLILFDQWO\ DIWHU *UHHFH¶V ILUVW
bailout. The average change in CDS spread for Greece in the 7 days after the event is 
-0.093 bp, while the spread stands at 0.038 bp in the month before the rescue. 
Germany saw its daily changes in CDS spread tightens from -0.0081 bp (7 days 
before) to - ES  GD\V DIWHU 7KH ³UHVFXH´ HIIHFW EHFRPHV ZHDNHU RYHU D
longer period, e.g. from -0.0939 bp to 0.0005 bp for Greece 30 days after the event. 
It could be said that the bailout plan was effective in saving Greece from default, by 
lowering its CDS spread significantly, while the spreads of core countries benefit 
from it as well. The 7-day spread change is slightly higher than before the bailout 
(-0.0249 bp vs -0.0282 bp).  
6LPLODUO\IRU,UHODQG¶VEDLORXWWKHXSZDUGWUHQGLQ&'6VSUHDGLVUHYHUVHGDIWHU  LWV
implementation. Furthermore, the bailout effect becomes weaker for the bailed 
country only in the longer term, while the credit risk of other countries continues to 
fall.  
$V IRU 3RUWXJDO¶V EDLORXW DQG *UHHFH¶V VHFRQG EDLORXW DFFRUGLQJ WR Figure 3 the 
spreads of these two bailed-out countries is not tightened by the bailout plan. On the 
contrary, it becomes even wider after the rescue plan is announced. The change in 
7-day CDS spreads for Portugal surges from -0.0109 bp to 0.0222 bp after its bailout. 
7KHPDUNHWVKRZVWKHVDPHUHDFWLRQWR*UHHFH¶VVHFRQGEDLORXW (-0.0175 bp 7 days 
before to 0.0049 bp 7 days after). The CDS spreads of other European countries also 
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widened after these two bailouts, when daily changes in spreads turn from negative to 
positive. This may indicate that these rescue plans did not achieve the aim of 
narrowing CDS spreads in a troubled country but nonetheless worsened the credit risk 
of all EU members.  
6SDLQ¶VEDLORXWDVWKHODVWUHVFXHSODQSURYHVWREHHIIHFWLYHLQORZHULQJWKHVSUHDGV
IRUERWK6SDLQLWVHOIDVZHOODV³&RUH´FRXQWULHV.  
Table 15 Average daily changes in CDS spreads around event dates 
Date Event Countries 30D before 7D before 7D after 30D after 
02/05/2010 Greece first bailout 
Greece 0.0380 0.0261 -0.0939 0.0005 
Germany 0.0060 -0.0081 -0.0326 -0.0031 
France 0.0105 -0.0282 -0.0249 0.0120 
Ireland 0.0140 0.0241 -0.0664 0.0031 
UK -0.0036 0.0045 -0.0174 0.0071 
28/11/2010 Ireland bailout 
Ireland 0.0153 0.0326 -0.0217 -0.0022 
Germany 0.0267 0.0936 0.0089 0.0020 
France 0.0182 0.0517 0.0181 -0.0010 
Portugal 0.0233 0.0405 -0.0021 -0.0056 
UK 0.0150 0.0380 0.0025 -0.0015 
16/05/2011 Portugal bailout 
Portugal 0.0028 -0.0109 0.0222 0.0127 
Germany -0.0073 -0.0246 0.0095 0.0063 
France 0.0000 -0.0244 0.0099 0.0081 
Spain 0.0019 -0.0236 0.0153 0.0118 
UK -0.0003 -0.0236 0.0153 0.0076 
21/07/2011 Greece second bailout 
Greece 0.0024 -0.0175 0.0049 0.0098 
Germany 0.0146 -0.0018 0.0162 0.0227 
France 0.0115 -0.0091 0.0303 0.0248 
UK 0.0027 -0.0201 0.0129 0.0124 
09/06/2012 Spain bailout 
Spain 0.0081 -0.0007 -0.0050 -0.0022 
Germany 0.0100 0.0085 -0.0252 -0.0183 
France 0.0023 0.0158 -0.0213 -0.0090 
Austria 0.0043 -0.0127 -0.0202 -0.0141 
UK 0.0026 -0.0044 -0.0115 -0.0019 
This table presents the average daily changes in CDS spreads around event dates for the following 
time windows: 30 days before, 7 days before, 7 days after, 30 days after. The countries are selected for 
their different characteristics and importance to the regional economy.  
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Figure 3 Average daily changes in CDS spreads around bailout dates 
   
   
 
The figure presents the average daily changes in CDS spreads around bailout dates for the following 
time windows: 30 days before, 7 days before, 7 days after, 30 days after. The countries are selected for 
their different characteristics and importance to the regional economy, while some are directly 
affected by the policy intervention. 
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4.6.2 Bailout analysis 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHSUHVHQWWKHUHVXOWVIRU*UHHFH¶VILUVWDQGVHFRQGEDLORXWV,UHODQG¶V
EDLORXW3RUWXJDO¶VEDLORXWDQG6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW7KHVHEDLORXWVKDYHXQLTXHIHDWXUHVLQ
the Eurozone debt crisis. Greece was the first and worst affected nation, while the 
bailout for Spain, as the healthiest nation of the PIIGS, was caused by the Spanish 
government having to rescue its national banks in financial crisis, and was affected by 
the anxiety over Greece debt. We try here to identify any changes in the 
interdependence of sovereign credit risk before and after interventions during the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  
4*UHHFH¶VEDLORXWV 
Greece had two bailout plans, from 2 May 2010 and 21 July 2011. In this study, we 
focus on the interactions between Greece and 9 other countries in the Eurozone, within 
three time periods: before the first bailout, between bailouts, and after the second 
bailout. The Granger causality test result is shown first in Table 16, while the 
cointegration test is presented in Table 43. VECM and generalized impulse response 
function results are depicted in Table 17 and Figure 4.  
4.6.2.1.1 Granger causality and cointegration  
In Table 16, before the first bailout, Granger causality test results suggests that GR 
Granger-cause almost all other countries, except for the UK, while AU, BG, FR, DE, 
IR, IT and SP could Granger cause GR. It is consistent with our assumption that GR 
information is crucial in determining other countries, before bailout.  
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Before the first bailout, cointegration test results suggest there is a long-term 
relationship between GR and all the other countries, except FR and UK. The long-term 
cointegration relation, e.g. with Germany, may be written as: 
 ? ? ?஽ாǡ௧ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ீோǡ௧ ൅  ?ଵǡ௧ 
That is, a 1 bp change in the spreads for Greece leads to an adjustment in CDS 
VSUHDGVIRU*HUPDQ\RIESRYHUWKHORQJUXQ7KHVLJQLILFDQWȕVKRZVDVWURQJ
long-run equilibrium relationship between Greece and other countries, while the 
QHJDWLYHVLJQRIȕFRQILUPVWKDWDVWKHFUHGLWULVNRI*5LVORZHUHGWKH&'6VSUHDGV
of other cointegrated countries become narrower in the long run. A positive sign for 
ȕZRXOGVXJJHVWVRYHUHLJQ&'6VSUHDGVPRYH in the opposite direction. The spreads 
of BG, DE, IR, IT, PT and SP are negatively related to GR, over the range -0.341 bp 
to -1.005 bp. The result suggests that GR is in a long-term relationship with all PIIGS 
nations, but not with most core nations.  
BeIRUHLQWHUYHQWLRQWKHĮFRHIILFLHQWVVXJJHVWWKDW*5DGMXVWVDWDUDWHRI-0.037 bp 
in the relation GR-AT, and GR is also involved in the error correction mechanism 
within BG, DE and IT. In contrast, all the other countries, except for AT, adjust at a 
rate of -0.052 bp, -0.037, -0.014, -0.057, -0.084 and -0.081 bp respectively, in their 
relation with GR. Comparing the adjustment speed of the bailed-out and other 
countries, we find that ȁ ?ீோȁ ൐ ȁ ?஼௢௥௘ȁ, suggesting that GR is faster in adjustment 
VSHHGEHIRUHWKHILUVWEDLORXWLQWKHFDVHRI$7DQG'()URPĮFRHIILFLHQWVRI*5
and other countries under stress, we have ȁ ?ீோȁ ൏ ȁ ?௢௧௛௘௥௉ூூீௌȁ , showing a 
significant sensitivity to the spread for Greece among the other PIIGS before the 
bailout.  
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After the first bailout plan was activated, Greece could only Granger-cause AT and PT. 
Nevertheless, spread changes in all core countries are able to Granger-cause Greek 
spread. This suggests that the influence from Greece was weakened after first bailout, 
while the influence of the core countries was enhanced.  
Moreover, the long-term relation with GR alters after the bailout, as DE, IR and PT 
are no longer cointegrated with GR. Nevertheless, FR and UK begin to be in stable 
long-term relationVKLSVZLWK*5VSUHDG7KHĮFRHIILFLHQWVVKRZWKDWDOOFRLQWHJUDWHG
countries adjust to the long-term equilibrium after the bailout, with the exception of 
AT. Moreover, Greece actively adjusts in its relations with all the other EU members. 
Comparing the magnitude of the adjustment speed coefficients, ȁ ?ீோȁ is close to or 
greater than the ȁ ?௖௢௥௘ȁ, indicating a high sensitivity of GR spreads to the those of 
the core nations. For GR and the other PIIGS, the same relation is found, as ȁ ?ீோȁ ൏ ȁ ?௢௧௛௘௥௉ூூீௌȁ. 
Comparing the interactions between GR and each country for the pre- and 
post-periods, Greece adjusted faster in its relation with AT, but slower with BG, 
while other core countries do not have a constant cointegration relation with GR.  
After the second bailout plan was implemented, only IR and PT are Granger-caused by 
GR spread. But most core nations, BG, FR and DE, are able to Granger-cause GR. 
This is further support for Greece being the information receiver, rather than the 
source, after bailout.  
In terms of long-term relations, the results show that GR is cointegrated with AT, FR, 
'(8.37DQG63)URPWKHĮFRHIILFLHQWUHVXOWVLWLVIRXQGWKDWDOOWKHFRXQWULHV
that cointegrated with Greece try to eliminate deviation from their long-term 
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relationship, at the 5% level, except for Germany. Nevertheless, Greece only reacts 
to deviation from its relationship with Austria at the 5% level.  
&RPSDULQJWKHPDJQLWXGHRIĮFRHIILFLHQWVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHVHFRQG*UHHNEDLORXWȁ ?௢௧௛௘௥ȁ is larger LQWKHSHULRGDIWHUWKDWEDLORXWIRUDOOWKHVLJQLILFDQWĮ7KLVUHVXOW
indicates that AT, FR, UK, PT and SP adjusted faster after bailout. The less 
significant  ?ீோ  shows that Greece did not react as quickly as before.  
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Table 16 *UDQJHUFDXVDOLW\IRU*UHHFH¶VILUVWDQGVHFRQGEDLORXWV 
Variables Period PIIGS not GC others others not GC PIIGS 
test Pr() test Pr() 
Panel A Greece first bailout 
  
GR - AT before 3.159 0.025 4.819 0.003 
after 8.365 0.000 7.062 0.001 
GR - BG before 4.329 0.014 2.899 0.057 
after 0.248 0.780 2.345 0.098 
GR - FR before 7.025 0.001 5.031 0.007 
after 1.804 0.166 5.649 0.004 
GR - DE before 11.871 0.000 5.337 0.005 
after 0.622 0.431 4.838 0.029 
GR - UK before 1.704 0.184 2.08 0.127 
after 1.265 0.284 3.863 0.022 
GR - IR before 5.279 0.006 3.331 0.037 
after 1.487 0.228 0.439 0.645 
GR - IT before 5.019 0.007 2.435 0.09 
after 0.723 0.486 7.327 0.001 
GR - PT before 3.292 0.039 0.731 0.482 
after 2.588 0.077 0.947 0.389 
GR -SP before 6.841 0.001 2.533 0.081 
after 0.699 0.498 9.328 0 
 
   
Panel B Greece second bailout  
  
GR - AT before 
    
after 1.494 0.228 1.726 0.182 
GR - BG before 
    
after 0.943 0.392 2.813 0.063 
GR - FR before 
    
after 1.639 0.198 2.514 0.084 
GR - DE before 
    
after 1.050 0.373 3.444 0.018 
GR - UK before 
    
after 0.613 0.543 1.939 0.148 
GR - IR before 
    
after 2.541 0.082 2.802 0.064 
GR - IT before 
    
after 1.001 0.370 1.846 0.162 
GR - PT before 
    
after 3.853 0.005 0.519 0.722 
GR - SP before 
    
after 0.431 0.650 2.304 0.103 
The Granger causality test provides direction of information flows, when the lag is chosen by BIC. Its 
F-test results are summarized. The test equation is  ? ?ൌ  ? ൅ ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? ൅  ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? , the null 
hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y,  ? ?ൌ  ? for all j. If the statistic exceeds the 10% critical 
value (indicated by bold type), the null hypothesis of absence of Granger causality is rejected.  
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Table 17 VECM for Greece first and second bailout 
Variables Period Įothers ĮPIIGS Į11 Į12 Į13 Į14 Į15 Į16 Į21 Į22 Į23 Į24 Į25 Į26 ȕothers ȕPIIG 
Panel B Greece second                
GR - AT 
before -0.019 -0.037*** 0.01 -0.013 0.007 -0.001 -0.024 0 -0.038*** 0.045 0.015 -0.041** -0.034 0.005* 1 0.03 
[-1.591] [-3.149] [0.66] [-0.311] [0.378] [-0.03] [-0.454] [-0.178] [-2.634] [1.159] [0.827] [-1.985] [-0.663] [1.936] [0.18] 
after -0.011 -0.041*** 0 -0.001 0.003 0 -0.123*** 0.003* -0.004 0.013 0.002 0.01 -0.072 0.01*** 1 0.383** 
[-0.982] [-3.457] [-0.032] [-0.046] [0.572] [0.023] [-2.799] [1.894] [-0.741] [0.544] [0.426] [0.787] [-1.601] [7.275] [2.33] 
GR - BG 
before -0.052*** -0.041** -0.024* 0.038 0.008 -0.009 -0.066 0.005** -0.04*** 0.051 0.007 -0.046** -0.038 0.004* 1 -0.368*** 
[-2.967] [-2.129] [-1.848] [1.066] [0.446] [-0.471] [-1.399] [2.099] [-2.741] [1.307] [0.352] [-2.214] [-0.718] [1.674] [-3.46] 
after -0.028** -0.021** -0.004 0.072** 0.005 0.016 -0.157*** 0.006*** -0.004 0.009 0.001 0.008 -0.07 0.01*** 1 -0.161 
[-2.366] [-2.109] [-0.746] [2.544] [0.979] [1.12] [-2.971] [3.767] [-0.796] [0.364] [0.146] [0.648] [-1.543] [7.349] [-0.69] 
GR - FR 
before 
                
                after -0.029** -0.041*** 0.001 0.029 0.003 0.026** -0.141*** 0.006*** -0.003 0.016 0 0.009 -0.071 0.01*** 1 0.041 
[-2.161] [-3.168] [0.233] [1.139] [0.699] [1.99] [-2.976] [4.355] [-0.609] [0.646] [0.097] [0.714] [-1.568] [7.32] [0.27] 
GR - DE 
before -0.037** -0.053*** -0.012 0.06* -0.01 -0.007 0.058 0.005** -0.041*** 0.057 0.007 -0.046** -0.041 0.004* 1 -0.341*** 
[-2.351] [-3.099] [-0.931] [1.732] [-0.609] [-0.36] [1.251] [2.117] [-2.835] [1.488] [0.38] [-2.209] [-0.803] [1.726] [-3.09] 
after 
                
                
GR - UK 
before 
                
                after -0.028** -0.047*** 0.003 0.031 0.001 0.01 -0.071* 0.008*** -0.004 0.014 0.002 0.012 -0.071 0.01*** 1 0.109 
[-2.229] [-3.114] [0.6] [1.525] [0.381] [1.009] [-1.878] [6.54] [-0.765] [0.587] [0.425] [1.008] [-1.57] [7.412] [0.73] 
GR - IR 
before -0.014** -0.001 -0.029*** 0.015 -0.014 -0.023 -0.005 0.005** -0.041*** 0.049 0.006 -0.046** -0.027 0.005* 1 -0.763 
[-2.585] [-0.196] [-2.619] [0.521] [-0.953] [-1.486] [-0.137] [2.376] [-2.797] [1.244] [0.307] [-2.164] [-0.51] [1.877] [-0.96] 
after 
                
                
GR - IT 
before -0.084*** -0.054** -0.01 0.042 0 -0.019 -0.037 0.007*** -0.042*** 0.053 0.007 -0.047** -0.04 0.004* 1 -0.37*** 
[-3.399] [-2.048] [-0.699] [1.158] [0.009] [-0.948] [-0.755] [2.855] [-2.897] [1.376] [0.361] [-2.226] [-0.764] [1.75] [-5.24] 
after -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.004 0.06* 0.001 0.028* -0.223*** 0.01*** -0.004 0.013 0.002 0.012 -0.067 0.01*** 1 -0.042 
[-2.705] [-3.386] [-0.542] [1.815] [0.155] [1.695] [-3.649] [5.061] [-0.785] [0.548] [0.345] [0.986] [-1.488] [7.326] [-0.23] 
GR - PT 
before -0.055** -0.003 -0.011 0.02 -0.005 -0.021 -0.048 0.005** -0.04*** 0.046 0.008 -0.046** -0.022 0.005* 1 -1.005*** 
[-2.375] [-0.11] [-0.753] [0.541] [-0.261] [-1.065] [-0.973] [2.15] [-2.747] [1.169] [0.401] [-2.176] [-0.428] [1.827] [-11.48] 
after 
                
                
GR -SP 
before -0.081*** -0.046 0.004 0.038 -0.009 -0.05** -0.026 0.005** -0.04*** 0.05 0.006 -0.047** -0.031 0.004* 1 -0.448*** 
[-3.025] [-1.644] [0.279] [1.009] [-0.476] [-2.446] [-0.525] [2.175] [-2.773] [1.282] [0.306] [-2.244] [-0.606] [1.688] [-6] 
after -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.005 0.035 0.003 0.022 -0.214*** 0.008*** -0.004 0.011 0.001 0.008 -0.067 0.01*** 1 -0.195 
[-2.855] [-2.825] [-0.819] [1.121] [0.569] [1.383] [-3.713] [4.455] [-0.897] [0.446] [0.206] [0.687] [-1.497] [7.217] [-1.24] 
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Panel B Greece second                
GR - AT after 
2nd 
-0.17*** 0.117** -0.01 0.152 -0.016 0.017 0.142 0.008*** -0.054** -0.048 0.014 -0.029 -0.164 0.003 1 -0.186*** 
[-3.371] [2.481] [-0.447] [0.835] [-1.129] [0.585] [1.269] [2.904] [-2.484] [-0.279] [1.057] [-1.076] [-1.563] [1.02] - [-3.81] 
GR - BG after 
2nd 
                
                
GR - FR after 
2nd 
-0.057** 0.053 -0.024 0.145 -0.009 0.008 -0.141* 0.007*** -0.042* -0.067 0.009 -0.02 -0.12 0.002 1 0.109 
[-2.06] [1.404] [-1.476] [1.136] [-0.904] [0.402] [-1.781] [3.677] [-1.925] [-0.389] [0.647] [-0.695] [-1.124] [0.916] - [1.03] 
GR - DE after 
2nd 
-0.018 -0.038* -0.008 0.093 -0.006 0.019 -0.134 0.004* -0.09*** -0.122 0.01 -0.033 -0.103 0.002 1 0.124* 
[-1] [-1.695] [-0.336] [0.704] [-0.647] [0.912] [-1.623] [1.838] [-3.02] [-0.728] [0.836] [-1.227] [-0.98] [0.633] - [1.69] 
GR - UK after 
2nd 
-0.137*** 0.049 -0.007 0.048 -0.007 0.009 -0.025 0.003* -0.042* -0.06 0.01 -0.027 -0.132 0.002 1 -0.038 
[-2.726] [0.553] [-0.604] [0.494] [-0.922] [0.552] [-0.405] [1.819] [-1.911] [-0.346] [0.787] [-0.954] [-1.224] [0.792] - [-1.28] 
GR - IR after 
2nd 
                
                
GR - IT after 
2nd 
                
                
GR - PT after 
2nd 
-0.137*** -0.001 0.018 0.051 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.101*** -0.097 0.013 -0.03 -0.144 0.003 1 -0.098*** 
[-3.468] [-0.017] [1.205] [0.622] [-1.164] [0.131] [-0.023] [0.9] [-3.229] [-0.554] [0.958] [-1.076] [-1.324] [0.984] - [-2.63] 
GR - SP after 
2nd 
-0.132*** 0.116* -0.019 0.136 -0.007 0.007 -0.155** 0.002 -0.045** -0.088 0.01 -0.027 -0.161 0.001 1 0.023 
[-3.406] [1.779] [-1.5] [1.313] [-0.874] [0.429] [-2.453] [1.543] [-2.118] [-0.51] [0.804] [-0.995] [-1.517] [0.558] - [0.12] 
This table shows the coefficients estimates of CDS markets co-movement in the long run and short run. The VECM model is defined as: Ⱦ ?ǡ ൌ െɀ ?െ Ⱦ ?ǡ െ ɂ ?ǡ 
 ൤ ?ǡ ?ǡ൨ ൌ  ?Ƚ ?Ƚ ? ?ɂ ?ǡെ ?൅෍൤ɔ ?ǡ ɔ ?ǡɔ ?ǡ ɔ ?ǡ൨െ ?ൌ ? ൤ ?ǡെ ?ǡെ൨ ൅  ?Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ?Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ?൅  ?ǡ 
Where  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? is the ln-CDS spreads of rescued country at time t.  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? is the logarithmized CDS spreads of other country at time t.  ? ? ? ? ? represent the changes of  ? ? ? ?.
7KH ȕ PDWUL[ GHVFULEHV WKH ORQJ-run relationship between sovereign CDS spreads. The  ? ? and  ? ?, speed of adjustment, measure the speed of each market adjusting to 
long-UXQHTXLOLEULXP,IĮLVVLJQLILFDQWO\QHJDWLYH, the corresponding market would adjust back to the long-UXQHTXLOLEULXPGULYHQE\WKHHUURUFRUUHFWLRQWHUPİ  ? ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? ? ? are rating and outlook changes in the bailed-out countries,  ? ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? ? ? are Eurozone regional rating and outlook changes. As previous empirical test, VIX is the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options as a proxy for financial and economic uncertainty in the US market and captures iQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶ULVNDYHUVLRQ7KH86
yield spread reflects US financial market developments. ɂ ?ǡെ ? and ɂ ?ǡെ ? are the error correction terms, corresponding to the lag one of ɂ ?ǡ and ɂ ?ǡ, which are the residuals 
of cointegration equations. When the cointegration relation is rejected for pairs of CDS spreads, the VECM estimation shows as blank. ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. 
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4.6.2.1.2 Impulse response 
7KHUHVXOWVRILPSXOVHUHVSRQVHIXQFWLRQDQDO\VLVRI*UHHFH¶VEDLORXWVDUHSORWWHGLQ
Figure 4. The red solid lines represent the impulse responses before the first bailout, 
while the blue dashed line indicates the impulse responses in the period between the 
first and second bailout. The yellow dot-dash lines describe the responses after the 
second bailout plan was implemented. The impulse response of Greece and another 9 
countries are plotted in 4 graphs (2×2), such as Greece and Austria: GR->GR 
(upper-left), the response of GR to shock in GR; AR->GR (lower-left), the response of 
GR to shock in AT; GR->AR (upper-right), the response of AR to shock in GR; 
AT->AT (lower-right), response of AT to shock in AT.   
Before the first bailout, a shock in other countries temporarily affects CDS spreads for 
Greece (response sharply decreases). Similar but weaker responses are found for the 
period after first bailout. However, this reaction becomes stronger and permanent after 
the second bailout (response stays at the same level or higher). The only exceptions are 
,5 DQG 37 ZKHUH *UHHFH¶V UHVSRQVHV LQ WKH ILUVW WZR SHULRGV DUH SHUPDQHQW DQG
significant, but become much weaker and temporary after the second bailout.   
,QWHUPVRIWKH(XUR]RQHFRXQWULHV¶UHVSRQVHWRDVKRFNLQ*UHHFHWKHUHDFWLRQVDUH
permanent and stable before any EU intervention, with the exceptions of shocks from 
BG, UK and IT (peaks at day 2 or day 3 and declining thereafter). Nevertheless, the 
influence of Greece on other sovereign states becomes short term and limited after the 
first bailout. Only IR and PT show permanent reactions to shocks from Greece. After 
the second bailout, we find nR ³SHDNLQJ´ HIIHFW DQG WKH UHDFWLRQ LV PXFK ZHDNHU
compared with previous periods. AT is the only country to react more strongly than 
before (decreases steeply after peaking at day 2). For all three periods, the EU 
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PHPEHUV¶UHVSRQVHVWR*UHHNVKRFNDUHWHPporary and decrease significantly shortly 
after day 2.  
,Q DGGLWLRQ QDWLRQDO UHDFWLRQV WR FRXQWULHV¶RZQ VKRFNV VHHP WR IROORZ D FRPPRQ
pattern after the second bailout for Greece: peaks in the short-term (day 2) and then 
dropping steeply. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that Greece was significantly less 
sensitive to its own shock after the first bailout. 
TKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHLQIOXHQFHVRI*UHHFH¶VILUVWDQGVHFRQGEDLORXWVDUHDOVR
revealed by the IRF. In fact, there is no significant difference in terms of the cRUH¶V
response to Greek shock (spillover from Greece to core), which is further weakened 
DIWHUHDFKEDLORXW$VIRU*UHHFH¶VUHVSRQVHWRVKRFNLQDFRUHFRXQWU\ZHDUJXHWKDWLW
is strengthened in the case of AT, BG and DE, although not by much. After 10-20 days, 
the response of AT, BG, and DE after the first bailout exceeds the response in the 
pre-bailout period. To explain why the effect is not as significant as for the second 
bailout, we can make two suggestions: (1) as the first Greek bailouts was essentially 
unprecedented, the core countries were not yet much exposed to the credit risk of 
PIIGS (the public-to-public risk transfer was not complete), and investors were less 
sensitive to the credit risk changes of the cores; and (2) the first bailout was short and 
proved insufficient, which led to another bailout plan. The IMF admitted its original 
 EDLORXW SURJUDPPH IRU *UHHFH ZDV LQVXIILFLHQW DQG VHUYHG DV D ³KROGLQJ
RSHUDWLRQ´WKDWDOORZHGWKHHXURDUHDWRIRUWLI\LWVHOIDJDLQVWIinancial disaster (WSJ, 
2013). Moreover, it failed to put an end to the fear of an unruly Greek default.  
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Figure 4 GIR for Greece 1st and 2nd bailout 
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7KLV ILJXUH SUHVHQWV WKH JHQHUDOL]HG LPSXOVH UHVSRQVHV IRU *UHHFH¶V ILUVW DQG VHFRQG EDLORXWV 7KH
dynamic between GR and AT, BG, FR, DE, UK, IR, IT, PT and SP are plotted as a group of four, 2×2. 
e.g., the four graphs on top left panel show the GIRF for Greece and Austria respectively: GR 
(impulse variable) -> GR (response variable); GR (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.); AT (impulse 
var.) -> GR (response var.); AT (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.).  
Note: X-axis: number of days after the shock generated from the impulse variable. Y-axis: response to 
a one standard deviation shock in impulse variable. Red solid lines: impulse responses before the first 
bailout. Blue dashed line: impulse responses in the period between the first bailout and second bailout. 
Yellow dot-dash lines: responses after the second bailout plan activated. 
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4.6.2.1.3 Cross-country analysis 
Figure 5 VKRZV WKH UHVSRQVHRI(8 FRXQWULHV WR VKRFNV LQ*UHHFHEHIRUH*UHHFH¶V
bailout, over 22 days. The impact of shock in Greece is significant and permanent for 
all the countries over the long run. Although the responses of most countries cluster 
around 0.03 bp, PT and IR spreads are exceptionally sensitive to Greek shock. As the 
next bailed-out countries, GR spread development contains extra information for 
determining their spreads.  
Figure 6 and Figure 7 describe the Greek response to shock from other EU members, 
after *UHHFH¶VILUVWDQGVHFRQGbailouts, respectively. The response of Greek spread is 
higher for PT and IR shocks, while others only have weaker and temporary influence 
DIWHU *UHHFH¶V ILUVW EDLORXW 7KH KLJKHU VHQVLWLYLW\ RI VSUHDGV IRU *UHHFH FRXOG EH
caused by the public finance imbalances and high debt level in Portugal and Ireland, 
which were the next two governments to require financial support. Investor confidence 
in Greece is largely affected by the development of PT and IR spreads, e.g. whether 
they could be rescued by the EU and IMF. Furthermore, after the second bailout, the 
impulse responses of GR to core nations are more significant, led here by AT shock. 
Interestingly, the former strongest sources, PT and IR, have the least impact on Greece 
after its second bailout, when the spreads of PT and IR were no longer the information 
source for Greece after both had been rescued. It is worth noticing that the other two 
PIIGS states, Italy and Spain, had a significant long-term influence on Greek spreads 
(behind Austria) after the bailout. This might be explained by highly volatile 
government spreads ± in turn caused by domestic high debt and the possibility of 
further financial aid. Conversely, the core nations with large investments in the bailout 
DUHFORVHO\OLQNHGWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIVSUHDGVIRU*UHHFH*UHHFH¶VVSUHDGVEHFRPH
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
114 
 
more sensitive to the core members by linking the Greek credit risk to the 
creditworthiness of the core countries. 
Figure 5 Response of EU country spreads to a GR shock, before bailout 
 
This figure depicts the response of other EU nations to a Greece shock, before its bailout, using the 
GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five in 
legend), while IR, IT, PT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
 
Figure 6 GR response to shocks from other nations, after GR 1st bailout 
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This figure depicts the GR response to shock from other EU countries, after GR 1st bailout, using the 
GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five in 
legend), while IR, IT, PT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
Figure 7 GR response to shocks from other nations, after GR 2nd bailout 
 
This figure depicts the GR response to shock from other EU countries, after GR 2nd bailout, using the 
GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five in 
legend), while IR, IT, PT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
 
4.6.2.1.4 Discussion 
As the trigger of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, Greece had the highest 
deficit-GDP ratio (12.7%) and debt-GDP ratio (130%) in 2009 among all members. 
)ROORZLQJZRUVHQLQJILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVWKH(8DJUHHGRQD¼EQUHVFXHSDFNDJH
for Greece on 1 May 2010. This bailout payment was scheduled to be paid in several 
disbursements from May 2010 to June 2013. However, with the continued worsening 
of the Greek debt crisis, from 21 July 2011 to 21 February 2012, Greece requested a 
IXUWKHU¼EQEDLORXWIXQGIURPWKH(8DORQJZLWKD0% government bond haircut, 
with the bailout funds mainly supported by the core European countries, especially 
Germany and France. The detail of the bailout was not ratified until February 2012, 
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making the whole period after the second bailout a turbulent time. The first bailout 
SDFNDJHWRWDOOHG¼ELOOLRQRIZKLFKWKH,0)FRQWULEXWHG¼EQDQGWKH(XUR]RQH
tKHRWKHU¼EQ*HUPDQ\¶VVKDUHRIWKDW¼EQZDV¼EQZKLOH)UDQFHZDV
UHVSRQVLEOHIRU¼EQ6hortly after the aid was announced, Greek government debt 
ZDVUHVWUXFWXUHGPHDQLQJ³GHIDXOW´RQLWVGHEW 
Before the bailout, investors were most concerned with the development of Greek 
spread, since it contains important information: the possibility of future financial aid. 
This argument is supported by Granger causality test results, which show that Greek 
spread could Granger-cause most of the spread for other countries in Europe. Also, the 
IRF analysis shows that a shock from Greece has a significant and permanent impact 
on the CDS spreads of most other countries. Therefore, our Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
The bailout plan binds the spread of a bailed-out country to the creditworthiness of 
those paying for that support. Hypothesis 2 suggests a higher reliance of PIIGS spreads 
on those countries that contribute to the bailout, because of the extra risk exposure and 
liability. Nevertheless, the causality test result contradicts this proposal, as Greece 
could Granger-cause only the spreads for AT after the first Greek bailout and for none 
of the core countries after the second bailout. Moreover, the VECM result implies that 
Greece reacted to deviations more actively after its first bailout. The IRF results 
further underline a reduced short-term response to a GR shock, after each bailout, 
although GR shock has the strongest impact on AT and the UK after the second bailout 
across countries. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected by our results.  
Through the credit guarantee provided by the healthy nations in the EU, investors in 
Greek bonds and CDS would be more sensitive to changes in the credit status of 
countries financing this bailout, mainly core nations. We would therefore expect a 
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greater influence from the spreads of core countries on Greece after a bailout (H3). 
After the first Greek bailout, spread changes in all core countries are able to 
Granger-cause Greek spreads. Most still remain in the causality relation with Greece 
after second bailout. Moreover, a shock from the core countries has a significant and 
permanent effect on Greek spreads, especially after the second bailout. Thus, we have 
evidence in favour of H3. It is worth noticing that the sensitivity to the core countries 
might amplify the Greek debt crisis when credit issues of core countries emerge.   
As for H4, before intervention the important information contained in spreads for 
Greece leads to the exceptional influence of a Greek shock on PT and IR spreads 
(next to be bailed-out, and with a poor fiscal outlook), while the influences on others 
are clustered. In return, after the first Greek bailout, PT and IR exceed all the other 
spreads and become the dominant driving force in Greek spreads, since they would 
experience bailouts in this period. Furthermore, in the turmoil of the second bailout, 
PT and IR shock become the least important in affecting GR, which have been 
UHVFXHG E\ WKH (8 ZKLOH WKH FRUH QDWLRQV ZLWK ³QHZ´ LQIRUPDWLRQ KDYH ODUJHU
control. These findings support our H4. 
To sum up, we find contagion emerging from Greek spreads and spillover into other 
EU countries before bailout, while core countries adjust to correct the deviation. The 
Granger causality test results suggest that Greece could Granger-cause most other 
countries but its influence is weakened after bailout. This supports H1 by discovering 
the existence of spillover effects from Greece to other EU countries, while spillover 
in the other direction is much weaker. The Granger causality test and impulse 
response analysis fails to support H2 as they find weaker and only temporary 
reactions to Greek shock after the first and second bailouts. However, we find strong 
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HYLGHQFHIRU+ZKHUHGHYHORSPHQWRIFRUH(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV¶VSUHDGVEHJLQVWR
SOD\DQLQFUHDVLQJO\LPSRUWDQWUROHLQ*UHHFH¶VVSUHDGDIWHUHDFKURXQGRIILQDQFLDO
DLG + LV SDUWO\ VXSSRUWHG LQ WKH FDVH RI *UHHFH¶V ILUVW EDLORXW ZKLOH LQ *UHHFH¶V
VHFRQG EDLORXW SHULRG DV D SHULRG RI WXUPRLO UDWKHU WKDQ D µQRUPDO¶ SRVW-bailout 
period, Greece shows higher sensitivity to its own spread. Our findings therefore 
support H4: the more information (bad fiscal outlook and financing the bailout) a 
FRXQWU\¶V VSUHDG FRQWDLQV WKH FORVHU LWV UHODWLRQ LV ZLWK WKH EDLOHG-out nation, no 
matter whether it is a PIIGS or a core country.   
4.6.2.2 Ireland bailout  
2Q1RYHPEHU,UHODQGUHOXFWDQWO\WRRNDEDLORXWRI¼ELOOLRQIUom the IMF, 
the European Commission and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSF). 
The analysis is conducted for the pre-bailout and post-bailout period, including: 
Granger causality test in Table 18, cointegration test in Table 44 and VECM and IRF 
in Table 19 and Figure 8.  
4.6.2.2.1 Granger causality and cointegration  
Before the bailout, for the short-term relationship, we find that the spread for Ireland 
could Granger-cause AT, DE, GR, IT and PT. Two are core European nations. This 
is partly in line with the suggestion of spillover from IR to the cores before 
intervention. In addition, the causality test of the opposite direction shows all 
countries were able to Granger-cause changes in IR, except for BG.   
The cointegration test shows that a long-term relationship exists only with AT, DE, 
UK and IT, in the pre-bailout period. A 1 bp change in the Ireland spread could lead 
to an adjustment in Germany CDS spread of 0.044 bp. 7KHDGMXVWPHQWVSHHGWKHĮ
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coefficient, suggests that, of the four cointegrated pair of countries, all of them adjust 
to correct error, while IR provides the stochastic trend in the long-run relation in the 
error correction mechanism. ȁ ?௢௧௛௘௥ȁ is generally close to or larger than ȁ ?ூோȁ, 
indicating that these four countries adjust back to equilibrium faster than IR, in the 
pre-intervention period. This result supports our H1.  
After bailout, IR is able to Granger-cause more core countries, AT, FR, DE and UK, 
indicating increased influence on the cores after bailout. Moreover, the fact that most 
countries are also able to Granger-cause changes in IR leads to the conclusion that IR 
is strongly affected by international markets over the short run, especially those of 
the core nations. However, the cointegration test shows no cointegration for IR with 
any country, suggesting that there is no stable long-run relation between IR and 
others. 
Table 18 Granger causality test for the Ireland bailout 
Variables Period PIIGS not GC others others not GC PIIGS 
test Pr() test Pr() 
IR - AT before 3.993 0.002 3.176 0.008 
after 5.759 0.000 1.288 0.274 
IR - BG before 1.599 0.134 1.407 0.201 
after 1.175 0.312 2.471 0.012 
IR - FR before 1.576 0.180 2.902 0.022 
after 2.716 0.001 2.522 0.003 
IR - DE before 4.395 0.001 3.058 0.01 
after 5.129 0.000 3.2 0.013 
IR - UK before 0.339 0.561 4.321 0.038 
after 1.765 0.081 1.969 0.048 
IR - GR before 3.947 0.000 4.202 0 
after 1.561 0.133 1.801 0.074 
IR - IT before 3.620 0.000 2.454 0.01 
after 1.322 0.230 4.896 0 
IR - PT before 2.212 0.052 2.312 0.043 
after 4.688 0.001 3.455 0.008 
IR - SP before 0.943 0.453 2.914 0.013 
after 1.005 0.431 6.358 0 
The Granger causality test provides direction of information flows, when the lag is chosen by AIC. Its 
F-test results are summarized. The test equation is  ? ?ൌ  ? ൅ ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? ൅  ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? , the null 
hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y,  ? ?ൌ  ? for all j. If the statistic exceeds the 10% critical 
value (indicated by bold type), the null hypothesis of absence of Granger causality is rejected.  
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Table 19 VECM for the Ireland bailout 
Variable Perio Įothers ĮPIIGS Į11 Į12 Į13 Į14 Į15 Į16 Į21 Į22 Į23 Į24 Į25 Į26 ȕother ȕPIIG 
IR - AT 
before -0.031** -0.033** 0.001 0 0.005 -0.002 -0.068 0.001 -0.025 0.009 -0.016** -0.021 -0.073 0.007** 1 -0.14 
[-2.744] [-3.047] [0.031] [-0.013 [0.641] [-0.146 [-1.675 [0.806] [-1.593 [0.32] [-2.411] [-1.451 [-1.891 [4.56] [-0.98
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
IR - BG 
before 
              
- - 
              
- 
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
IR - FR 
before 
              
- - 
              
- - 
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
IR - DE 
before -0.03*** -0.018* -0.014 0.009 -0.01 0 0.005 0.008** -0.023 0.006 -0.018** -0.018 -0.057 0.006** 1 0.044 
[-2.671] [-1.667] [-0.848 [0.299] [-1.492 [0.027] [0.116] [5.149] [-1.464 [0.19] [-2.727] [-1.243 [-1.479 [4.337] [0.21] 
after 
              
- - 
              
- - 
IR - UK 
before 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 1 0 
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] - [0.54] 
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
IR - GR 
before 
              
- - 
              
- 
after 
              
- - 
              
- - 
IR - IT 
before -0.019** 0.001 -0.011 0.012 -0.009 0.003 -0.06 0.01*** -0.025 0.008 -0.018** -0.019 -0.07* 0.006** 1 0.242 
[-2.686] [0.145] [-0.627 [0.357] [-1.177 [0.159] [-1.393 [6.112] [-1.61] [0.262 [-2.658] [-1.313 [-1.824 [4.173] [0.94] 
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
IR - PT 
before 
              
- - 
              
- 
after 
              
- - 
              
- - 
IR - SP 
before 
              
- - 
              
- 
after 
              
- - 
              
- 
This table shows the coefficients estimates of CDS markets co-movement in long-run and short run. The VECM model is defined in Eq 19 and 20. 7KHȕPDWUL[GHVFULEHVWKH
long-run relationship between sovereign CDS spreads. The Ƚ, speed of adjustment, measure the speed of each market adjusting to long-UXQHTXLOLEULXP,IĮLVVLJQLILFDQWO\
negative, the corresponding market would adjust back to the long-UXQHTXLOLEULXPGULYHQE\WKHHUURUFRUUHFWLRQWHUPİ:KHQWKHFRLQWHJUDWLRQ relation is rejected for pairs of 
CDS spreads, the VECM estimation would show as blank. Significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.  
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4.6.2.2.2 Impulse response 
The impulse responses analysis, depicted in Figure 8, shows the interdependence 
between the Ireland spread and the spreads of other countries, in the pre- and 
post-bailout periods28. The graph in the upper-right corner of each panel indicates the 
reaction of EU countries to an Ireland shock. In the pre-bailout period, an IR shock 
stably and significantly affects all other countries, while DE and GR are temporarily 
affected. In the post-bailout period, an IR shock is able to influence all the core 
nations permanently; the effects on AT and DE exceeds those evident in the 
pre-bailout period after day 5 of the post-bailout period.  
As for the response of IR to shock from other countries, in the pre-bailout period, IR 
is strongly and permanently affected by BG, FR, GR, IT, PT and SP.  In the 
post-bailout period in all cases the effect is weaker. Conversely, the formerly weak 
sources, AT and DE shock, show increased influence on IR after the bailout.  
Moreover, in terms of response to an internal shock, IR is highly affected by an IR 
shock before financial aid.  But the sensitivity of IR spread to domestic shock is 
lower after the bailout. In addition, Austria and Germany again show stronger 
reaction to shocks from themselves after bailout, while the impacts are generally 
weaker for the others.   
                                                          
28
 The UK-IR relation is not shown in the Figure 8, since the IRF analysis leaves no appropriate data 
in the pre-bailout period.  
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Figure 8 GIRF for Ireland bailout 
   
  
   
Chapter 4                          Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
123 
 
  
This figure presents the generalized impulse responses for the Ireland bailout. The dynamic between 
IR and AT, BG, FR, DE, GR, IT, PT and SP is plotted as a group of four, 2×2. e.g., the four graphs in 
the top left panel show the GIRF for Ireland and Austria respectively: IR (impulse variable) -> IR 
(response variable); IR (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.); AT (impulse var.) -> IR (response var.); 
AT (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.).  
Note: X-axis: number of days after the shock generated from the impulse variable. Y-axis: response to 
a one standard deviation shock in the impulse variable. Red solid lines: impulse responses before 
bailout. Blue dashed line: impulse responses after bailout plan activated. 
 
4.6.2.2.3 Cross-country analysis 
Figure 9 shows the impulse response of EU countries to IR shock over 22 days before 
,UHODQG¶VEDLORXW$VWDEOHDQGSHUPDQHQWLPSDFWIURP,5VKRFNFDQEH found for most 
of the countries, led by PT and IT, while SP comes in third. The PT response could be 
led by the worsened expectation on PT debt, which required bailout after the Ireland 
bailout. In addition, IT, as the largest of the PIIGS economies, was a constant concern. 
On the other hand, the core nations, especially AT and DE, were less sensitive to IR 
shock before intervention. A pattern is found in the response to IR shock: those 
FRXQWULHV ZLWK D KHDOWKLHU ILVFDO RXWORRN DQG OLWWOH ³QHZ´ LQIRUPDWLRQ were less 
influenced. Specifically, the relatively low response for GR could be caused by its 
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recent bailout, which is not as informative as before, with a better prospect of Greece 
paying its debt.   
Figure 10 describes the IR response to shock from other EU members for 22 days in 
the post-bailout period. IR response to external shock is long term and continuing for 
most countries. PT is the most influential source over the long run, at 0.025 bp, while 
FR is the least crucial country affecting IR spread, at 0.005 bp. There is an interesting 
finding that the UK is the second most affected by IR shock, which is surprising 
considering its isolated role in the Eurozone rescue. However, since the Ireland bailout 
was the only one to which the UK contributed, the result is reasonable and interesting. 
It is consistent with o H3. Overall, the impact on IR spread is stronger for PIIGS 
nations than for core states. The long-run responses of two groups of countries 
generally cluster for each group, with the exception of Belgium and Greece. PT, IT 
and SP are three important PIIGS nations facing bailout in the forthcoming 
post-bailout period, which are shown as the driving forces in IR spreads. Although 
Belgium is one of the cores, it had the third highest debt-GDP ratio in Eurozone, at 
100%. The concern of spillover from others makes its spread behave like that for the 
PIIGS. In addition, the recent bailout for GR leads to a less informative GR spread, 
which leads to a lower influence on IR.   
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Figure 9 EU country spreads in response to IR shock, before bailout 
 
This figure depicts the response of other EU nations to Ireland shock, before its bailout, using the 
GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, and DE (top four in 
legend), while GR, IT, PT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
 
Figure 10 IR response to shock from other EU countries, after bailout 
 
This figure depicts the IR response to shock in other EU nations, after its bailout, using the GIRF 
estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE, and UK (top five in 
legend), while GR, IT, PT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
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4.6.2.2.4 Discussion 
Different from Greece, which was trapped in sovereign debt crisis from government 
RYHUVSHQGLQJ ,UHODQG¶V GHEW FULVLV ZDV FDXVHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW SURYLGLQJ
guarantees for six Irish banks. After the bursting of the property bubble in 2008, 
these Irish banks lost hundreds of billions euros. In order to save its major banks 
from collapse, the government introduced a bank guarantee scheme. It ended up with 
extensive losses. On 28 November 2010, the Irish government required assistance 
from the EU and IMF, and requested  a ¼85 bn bailout fund, ¼67.5 bn of which was 
provided by the EFSF, the EFSM and the IMF, while ¼17.5 bn was from Irish 
pension funds and the UK, Denmark and Sweden.  
The Granger causality test finds that the IR spread could Granger-cause AT, DE, GR, 
IT and PT, partly supporting the proposition that Ireland had influence on the spreads 
of other nations in the short run. Over the long run, the cointegration analysis shows 
IR led AT, DE, UK and IT. In addition, the IRF finds IR shock has a significant and 
permanent influence on most countries, which supports our H1.  
Our Hypothesis 2 suggests a greater influence of PIIGS spreads on other countries 
after bailout, because the financing plan makes the cores more exposed to the credit 
risk of the bailed-out country. AT, FR, DE and the UK being Granger-caused by IR 
spreads supports our hypothesis, although there is no long-term cointegration relation 
between IR and any other nations. Furthermore, the IRF results underline a weaker 
reaction to IR shock for most countries, except for AT and DE. These findings lead 
to the conclusion that only some PIIGS, as well as Austria and Germany, are more 
affected by changes in the Ireland spread.  
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Whether the credit guarantee by other EU nations leads to higher sensitivity of 
Ireland to these countries is examined by H3. That most countries were able to 
Granger-cause IR highlights that IR is highly sensitive to the international markets 
over the short run. Moreover, AT and DE shock had a stronger and permanent effect 
on IR after the bailout, while no similar pattern was found in the relation with other 
cores. This partly supports our Hypothesis 3, and also indicates a country-specific 
characteristic.   
For H4, a pattern is found in the response to IR shock:  those countries with a 
KHDOWKLHU ILVFDO RXWORRN $7 DQG '( DQG OLWWOH ³QHZ´ LQIRUPDWLRQ *5 ZHUH OHVV
influenced, and the more risky nations (PT and IT) were more closely related to 
developments in IR. A similar pattern is found for the post-intervention period, as PT, 
IT and SP were risky PIIGS facing bailout, and were the driving forces in IR spreads. 
In addition, although Belgium is not a PIIGS country, its high debt-GDP ratio meant 
the country had crucial information for IR spread. The country-specific characteristic 
is well explained by the results, as higher information content leads to tighter relations 
with the bailed-out nation.   
Combining the results from above, H1, H2, and H3 are supported by our results, in 
the case of Austria and Germany. The unique behaviour of AT and DE in their 
relations with IR, as well as in the GR bailout, is caused by their specific economic 
situations. Austria and Germany were countries with low debt-GDP ratios in the EU, 
at 69% and 74% in 2010, respectively. Their budget deficit-GDP ratios were also 
lower than those of most other EU members, at 4.5% and 4.2%, respectively. The 
fiscal health of AT and DE made them more closely related to IR spread among the 
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cores. The country-specific characteristic in H4 is therefore well supported, as higher 
information content leads to tighter relations with the bailed-out nation. 
4.6.2.3 Portugal bailout 
On 16 May 2011, the EU and IMF approved a ¼78bn bailout for Portugal. The deal 
gives three-\HDUORDQRIXSWR¼ELOOLRQHTXDOO\VKDUHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ)LQDQFLDO
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the IMF. Our sample period is divided into two parts: pre-bailout and 
post-bailout periods. The Granger causality test results of its relationship with 9 other 
countries are presented in Table 20, the results of the cointegration test are shown in 
Table 45, with VECM and IRF in Table 21 and Figure 11. 
4.6.2.3.1 Granger causality and cointegration  
In the pre-bailout period, we find that changes in spreads for Portugal could 
Granger-cause those for all the core countries: AT, BG, FR, DE and UK. Ireland was 
the only one of the PIIGS whose spreads were Granger-FDXVHGE\3RUWXJDO¶VVSUHDG
Conversely, PT is Granger-caused by all PIIGS countries, but not those of the core 
countries, with the exceptions of AT and DE.  
Moreover, the cointegration result shows that Portugal is cointegrated with all core 
countries over the long run, except France. For example, a 1 bp change in the 
Portugal spreads couOGOHDGVWRDQDGMXVWPHQWLQ*HUPDQ\¶V&'6VSUHDGE\ES
over the long run. ,Q DGGLWLRQ Į FRHIILFLHQW LQ Table 21 underlines that all the 
cointegrated core nations adjust back to the long-run equilibrium with Portugal at the 
5% level. Meanwhile, PT makes adjustment only in its relation with AT, DE and GR, 
at -0.04 bp, -0.031 bp and 0.035 bp. These results indicate the leading role of PT as 
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the source of spillover before intervention. Comparing the magnitude of adjustment 
speed, we find that ȁ ?஺்ȁ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൏  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ൌ ȁ ?௉்ȁ, which reflects that PT adjusts 
more quickly. BG and IT were the fastest countries in price adjustment in the relation 
with PT before bailout, ȁ ?஻ீȁ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ȁ ?ூ்ȁ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?.  
After the announcement of the Portugal bailout plan, the short-term relation between 
Portugal and core countries changes as BG, DE and UK are no longer 
Granger-caused by PT, while PT has larger impact on all PIIGS nations. Moreover, 
only BG Granger-causes PT, while the all PIIGS countries Granger-cause PT, as in 
the pre-EDLORXWSHULRG,WVXJJHVWVDZHDNHQHGLQIOXHQFHIRU3RUWXJDO¶VVSUHDGVRQWKH
cores.  
7KHȕFRHIILFLHQWVVXJJHVWWKDW'(DQG8.DUHQRWLQDORQJ-term relation with PT, 
while FR and SP begin to be cointegrated with Portugal. AT, FR, GR, IT and SP 
adjust to long-run relations with Portugal at the 5% level, in the post-bailout period. 
Meanwhile, PT adjusts to long-run equilibrium only with BG and SP at the same 
VLJQLILFDQFHOHYHO  &RPSDULQJWKHĮFRHIILFLHQWVZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVSHULRGZHKDYH
D PRUH UDSLG UHVSRQVH WR GHYLDWLRQ IURP HTXLOLEULXP IURP $7 ZKLOH WKH RWKHU Į
coefficients of the core countries are either insignificant or not comparable.  
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Table 20 Granger causality test for Portugal bailout 
Variables Period PIIG not GC others others not GC PIIG 
test Pr() test Pr() 
PT - AT before 3.806 0.002 5.041 0 
after 5.938 0.003 0.4 0.671 
PT - BG before 2.019 0.074 1.048 0.389 
after 0.264 0.768 6.121 0.002 
PT - FR before 4.343 0.002 0.732 0.57 
after 4.862 0.008 1.102 0.333 
PT - DE before 2.909 0.004 4.047 0 
after 0.722 0.577 1.811 0.126 
PT - UK before 2.225 0.065 1.474 0.209 
after 0.287 0.751 0.837 0.434 
PT - GR before 1.340 0.229 3.665 0.001 
after 4.820 0.008 3.705 0.025 
PT - IR before 2.969 0.012 2.2 0.053 
after 3.881 0.004 3.712 0.006 
PT - IT before 1.927 0.105 3.177 0.014 
after 3.994 0.019 7.918 0 
PT - SP before 1.100 0.359 4.335 0.001 
after 3.130 0.045 8.108 0 
The Granger causality test provides direction of information flows, when the lag is chosen by AIC. Its 
F-test results are summarized. The test equation is  ? ?ൌ  ? ൅ ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? ൅  ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? , the null 
hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y,  ? ?ൌ  ? for all j. If the statistic exceeds the 10% critical 
value (indicated by bold type), the null hypothesis of absence of Granger causality is rejected and 
emphasized in bold.  
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Table 21 VECM for Portugal bailout 
Variables Period Įothers ĮPIIGS Į11 Į12 Į13 Į14 Į15 Į16 Į21 Į22 Į23 Į24 Į25 Į26 ȕothers ȕPIIG 
PT - AT 
before -0.019** -0.039*** 0.011 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.062* 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.012** 0.005 -0.088** 0.01*** 1 0.112 
[-2.147] [-3.909] [1.155] [-0.265] [-0.176] [0.146] [-1.754] [1.195] [0.221] [-0.04] [-2.148] [0.345] [-2.227] [6.576] [1.59] 
after -0.031** 0.006 0.003 -0.065 0 0 -0.038 0.007*** -0.004 -0.035 -0.003 -0.002 -0.078** 0.002** 1 -1.509*** 
[-2.565] [0.868] [0.146] [-0.677] [0.007] [0.031] [-0.658] [4.267] [-0.362] [-0.63] [-1.103] [-0.316] [-2.392] [2.378] [-8.32] 
PT - BG 
before -0.029** -0.019 0.017* 0.019 -0.01** 0.012 -0.081** 0.006*** 0.003 0.002 -0.012** 0.01 -0.085** 0.01*** 1 -0.504*** 
[-2.59] [-1.474] [1.843] [0.938] [-2.041] [1.003] [-2.257] [4.806] [0.32] [0.092] [-2.152] [0.688] [-2.082] [6.375] [-5.57] 
after -0.005 0.017** -0.003 -0.069 0 0.002 -0.2*** 0.005*** -0.004 -0.028 -0.003 -0.004 -0.078** 0.002** 1 -1.542*** 
[-0.521] [2.441] [-0.15] [-0.884] [-0.098] [0.163] [-4.315] [3.821] [-0.334] [-0.514] [-1.166] [-0.463] [-2.409] [2.289] [-8.16] 
PT - FR 
before                - 
               - 
after -0.04*** -0.001 0.013 -0.111 0.002 -0.004 -0.239*** 0.006*** -0.003 -0.04 -0.003 -0.002 -0.076** 0.002** 1 -0.927*** 
[-3.269] [-0.103] [0.731] [-1.319] [0.547] [-0.349] [-4.794] [4.071] [-0.259] [-0.721] [-1.106] [-0.24] [-2.334] [2.346] [-6.4] 
PT - DE 
before -0.021** -0.031*** 0.013 0.017 -0.009 0.015 0.045 0.007*** 0.002 0.006 -0.008 0.005 -0.089** 0.009*** 1 -0.063 
[-1.992] [-2.917] [1.312] [0.814] [-1.554] [1.113] [1.134] [4.507] [0.148] [0.288] [-1.432] [0.366] [-2.209] [6.162] [-0.65] 
after                - 
               - 
PT - UK 
before -0.022*** -0.012 0.013* -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 0.006*** 0.004 0.003 -0.012** 0.009 -0.078* 0.01*** 1 0.036 
[-2.754] [-1.071] [1.742] [-0.477] [-1.204] [-0.105] [-0.31] [5.69] [0.385] [0.15] [-2.186] [0.66] [-1.911] [6.376]  [0.41] 
after                - 
              - 
PT - GR 
before 0.006 0.035** 0.004 -0.031 -0.01* 0.002 -0.033 0.008*** 0 0.001 -0.01* 0.01 -0.074* 0.009*** 1 -1.034*** 
[0.45] [2.321] [0.415] [-1.56] [-1.899] [0.131] [-0.903] [6.189] [-0.008] [0.048] [-1.773] [0.753] [-1.844] [6.125] [-15.03] 
after -0.006*** -0.001 -0.011 0.042 0 -0.004 -0.079* 0.002* -0.004 -0.036 -0.002 -0.003 -0.078** 0.002** 1 0.136 
[-2.97] [-0.488] [-0.647] [0.524] [0.052] [-0.362] [-1.658] [1.801] [-0.298] [-0.64] [-0.971] [-0.334] [-2.38] [2.326]  [0.2] 
PT - IR 
before                - 
              - 
after                - 
              - 
PT - IT 
before -0.034*** -0.018 0.023** 0.013 -0.011** 0.018 -0.09** 0.01*** 0.006 0.004 -0.012** 0.012 -0.082** 0.01*** 1 -0.269*** 
[-2.848] [-1.448] [2.251] [0.59] [-2.045] [1.346] [-2.296] [6.603] [0.526] [0.164] [-2.034] [0.864] [-2.045] [6.401] [-3.04] 
after -0.024*** -0.01* -0.011 -0.035 0.001 0.004 -0.297*** 0.002* 0 -0.049 -0.003 -0.002 -0.079** 0.002* 1 -0.498*** 
[-3.5] [-1.787] [-0.75] [-0.54] [0.311] [0.415] [-7.677] [1.93] [0.03] [-0.893] [-1.109] [-0.293] [-2.441] [1.933]  [-2.8] 
PT - SP 
before                - 
              - 
after -0.035*** -0.024*** 0.003 -0.06 -0.001 0.001 -0.232*** 0.002** 0 -0.05 -0.003 -0.002 -0.075** 0.002** 1 -0.294** 
              [-2.38] 
This table shows the coefficients estimates of CDS markets co-movement in long-run and short run. The VECM model is defined as Eq 19 and 20. 7KH ȕ PDWUL[ GHVFULEHV WKH ORQJ-run 
relationship between sovereign CDS spreads. The Ƚ, speed of adjustment, measure the speed of each market adjusting to long-UXQHTXLOLEULXP,IĮLVVLJQLILFDQWO\QHJDWLYHWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ
market would adjust back to the long-run equilibrium, driven by the HUURUFRUUHFWLRQWHUPİ:KHQWKHFRLQWHJUDWLRQUHODWLRQLVUHMHFWHGIRUSDLUVRI&'6VSUHDGVWKH9(&0HVWLPDWLRQZRXOG
show as blank. Significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. 
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4.6.2.3.2 Impulse response 
Figure 11 describes the impulse responses analysis for Portugal and other countries, 
in the pre- and post-EDLORXW SHULRGV %HIRUH WKH EDLORXW 3RUWXJDO¶V UHVSRQVHV WR
shocks in other EU countries follow an interesting pattern. A shock originating from 
the core countries is found to lead to a temporary shift in the Portugal spreads (t<5), 
ZKLOH D VKRFNRQRQHRI WKH3,,*6FRXQWULHVKDV DSHUPDQHQW HIIHFW RQ 3RUWXJDO¶V
spreads. Moreover, it suggests close interdependency among PIIGS countries before 
bailout. A permanent reaction is found in most countries facing a Portugal shock, 
except for the UK. After bailout, a shock from most of EU countries (all the core 
nations and most of the PIIGS, but not Spain) has a significant and permanent 
influence oQ3RUWXJDO¶V VSUHDG)XUWKHUPRUH WKH LQIOXHQFH IURP WKHFRUHFRXQWULHV
AT, BG and DE are stronger compared with the pre-bailout period. 
A PT shock was able to cast a significant and long-term influence on most other EU 
nations before the bailout. However, afterwards, the influences from EU country 
shock are generally weaker, even though these are stable and permanent responses. 
Only AT and FR shocks show a greater impact on PT spread than in the pre-bailout 
period.    
In terms of response to a shock from itself, PT is less sensitive to a PT shock after the 
bailout, in its relations with all other countries. All the core countries have a greater 
response to an internal shock in the post-intervention period.  
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Figure 11 GIRF for Portugal bailout 
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This figure presents the generalized impulse responses for the Portugal bailout. The dynamic between 
PT and AT, BG, FR, DE, UK, GR, IR, IT and SP are plotted as a group of four, 2×2. e.g., the four 
graphs on top left panel show the GIRF for Portugal and Austria respectively: PT (impulse variable) -> 
PT (response variable); PT (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.); AT (impulse var.) -> PT (response 
var.); AT (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.).  
Note: X-axis: number of days after the shock generated from the impulse variable. Y-axis: response to 
a one standard deviation shock in impulse variable. Red solid lines: impulse responses before bailout. 
Blue dashed line: impulse responses after bailout plan is activated. 
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4.6.2.3.3 Cross-country analysis 
Figure 12 shows the impulse response of EU countries to a PT shock, before 
3RUWXJDO¶VEDLORXW$37VKRFNFRXOGOHDGWRDVWDEOHUHVSRQVHLQRWKHU(8FRXQWULHV
The long-term response of PIIGS countries are clustered (led by IT and SP) at around 
0.04, while the responses of cores show some gap between each other (the UK and AT 
are the least affected). This result indicates that investors in the PIIGS countries have 
similar attitude to news from Portugal, which further supports the inter-connection 
between PIIGS and the crucial importance of being bailed-out. The responses of the 
core countries can be ranked highest to lowest: BG, FR, DE, UK and AT. BG, the most 
³3,,*6´PHPEHURIWKH³&ore´ group, given that it has the highest debt-GDP ratio, had 
a higher sensitivity to PT shock than the other core countries.   
Figure 13 demonstrates the PT response to shock from other EU countries, after its 
bailout. This figure shows the increasing influence of the core countries on the 
development of PT spread, led by BG and UK. An upward and constant response of 
PT is found in the relation with all core countries, while the impact from the PIIGS 
appears to be much weaker, except for IR and IT. Italy, having the second highest 
debt-GDP ratio (120%) in the Eurozone in 2010, is the only country among the PIIGS 
not to receive an official bailout.  It is reasonable for investors to believe that the IT 
spreads contain constantl\ XSGDWHG ³QHZ´ LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW LV XVHG WR DIIHFW RWKHU
FRXQWULHV¶&'6VSUHDGV+RZHYHU LW LV LQWHUHVWLQJWRILQGWKDW ,5DVDFRXQWU\WKDW
previously experienced bailout, still had a significant influence on PT spread, while SP, 
the only remaining PIIG \HW³WREHEDLOHG-RXW´KDVRQO\DVKRUW-term impact on PT and 
the second least influence over the long run. 
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Figure 12 (8FRXQWULHV¶UHVSRQVHVWR37VKRFNEHIRUHEDLORXW 
 
This figure depicts the response of EU countries to PT shock, before PT bailout, using the GIRF 
estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five in 
legend), while GR, IR, IT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
 
Figure 13 PT response to shock from EU countries, after bailout 
 
This figure depicts the response of PT spread to shock from other EU nations, after PT bailout, using 
the GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five 
in legend), while GR, IR, IT and SP are the group of PIIGS (bottom four in legend).  
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4.6.2.3.4 Discussion 
After the 2008 financial crisis, two Portuguese banks, BNP and BPP, fell into serious 
difficulty, which forced the Portuguese government to step in and give them a bailout 
so as to prevent the financial crisis from spreading. Portuguese government bonds 
faced increased pressure after Moody lowered its rating in 2010. Therefore, to 
stabilize its public finance, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility and the IMF approved a three-year loan of up to 
¼ ELOOLRQ WR WKH 3RUWXJXHVH JRYHUQPHQW 7KURXJK WKH EDLORXW SODQ 3RUWXJDO¶V
spreads are expected to be highly affected by the core nations that financed the 
rescue plan. Before bailout, credit risk spillover is seen from PT to most other 
countries, except for the UK, according to the Granger causality results. In addition, 
the leading role of PT is highlighted by the cointegration test, as all core nations 
adjusted back to the long-term equilibrium. Therefore, our H1 is supported in 
3RUWXJDO¶VEDLORXW  
After the Portugal bailout, risk spillover into the core countries is seen: Austria and 
France. This is supported by the Granger causality test and the permanent effect of 
PT shock on AT and FR, which are the two nations most influenced by PT shock 
across all 9 EU members. These results support our H2, that because of credit risk 
transfer, the bailed-out country has a stronger explanatory power for the spreads of 
core nations.    
Moreover, shocks to all the core countries, AT, BG, FR, DE and UK, have a 
SHUPDQHQW DQG VLJQLILFDQW HIIHFW RQ 3RUWXJDO¶V VSUHDGV DIWHU WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ RI
which AT, BG and DE shock has increasing effect on PT spread. Nevertheless, 
Granger causality testing suggests only BG could Granger-cause PT. No similar 
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impact is observed for the other PIIGS countries. Therefore, H3 is partially 
confirmed.  
Considering the reduced level of reaction to its own shock from the GIRF results, 
Portugal becomes more sensitive to changes in the core countries after bailout, from 
which it may be concluded that the bailout plan successfully transferred credit risk 
from Portugal to the core countries.   
As for H4, before bailout, a PT shock led to a higher long-term response for PIIGS 
countries, clustered at 0.04 bp, and lower responses in core countries. This underlines 
that investors in the PIIGS countries share similar attitudes to PT information, and 
WKH FUXFLDO LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH IDFWRU µPLJKW KDYH WR EH EDLOHG-oXW¶ DV ,WDO\ ZKLFK
actually did not prove to need a bailout, though there was the prospect of this at the 
time) and Spain (which was the next to receive a bailout) are the most sensitive to PT 
shock. After the bailout, the core countries had a greater influence on the PT spread, 
indicating enhanced influence of cores over the development of CDS spreads in the 
bailed-out country. 
To sum up, our results support H1, as we found strong and permanent responses to 
shocks in Portugal. After the bailout plan was implemented, causality and 
cointegration tests and the GIRF results support spillover from Portugal to two core 
countries over the long term, Austria and France, which supports our H2. In addition, 
according to GIRF, with a reduced level of sensitivity to its own shock, Portugal 
became more sensitive to shifts in the core countries after its bailout, which supports 
our H3. The clustered response of PIIGS countries before intervention and the strong 
influence from the core are in line with the country-specific characteristic: as a 
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FRXQWU\¶VVSUHDGEHFRPHVPRUHLQIRUPDWLYHLWKDVDKLJKHULPSDFWRQWKHEDLOHG-out 
country.    
46SDLQ¶VEDLORXW 
As the last country asking for bailout, on 9 June 2012, Spain was granted ¼100 bn in 
order to help its failing banks (Spain having partly nationalized Bankia SA in May). 
Bilateral relationships are studied for 8 EU countries (Greece exited the debt market 
after it defaulted), in two sub-periods: pre-bailout and post-bailout. The Granger 
causality test results are presented in Table 22, cointegration test results are shown in 
Table 46, with VECM and IRF in Table 23 and Figure 14.  
4.6.2.4.1 Granger causality and cointegration  
The Granger causality test results suggest that, changes in SP could Granger-cause 
all EU countries, while AT, FR, DE and PT could Granger-cause SP. This indicates 
both that the spillover is directed from the rescued country to others, and that there 
was a significant effect on PT spread from the core European countries.  
Cointegration analysis reveals a stable long-run relation between SP and all other 
countries with the exceptions of IR and IT. For example,  ?ிோ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp shows 
that a 1 bp decrease in SP translates into a 0.916 bp drop in FR spread over long-run.  
7KHĮFRHIILFLHQWVLQTable 23 suggest that all of the core countries adjust to long-run 
equilibrium, while PT is  less active in adjustment at the 5% level of significance. In 
the relation with BG and FR, the SP results do not participate in the error correction 
mechanism for these nations. AT, DE, UK and PT are the nations that SP actively 
involves in the error correction. Therefore, we conclude that spillover originates from 
Spain and influences most other countries, as shown by Granger causality testing. 
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&RPSDULQJWKHPDJQLWXGHRIĮFRHIILFLHQWVZHILQGWKDW  ȁ ?஻ீȁȁ ?ிோȁ are larger 
than their correspondingȁ ?ௌ௉ȁ, although there is no significant difference in the 
relation with others. The causality is then suggested to be from SP to the cores, 
before bailout.  
After the bailout plan is implemented, the Granger causality relation between SP and 
other countries shows that SP could Granger-cause all other countries (with the 
exception of IT), and only be Granger-caused by AT.  
Of the five core countries, only AT, BG and FR were still in a long-term relation 
with PT after the bailout. Compared with the pre-bailout period, the decreases in the 
ȕFRHIILFLHQWVIRU%*DQG)5VXJJHVWWKHLUJUHDWHULQIOXHQFHRQ63RYHUWKHORQJUXQ
from  ?஻ீ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp and  ?ிோ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp to  ?஻ீ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? bp and  ?ிோ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? bp, respectively. The iQVLJQLILFDQWĮFRHIILFLHQWVRI63VXJJHVW WKDW
Spain provides the stochastic trend in the error correction with all these cointegrated 
countries. On the other hand, all the core countries adjust to close the gap. These 
results emphasize the lead role of SpDLQ¶VVSUHDGVDIWHUEDLORXW&RPSDUHGZLWKWKH
pre-bailout period, the speed of adjustment is greatly increased for BG and FR, at 
-0.072 and - )UDQFH¶V &'6 VSUHDGV DUH WKH PRVW DFWLYH DPRQJ DOO WKH
cointegrated nations. It also supports our H2, of an increased influence from the 
bailed-out countries to the cores.  
  
Chapter 4                             Sovereign credit risk interdependencies and impact of credit ratings 
141 
 
Table 22 *UDQJHUFDXVDOLW\WHVWIRU6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW 
Variables Period PIIG not GC others others not GC PIIG 
test Pr() test Pr() 
SP - AT before 12.416 0.000 3.253 0.006 
after 3.554 0.001 4.601 0 
SP - BG before 4.145 0.000 1.188 0.31 
after 4.422 0.013 2.236 0.11 
SP - FR before 8.111 0.000 2.13 0.048 
after 12.044 0.000 0.091 0.913 
SP - DE before 11.627 0.000 6.099 0 
after 2.753 0.067 0.445 0.642 
SP - UK before 5.470 0.000 1.449 0.172 
after 3.058 0.012 1.936 0.091 
SP - IR before 5.673 0.000 1.267 0.276 
after 6.894 0.000 0.425 0.791 
SP - IT before 2.029 0.073 0.395 0.852 
after 0.275 0.760 0.24 0.787 
SP - PT before 6.448 0.000 3.556 0.007 
after 9.566 0.000 1.432 0.242 
The Granger causality test provides direction of information flows, when the lag is chosen by AIC. Its 
F-test results are summarized. The test equation is  ? ?ൌ  ? ൅ ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? ൅  ?  ? ? ? ?െ ? ? ?ൌ ? , the null 
hypothesis is that x does not Granger cause y,  ? ?ൌ  ? for all j. If the statistic exceeds the 10% critical 
value (indicated by bold type), the null hypothesis of absence of Granger causality is rejected.  
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Table 23 9(&0IRU6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW 
Variables Period Įothers ĮPIIGS Į11 Į12 Į13 Į14 Į15 Į16 Į21 Į22 Į23 Į24 Į25 Į26 ȕothers ȕPIIG 
SP - AT 
before -0.014** -0.016*** 0 -0.022 -0.001 -0.002 -0.06* 0.004*** 0.006 -0.032 -0.002 -0.001 -0.124*** 0.006*** 1 -0.197 
[-2.178] [-2.627] [0.005] [-0.787] [-0.347] [-0.17] [-1.777] [3.688] [0.599] [-1.268] [-0.769] [-0.175] [-4.017] [5.803] [-1.14] 
after -0.011*** -0.005** -0.002 0.148* 0.007 -0.017 -0.068 0 0.002 0.113* -0.002 -0.016 -0.348*** 0.001 1 0.003 
[-4.064] [-2.357] [-0.113] [1.792] [1.196] [-0.88] [-0.88] [-0.086] [0.109] [1.684] [-0.485] [-0.967] [-5.542] [0.586] [0] 
SP - BG 
before -0.034*** -0.018 0.004 -0.014 -0.006** 0.011 -0.113*** 0.005*** 0.007 -0.034 -0.004 0.003 -0.129*** 0.006*** 1 -1.024*** 
[-3.104] [-1.481] [0.433] [-0.611] [-2.244] [1.46] [-3.956] [5.681] [0.7] [-1.312] [-1.247] [0.34] [-4.12] [5.394] [-13.85] 
after -0.072*** -0.013 0.004 -0.009 0.003 -0.014 -0.342*** 0.002 -0.007 0.16*** -0.001 -0.014 -0.395*** 0.002 1 -1.46*** 
[-3.533] [-0.984] [0.221] [-0.097] [0.399] [-0.533] [-3.402] [0.639] [-0.567] [2.656] [-0.136] [-0.862] [-6.292] [0.873] [-8.25] 
SP - FR 
before -0.036*** -0.016 0.008 -0.014 -0.002 0 -0.103*** 0.006*** 0.006 -0.033 -0.003 0.002 -0.124*** 0.005*** 1 -0.912*** 
[-3.287] [-1.418] [0.904] [-0.584] [-0.737] [0.051] [-3.534] [6.527] [0.64] [-1.276] [-0.982] [0.196] [-3.961] [5.358] 
 
[-11.59] 
after -0.112*** -0.015 -0.01 0.103 0.006 -0.022 -0.249*** -0.004 -0.003 0.124** -0.001 -0.012 -0.384*** 0.002 1 -1.072*** 
[-3.435] [-0.627] [-0.596] [1.229] [0.959] [-0.977] [-2.798] [-1.046] [-0.231] [2.062] [-0.287] [-0.743] [-6.006] [0.699] [-9.81] 
SP - DE 
before -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.004 -0.006* 0.017* -0.052 0.006*** 0.005 -0.033 -0.003 0 -0.113*** 0.006*** 1 -0.385*** 
[-2.778] [-2.842] [-0.21] [0.155] [-1.785] [1.915] [-1.583] [5.44] [0.506] [-1.294] [-1.046] [-0.039] [-3.646] [5.562] [-3.17] 
after 
              
 
- 
              
 
- 
SP - UK 
before -0.018** -0.021** 0.001 -0.019 0 -0.002 -0.039* 0.004*** 0.006 -0.033 -0.004 0.002 -0.126*** 0.006*** 1 0.021 
[-2.472] [-2.141] [0.128] [-1.005] [-0.17] [-0.298] [-1.662] [5.752] [0.662] [-1.283] [-1.368] [0.231] [-4.013] [5.358] 
 
[0.17] 
after 
              
 - 
              
- 
SP - IR 
before 
              
 - 
              
- 
after 
              
 
- 
              
 
- 
SP - IT 
before 
              
 - 
              
- 
after -0.094 0.013 0.006 0.076 0.002 -0.021 -0.434*** 0.001 -0.001 0.121** -0.001 -0.014 -0.386*** 0.002 1 -1.055*** 
[-1.323] [0.184] [0.542] [1.284] [0.513] [-1.317] [-6.883] [0.381] [-0.102] [1.987] [-0.269] [-0.844] [-5.99] [0.729] [-27.8] 
SP - PT 
before 0.005 0.016*** 0.005 -0.037 -0.008*** 0.005 -0.066** 0.005*** 0.006 -0.039 -0.003 0.003 -0.121*** 0.006*** 1 -1.973*** 
[0.982] [2.735] [0.541] [-1.472] [-2.851] [0.609] [-2.207] [5.577] [0.661] [-1.536] [-1.087] [0.357] [-3.918] [5.55] [-10.78] 
after 0.02 0.061*** 0.003 0.038 0 0.004 -0.165*** 0.001 -0.002 0.123** 0 -0.018 -0.388*** 0.002 1 -0.923*** 
[1.326] [3.107] [0.353] [0.847] [-0.04] [0.326] [-3.471] [0.342] [-0.168] [2.108] [-0.075] [-1.117] [-6.255] [0.781] 
 
[-6.28] 
This table shows the coefficients estimates of CDS markets co-movement in the long run and short run. The VECM model is defined in Eq 19 and 20. 7KHȕPDWUL[GHVFULEHV
the long-run relationship between sovereign CDS spreads. The Ƚ, speed of adjustment, measure the speed of each market adjusting to long-UXQ HTXLOLEULXP ,I Į LV
significantly negative, the corresponding market would adjust back to the long-UXQ HTXLOLEULXPGULYHQE\ WKH HUURU FRUUHFWLRQ WHUPİ:KHQ WKH FRLQWHJUDWLRQ UHODWLRQ LV
rejected for pairs of CDS spreads, the VECM estimation would show as blank. Significant level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.  
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4.6.2.4.2 Impulse response 
The results of IRF are plotted in Figure 14, as a panel of 2×2 graphs. The response of 
Spain to a shock in other EU countries before the bailout shows a similar trend: 
shock from any EU country only temporally affects Spanish CDS spread, which 
decreases rapidly after day 3. However, after the bailout, the influences on SP 
become stable and permanent, although some of them appear weaker than before. 
German and Italian shocks have a stronger impact on Spain spread in the post-bailout 
period than in the pre-bailout period, while Austrian and UKs shocks have the same 
level of influence as in the pre-bailout period, at day 22.  
The responses to a Spanish shock in the pre-bailout period of eight countries are both 
stable and permanent, but not for the UK. A similar but stronger and increasing 
response to SP shock is found for the post-bailout period for BG, FR, IR, IT and PT. 
It can be concluded that Spain had a higher impact on other members in the EU, 
especially the PIIGS, after bailout.   
In addition, shocks originating from Spain have a weaker influence on Spanish 
VSUHDGV DIWHU EDLORXW LQ WKH UHODWLRQ ZLWK DOO RWKHU QDWLRQV 7KH FRUH FRXQWULHV¶
reaction to an internal shock follows the downward pattern, which is weaker in the 
latter period. 
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Figure 14 *,5)IRU6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW 
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7KLVILJXUHSUHVHQWVWKHJHQHUDOL]HGLPSXOVHUHVSRQVHVIRU6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW7KHG\QDPLFVEHWween SP 
and AT, BG, FR, DE, UK, IR, IT and PT are plotted as a group of four, 2×229. e.g., the four graphs on 
top left panel show the GIRF for Spain and Austria respectively: SP (impulse variable) -> SP 
(response variable); SP (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.); AT (impulse var.) -> SP (response var.); 
AT (impulse var.) -> AT (response var.).  
Note: X-axis: number of days after the shock generated from the impulse variable. Y-axis: response to 
a one standard deviation shock in impulse variable. Red solid lines: impulse responses before bailout. 
Blue dashed line: impulse responses after bailout plan activated. 
 
4.6.2.4.3 Cross-country analysis 
Figure 15 shows the impulse response of EU countries to Spanish shock over the long 
UXQGD\VEHIRUH6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW7KHVWURQJLPSDFWRI63VKRFNDSSHDUVWREH
consistent for both groups of countries. The most heavily influenced is IT spread, over 
0.05 bp, followed by BG and FR.  A pattern may be found in the results: the nations 
ZLWKPRUH³XQFHUWDLQW\´DUHPRUHLQIOXHQFHGE\63VKRFNOLNH,7%*DQG)57KH\
share the same feature: they had not experienced any bailout, but did have high 
debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios. On the other hand, the least affected countries, the 
                                                          
29
 Greece had already defaulted on its sovereign debt when Spain asked for a bailout from the EU and 
IMF. Therefore, the relationship between Spain and Greece is not examined.  
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UK, AT and DE, are more optimistic on their fiscal outlook. Furthermore, because of 
their previous bailout, IR and PT were not much affected by SP shock.   
Figure 16 depicts the SP response to shock from other EU members, after SP bailout. 
The response of SP is permanent and stable for shock from all other nations. SP spread 
was the most sensitive to IT shock, which led others by over 0.015 bp. The concern 
DERXW ,WDO\¶V GRPHVWLF HFRQRP\ ZLWK KLJK QDWLRQDO GHEW DQG future spillover from 
other PIIGS means that IT spreads contain important information for other countries. 
In terms of the magnitude of response, the core nations have limited influence 
compared with the PIIGS. The responses of the core countries can be ranked (highest 
to lowest): BG, FR, UK, DE and AT. Also, although two core countries, BG and FR, 
have a greater influence on SP spread after bailout, the dominant effect on SP depends 
on the information contained in the spread of a country, which explains the close 
connection between the PIIGS.    
Figure 15 Response of EU countries spreads to Spain shock, before bailout 
 
This figure depicts the response of EU countries to SP shock, before SP bailout, using the GIRF 
estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five in 
legend), while IR, IT and PT are the group of PIIGS (bottom three in legend).  
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Figure 16 Spain response to shock from other EU nations, after bailout 
 
This figure depicts the response of SP spreads to shock from other EU nations, after SP bailout, using 
the GIRF estimation results (for 22 days). The core nations include AT, BG, FR, DE and UK (top five 
in legend), while IR, IT and PT are the group of PIIGS (bottom three in legend).  
 
4.6.2.4.4 Discussion 
Claiming a bank rescue plan rather than sovereign rescue package during the 
VRYHUHLJQGHEWFULVLV6SDLQDVNHGIRU¼EQWRKHOSLWVIDLOLQJQDWLRQDOL]HGEDQNV
Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco and Banco de Valencia. As the fifth largest 
economy in the EU, Spain had the lowest debt level among the other 10 EU member 
states studies here (53.9% in 2010), from 2007 to 2012. However, the government 
spent a large amount of money to bail out banks after a housing bubble burst. Spain 
maintained a high deficit-GDP ratio since 2009 (around 10%) and the highest 
unemployment rate in the EU, of over 20% in 2011. The difficulty in bond markets 
LQ-XQHOHGWRWKH¼EQEDQNLQJVHFWRUVXSSRUWSDFNDJH  
Spain should be less affected by other sovereign states but have a large influence on 
others, considering its importance in the EU economy and relatively stable sovereign 
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debt compared with the other PIIGS. The argument is supported by the Granger 
causality test and cointegration test results, where we find only AT, FR, DE and PT 
could Granger-cause the Spanish spreads, while the latter were able to Granger cause 
most of the other countries. A Spanish shock had a permanent effect on other 
countries before the bailout, which is in line with our H1.  
After bailout, the Granger causality test underlines the importance of SP spread in 
determining others, as SP Granger-caused all core nations, which backs our H2. 
Additionally, cointegration analysis suggests that SP spread does not join the error 
correction but provides the stochastic trend. Furthermore, IRF results imply that BG, 
FR, IR, IT and PT are more sensitive to changes in SP after its bailout. The finding is 
in agreement with the hypothesis that Spain, as the fifth largest economy in the EU, 
has a large influence on others when these EU nations are more exposed to Spanish 
risk through their provision of funds for the bailout.  
Financial aid from the core countries serves as credit guarantee for Spain led  to 
6SDLQ¶V KLgher reliance on the cores. Although AT, DE, UK and IT still had a 
VLJQLILFDQW LQIOXHQFH RQ 63 DIWHU WKH EDLORXW RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ VSUHDGV VKRZ PXFK
weaker impacts on SP, as the Granger causality test suggests by finding only AT 
could Granger-cause SP. Furthermore, in the long-term relation, SP fails to join the 
error correction in all cases. It is consistent with our assumption that SP would be 
less affected by others, due to the nature of the bailout. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported only in the cases of Austria and Germany, which are the influential forces 
in the EU. 
Comparing the responses across countries, we find support for a difference in 
reaction being caused by country-specific characteristics (H4). Before intervention, 
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countries with more information (no bailout, high debt and deficit) are more 
influenced by SP shock, while least affected countries were those with a better fiscal 
outlook. A similar pattern is found in the post-bailout period.  
To sum up, our results support H1, as Granger causality and cointegration tests and 
IRF suggest that Spain led and then spilled over into other countries before its bailout. 
After announcement of the aid package, the lead role of Spain was enhanced for most 
countries, supporting H2. According to IRF, although the impact of other nations was 
shown to be stable, most of their influences were weaker than in pre-bailout periods. 
H3 is supported only in the relations between Spain and Austria and Germany, the 
most active forces in these bailouts. However, comparing across countries, AT and 
'(DUHQRWWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUVLQGHWHUPLQLQJ6SDLQ¶VVSUHDGVDVRWKHU3,,*6
and BG shocks can trigger larger responses. In the cross-country analysis, the fiscally 
healthy and the bailed-out nations are less connected ZLWK6SDLQ¶VVSUHDG,QDGGLWLRQ
the non-bailout PIIGS were closely linked to SP spread. Thus, H4 is confirmed by the 
importance of country-specific characteristics. The influence of a country (how much 
D FRXQWU\ DIIHFWV RWKHUV GHSHQGV RQ LWV ³LQIRUPDWLRQ´ ZKLOH LWV VHQVLWLYLW\ WR DQ
H[WHUQDO LPSDFW KRZ PXFK D FRXQWU\ LV DIIHFWHG E\ RWKHUV GHSHQGV RQ LWV ³ILVFDO
VLWXDWLRQ´   
4.7 Conclusions and implications 
6RYHUHLJQFUHGLWUDWLQJVHUYLQJDVDQLQGLFDWRURIDFRXQWU\¶VFUHGLWULVNKDVEHHQD
hotly debated topic in both industry and academia, particularly since the start of the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Academic studies from the 1990s onwards suggest 
that it has significant influence on the bond, stock and CDS markets. We study the 
dynamic between daily sovereign credit rating and outlook and CDS spreads for 37 
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international markets from November 2004 to June 2012, and the spillover effect 
between these markets. We apply a VECM model and Granger causality test in order 
to estimate bi-directional links between credit ratings and sovereign CDS spreads. 
Under a panel regression framework, we focus on spillover of sovereign rating 
information to CDS spreads across borders over periods of crisis (December 2007±
June 2009, August 2010±June 2012) and pre-crisis (November 2004±December 2007, 
June 2009±August 2011).  
First, our results show the bilateral links for daily CDS spreads in international 
markets and sovereign credit rating/outlook. There is a significant response of 
government CDS spreads to both rating and outlook, with a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and rating/outlook for the majority of 
countries. Credit ratings and outlooks lead sovereign CDS spreads in most cases. Past 
rating and outlook revision may help to anticipate changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
but the results of the Granger causality tests suggest a mixed causality relation. 
Second, we find negative international spillover effects of outlook changes on CDS 
markets, but no similar influence from rating changes. These results imply that 
outlook improvement not only narrows the CDS spreads of local countries but also 
affects those in other markets. Moreover, credit quality of the home countries does 
not have much influence on such spillover, while its µoutlook¶ shows significance at 
the 10% level. The results further suggest spillover is a regional effect rather than a 
global effect. Countries within the same region share more linkages through bilateral 
and third-party trading, commonalities among lenders, political connections and 
other sources (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2003), making sense of spillover being 
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limited to the same region. However, the US market is found to have a significant 
global influence. 
Finally, during times of crisis, sovereign CDS spreads become more sensitive to 
external factors: regional outlook changes and the US market. These external spillover 
factors had a much weaker influence in the pre-crisis period. This is in line with the 
findings of Fender et al. (2012), who suggest that, in the times of turmoil, international 
investors are more sensitive to recent developments in the global environment. 
Generally in the spillover estimation, credit outlook had more persistent effect on CDS 
spreads than credit rating, suggesting that outlook changes have a greater influence on 
changes in CDS spreads. 
Overall, we find that sovereign CDS markets react to and are led by credit rating and 
outlook. Over the short term, rating and outlook changes in countries within the same 
region can strongly influence CDS spreads. This spillover effect is especially strong 
during periods of crisis. The large US market has a unique, universal impact on other 
markets. 
As for the Eurozone debt crisis, a series of financial supporting measures was 
introduced by the EU and IMF in order to rescue troubled countries from default. 
These interventions changed the interaction between the credit risks of the EU 
members. This study sought to detect bilateral linkages (spillover) in the sovereign 
credit markets and to capture the presence of any contagion effect by focusing on 
parallel movements between markets (sovereign CDS and credit rating and the CDS 
spreads of different countries) in the wake of the recent crisis, and the role of policy 
intervention in the changes. Four hypotheses are proposed for the study. First, before 
bailout, changes in the credit risk of bailed-out countries affect the credit risk of core 
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European countries. Second, after the bailout programmes were implemented, the 
credit risk changes for bailed-out nations have even more influence on core countries 
than before. Third, DIWHUDEDLORXWDFRXQWU\¶VVSUHDGVDUHPRUHVHQVLWLYHWRFKDQJHV
LQ FRUH FRXQWULHV¶ FUHGLW Uisk. Finally, comparing the different interactions across 
countries, we propose that these differences depend on country-specific 
characteristics, like fundamentals (debt and deficit level) and how informative its 
spreads are. The vulnerability of a countr\ WRH[WHUQDO VKRFNGHSHQGVRQ LWV³ILVFDO
VLWXDWLRQ´7KHLQIOXHQFHRIDFRXQWU\¶V&'6VSUHDGGHSHQGVRQLWV³LQIRUPDWLRQ´ 
For the first hypothesis, before intervention, the spreads of bailed-out countries have 
strong influence on core European countries. This argument is supported in the case 
of all aid packages: the bailout of Greece 1st, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. We find 
that the credit risk spillover channel is from PIIGS to the cores before intervention. 
In this period, the development of the Greek spread contains crucial information for 
the spread of other EU nations: the fear of contagion and expectation of future 
financial aid. 
Since the financing plan makes the core countries more exposed to the credit risk of 
the bailed-out country, changes in spreads for the PIIGS are able to trigger a larger 
VKLIWLQFRUHFRXQWULHV+DVLQWKHFDVHRI,UHODQG¶V3RUWXJDO¶VDQG6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW
Nevertheless, not all core countries are more sensitive to a PIIGS after its bailout: 
this was the case for AT anG'(LQ ,UHODQG¶VEDLORXW IRU$7DQG)5LQ3RUWXJDO¶V
EDLORXWDQGIRU%*DQG)5LQ6SDLQ¶VEDLORXW7KHVHVWURQJO\DIIHFWHGVWDWHV$XVWULD
Belgium, France and Germany) are all Eurozone countries, while the UK was less 
affected. Moreover, the influences RI EDLORXW FRXQWULHV GLIIHU DFURVV FDVHV 6SDLQ¶V
spread shows a significant impact on other PIIGS countries, while Greece, Ireland 
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and Portugal affect only core countries. The strong effect of a Spanish shock relates 
to the size of its economy and features of its bailout. This heterogeneity is related to 
our Hypothesis 4.  
As for our third hypothesis, we conclude that the core countries gain more influence 
on the spreads of bailed-out countries after the intervention for every bailout, 
especially Austria and Germany, according to IRF. Since the core countries 
contributed to the funding of the bailouts, and served as credit guarantees for the 
PIIGS, the bailed-out countries had a greater higher reliance on core countries, which 
in turn could lead to increased sensitivity of a core country to its own debt crisis if 
credit issues emerge.  
Finally, the spillover of credit risk is consistent across countries and rescue plans 
after intervention. The links between the bailed-out country and others follows the 
same pattern, for each bailout. The performance depends on the country-specific 
characteristic at that time, rather than the group that the country belongs to (PIIGS or 
core). The influence of a country (how much a country affects others) depends on its 
³LQIRUPDWLRQ´WKHPRUHLQIRUPDWLYHLWVVSUHDGLVWKHPRUHLQIOXHQFHLWhas. Sensitivity 
to external impact (how much a country is affected by others) is related to LWV³ILVFDO
VLWXDWLRQ´WKHVWURQJHULWVILVFDORXWORRNLVWKHOHVVLWLVFRQWUROOHGE\H[WHUQDl shocks.  
Thus, this study is able to provide insights for both international investors and policy 
makers. International investors are worried about the increasing links in asset prices 
across national boundaries and asset classes. If cross-country and cross-market 
correlation changes during periods of crisis, portfolio diversification could fail to 
deliver safety. In these circumstances, diversification strategies for portfolio 
management would be unable to diversify risk, leaving the portfolio exposed to 
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international shocks. Our results confirm their worries regarding international 
integration. Nevertheless, our study also suggests that the contagion is regional rather 
than global. During periods of crisis, further portfolio diversification across 
international markets could help limit potential credit risk spillover. On the other 
hand, for speculators, it could create a profit margin in the co-movement if they 
understand the direction and channels of information transmission. For arbitragers, 
finding the difference and lead-lag relation between credit derivate markets is 
profitable. 
For policy makers, at the country level, of the two factors affecting contagion, the 
more crucial is the national fiscal situation. To reduce likelihood of financial 
contagion, it would be necessary to reduce the fiscal and current account deficit, 
enhance the quality of the financial sector, and improve the exchange rate (with 
non-EU currencies). It should also be noted that countries in financial distress are 
highly sensitive to any shock from the bailed-out countries, as shown in the 
cross-country IRF analysis. Without reducing the financial stresses, either by 
improve fundamentals or through rescue funds, it would not be possible to keep the 
sovereign credit market stable and solid.  
At the EU policy level, the euro was introduced to provide a strong currency across 
financial markets and avoid devaluations. The stability pact forces each government 
to remain within the deficit limit, at 6%, and debt limit, at 60%. But there is no 
supranational government to control tax, spending and transfer between poor and 
rich members. Although different countries fell into crisis for different reasons, 
excessive credit creation was a common factor that needs to be taken account of by 
regulators and policy makers. The crisis resolution mechanism (the ESM) provides a 
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precious lesson for the EU, and may serve as evidence of the need for a Eurobond, as 
that might to solve the debt issue forever.   
The ECB faces constitutional and political obstacles, and is unable to act like the 
Bank of England, for instance, which has used QE to allow the purchase of 
government debt. The ECB has nevertheless done a considerable part in avoiding an 
HYHQZRUVHFULVLVE\DGRSWLQJDVHULHVRI³XQFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDVXUHV´6HWWLQJXSD
permanent firewall to protect its members from future crisis should be on its task list. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Dynamic correlation between variances in 
sovereign CDS market during the 
Eurozone debt crisis 
5.1 Introduction 
Modelling volatility in financial time series has attracted much attention ever since 
the introduction of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model by 
Engle (1982). A large body of literature has been devoted to univariate models, but 
modelling co-movements of financial volatility is of great practical importance. The 
instability observed on sovereign CDS spreads of one country is in part due to 
volatility in another market (volatility spillover), especially surrounding policy 
intervention date. Reliable estimates of this correlation between financial instruments 
have been the motivation for both academics and practitioners. Indeed, accurate 
knowledge of such correlations is critical for many common tasks in financial 
management. Hedging require estimation of correlations between assets. If the 
correlations and volatilities change over time, then the hedging strategies will be 
ineffective and require adjustment to account for the most recent information and 
changes. Both asset allocation and risk management rely heavily on correlation and 
covariances. Construction of an optimal portfolio requires a forecast of the 
correlation of the returns. Similarly, the calculation of the standard deviation of 
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portfolio requires a covariance matrix of all the assets in the portfolio. Furthermore, 
for a better understanding of the influence of financial policy interventions on market 
correlations, a study of the nature of such correlations over time is also necessary. 
The problem presented by the financial crisis is that the correlation of asset returns, 
linked by fundamentals, appears to change, across both national boundaries and asset 
classes (Bollerslev et al., 1988). Andersen et al. (2001) emphasize that correlations 
increase during periods of high volatility, which crisis periods generally are. Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) focus on cross-market correlation coefficients and show that 
these estimations are biased and inaccurate because of heteroscedasticity. According 
to their results, higher co-movements in different markets could be caused by 
increased market volatility. This questions the usual implicit assumption of constant 
correlation/covariance and calls for econometric approaches to capture the evolution 
of correlations over time.  
To overcome the limitations of conditional variance and heteroscedasticity in 
previous studies, new models have been developed to control for the phenomenon of 
time-varying volatility. Based on the multivariate constant correlation generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model of Bollerslev (1990), 
Beine (2004) applies the VEC model of Bollerslev et al. (1988) to look at the impact 
of central bank intervention on the variances and covariances between yen-dollar and 
euro-dollar exchange rates. He suggests that increases in the covariance are 
associated with concerted interventions. In order to investigate the causality of a 
volatility spillover between the US dollar±Deutschemark and the US dollar±Japanese 
yen exchange rates, a test statistic built on the results from GARCH estimations was 
calculated by Hong (2001).  
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As one extension of the multivariate constant correlation GARCH models, the 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model is frequently used by researchers for 
measuring time-varying conditional correlations. It is able to address the 
heteroscedasticity problem without dividing the whole sample period into 
sub-periods. Also, the model is able to trace the time-varying correlation coefficients 
for groups of markets. Chiang et al. (2007) found an increase in correlation and 
continued high covariance for the Asian crisis in 1997 using a DCC model. More 
recently, Missio and Watzka (2011) focused on bond market links during the 
sovereign debt crisis using the DCC approach. They explain why the Engle (2002) 
model, among other multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) models, is suitable for DCC estimates. The model 
can capture the dynamics of both the variances and the correlations. Therefore, the 
estimation method allows for a correction of heteroscedasticity, and, in addition, no 
exogenous sub-sample assumptions have to be made.  
The present study investigates the correlation of variances between 9 major European 
Monetary Union (EMU) countrieV¶ FUHGLW GHIDXOW VZDS &'6 PDUNHWV GXULQJ WKH
sovereign debt crisis, and hence examines the impacts of policy interventions on 
these markets, using the DCC-GARCH model. Specifically, the main purpose is to 
assess to what extent the bailout plans influenced the dynamics of correlation. To the 
best of our knowledge, such a study examining dynamic correlation between 
variances of sovereign CDS spreads in the context of the Eurozone debt crisis has not 
been reported. This study sought to reconcile the aforementioned two streams of 
literature: the econometric approaches estimating the time-varying correlation 
between markets, and the empirical analysis of the impact of policy intervention. 
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Understanding the link between financial intervention and cross-country correlation 
is valuable for both portfolio optimization and forecasting.  
The main findings of this study are that correlations between CDS spread variances 
are dynamic and time-varying for all the sample countries. There was a significant 
pattern for all the bilateral relations. Most of the policy interventions led to a 
significant increase in pairwise correlations. A temporary reaction, with a subsequent 
reversion to the normal range, is suggested to be an intervention-caused contagion 
effect. Comparing across countries, correlations with Austria and Germany were less 
volatile and showed a weaker reaction to these interventions. One interpretation of 
this pattern is that there was ³two-ZD\IHHGEDFN´ between the healthy country and 
the bailed-out country, as proposed by Acharya et al. (2011), in the form of 
public-to-public risk transfer. The increased debt and deficit partly result from 
assisting other troubled nations. Through policy interventions, any deterioration in 
the sovereign creditworthiness of the healthy countries can transmit back to the 
bailed-out countries.  
To assess the impact of policy intervention, our empirical analysis controls for the 
external regressors, including implied volatility of S&P 500 index options (VIX) and 
credit rating and outlook. The estimation result suggests that credit rating and 
outlook and VIX do not show much impact on the dynamic conditional correlations 
between the variances of EMU countries, while announcements of policy 
intervention have a significant and consistent impact on pairwise cross-market 
correlations. This finding suggests that policy interventions play a direct and 
significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlations in EMU markets. 
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5.2 Data 
We use daily sovereign CDS spread for 9 EMU countries in Dataset 2: Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BG), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), 
Portugal (PT), and Spain (SP). Our sample time span starts from 28 April 2009 
(shortly after the bank bailout programme was implemented but before Greece 
announced its 12.5% deficit) and ends at 17 February 2013. We also include the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, VIX. This serves as a proxy for global 
ILQDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFLQIOXHQFHDQGFDSWXUHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶ULVNDYHUVLRQ 
as it was shown to be a constant and significant source of international spillover in 
the previous chapter. The sovereign credit rating and outlook changes for the 9 
countries in the sample are also included to examine their impact on the dynamic 
correlations.  
The Ljung-Box test results, presented in Table 24, show that most of the countries 
have autocorrelation at lag 1, and most of them remain autocorrelated with more lags. 
The ARCH-LM test results, shown in Table 25, reveal that all series exhibit 
conditional heteroscedasticity, and justify application of the GARCH model.  
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Table 24 Ljung-Box test for CDS spread changes 
Lag 
 
1 2 3 4 
Austria 
 
0.578  0.814  0.435  0.528  
Belgium  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***   
France 
 
0.000***   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Germany  0.044**  0.008***  0.021**  0.022**  
Greece  0.168  0.170  0.041**  0.043**  
Ireland 
 
0.003***  0.005***  0.003***  0.000*** 
Italy  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Portugal 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Spain  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0. 0.000*** 
This table shows the Ljung±Box test statistic (p-value) for examining the null hypothesis of 
independence in the error term. We try several lag values (1, 2, 3, 4) to see if the conclusion reached 
changes for different values. If not, then the conclusion is clear, whereas if rejected, then the 
conclusion is that the data has autocorrelation. The results show that most of the countries have 
autocorrelation at lag 1, and most of them remain autocorrelated with more lags. Significance level 
denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1   
 
Table 25 ARCH-LM test for conditional heteroscedasticity 
lag  1 2 4 8 10 12 
Austria  0.02311**  0.00041***  0.00028***  0.00033***  0.00084***  0.00070***  
Belgium  0.00184***  0.00155***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  
France  0.01593**  0.00087***  0.00001***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00001***  
Germany  0.02593**  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  
Greece  0.02777**  0.02760**  0.00086***  0.00629***  0.00340***  0.00173***  
Ireland  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  
Italy  0.05387*  0.00000*** 0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  
Portugal   0.04289**  0.00003***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  
Spain  0.08203*  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000***  0.00000 *** 
This table shows the ARCH-LM test statistic (p-value) for examining the null hypothesis of no ARCH 
effect. Results of different lag length are shown (1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12) to see if the conclusion reached 
changes for different values. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is an ARCH effect in the CDS 
spreads series. The results show that all countries have ARCH at the 10% level of significance, and 
the effect becomes stronger with more lags. Significance level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, 
*=p<0.1  
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5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Multivariate GARCH models 
This study looks at the correlations EHWZHHQPDMRU(08FRXQWULHV¶&'6PDUNHWV
during the sovereign debt crisis, and hence examines the impacts of policy 
interventions on these markets. Specifically, it assesses to what extent the policy 
interventions influenced the dynamics of correlations of sovereign CDS spreads. 
Most tests measuring correlations and covariances fail to account for their 
time-varying nature, and generally divide the sample period into sub-samples to 
examine the impact of policies, causing heteroscedasticity and sub-sample bias.  
The dynamic of correlation of several assets can be studied using the multivariate 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) model. This 
model has to be parsimonious as well as interpretable, with positive definiteness of 
estimated covariance or correlation matrices. The problem with MGARCH models is 
that they not only increase the number of parameters to be estimated but also 
complicate the specifications of the conditional variance-covariance matrix. Missio 
and Watzka (2011) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2008) provide useful  
guidance on the choice of MGARCH model. Although several models are feasible 
technically, interpretation in the context of contagion analysis is suggested to be 
difficult. These MGARCH models are discussed further below. 
The first GARCH model for conditional covariance matrices is the VEC model, 
proposed by Bollerslev et al. (1988). The VEC operator converts a matrix to a vector 
by stacking its columns. It is a straightforward generalization of the univariate 
GARCH model. Each conditional variance and covariance is a function of all lagged 
conditional variances and covariances, and lagged squared returns and cross-products 
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returns. The original model is computationally very demanding, and anyway often 
contains too many parameters to be applicable. The simplified version of the model, 
³GLDJRQDO9(&´VWLOOFRQWDLQVST11SDUDPHWHUV7ZRPDLQDSSURDFKHV
have been used to find more parsimonious alternatives: imposing restrictions on the 
parameters of the VEC model, including the BEKK and factor models; and 
modelling conditional covariance through conditional variances and correlations, as 
in the VC, CCC and DCC-GARCH models.   
Engle and Kroner (1995) introduced a model that can directly measure the 
time-varying covariance, called the Baba-Engle-Kraft-Kroner (BEKK) model. In this 
model and its generalizations, systems of simultaneous equations are analysed and 
provide sufficient constraints to allow for the positive definiteness of conditional 
covariance matrices. The model is feasible in terms of technical correctness and 
estimation procedures. However, it requires the specification of too many 
parameters.30 Moreover, difficulty in interpretation of the estimated parameters 
makes it inappropriate for contagion analysis.  
The factor GARCH model developed by Engle et al. (1990) follows a conditional 
heteroscedasticity process in estimating the covariance matrices. Its advantage is the 
simplicity of its estimation procedure, but it has drawbacks in selecting the correct 
factor for covariance matrices and interpretation of the results.  
The constant conditional correlation (CCC) model was proposed by Bollerslev 
(1990). Its conditional covariance matrix is expressed as  ?௧ ൌ  ?௧ ? ?௧. Unlike other 
models estimating the covariance matrices directly, it models the conditional 
variances and conditional correlations instead. A constant conditional correlation 
                                                          
30
 Chiang et al. (2007) show the BEKK model becomes costly in estimation time if expanded to three 
asset returns.  
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matrix is estimated by calculating a GARCH estimation for each asset, while the 
covariance is proportional to the square root of the product of the estimated variance. 
However, the constant conditional correlation assumption has to be tested (Metiu, 
2012), and the model is not suitable for the study of contagion when the correlation 
is constant, which indicates interdependence.  
Due to the intuitive interpretation of correlations, a vast number of studies extend the 
CCC-GARCH model by specifying the correlation matrix,  ?௧. Tse and Tsui (2002) 
proposed the Varying Correlation (VC) model. It ensures the positive definiteness of 
the correlation matrix by construction. Furthermore, similar to other models, the 
VC-GARCH model improves the CCC model for extra parameters. However, the 
number of parameters is N(N+1)/2+2 in each correlation equation, which is a 
significant weakness when N is large. 
As another extension of CCC, the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model, 
introduced by Engle (2002), satisfies all the requirements above. The estimated 
correlation matrices are positive definite. From a theoretical point of view, the results 
are easier to interpret, as the correlation dynamics are the key in contagion analysis. 
From an econometric point of view, the DCC model has three advantages. First, it 
estimates correlation coefficients of standardized residuals accounting for 
heteroscedasticity. Second, it allows the inclusion of additional exogenous variables. 
Third, the model can examine multiple asset returns without adding too many 
parameters (two parameters for DCC-GARCH), allowing us to process many more 
correlation-coefficient series in one representation.  
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5.3.2 Dynamic Conditional Correlation - GARCH model 
Let  ?௜௧ ൌ  ? ?ଵ௧ǡ ǥ ǡ  ?௜௧ ? ? be the vector of interest, changes in CDS spreads in this case. 
With random disturbance terms,  ?௜௧ , time-varying covariance matrix  ?௧  and 
conditional variance equations of  ?௧, then: 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?൅෍   ௜ ?௧ି௜௠௜ୀଵ ൅෍   ௝ ?௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅  ?௧ (21) 
 
The dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 31  allows for the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix,  ?௧, to be time-varying. Therefore 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?௧ ?௧ ?௧ ൌ  ?௜௝ට ?௜௜௧ ?௝௝௧  (22) 
where  ?௧ is the ( ൈ ) diagonal matrix of the time-varying standard deviations 
from univariate GARCH models with ඥ ?௜௜௧ on the ith diagonal; and  ?௧ ൌ  ? ?௜௝ ?௧ is 
the time-varying correlation matrix, which needs to be inverted in calculation at 
every point, making the process much slower. The dynamic matrix process is 
modelled by a proxy process,  ?௧, as  ?௧ ൌ  ? െ  ? െ  ? ?ത ൅  ?௧ିଵ ?௧ିଵ ? ൅  ? ?௧ିଵ (23) 
where a and b are non-negative scalars, with constraint  ൅  ൏  ? to ensure 
stationary and positive definiteness.  ?௧is the ( ൈ ) time-varying covariance 
matrix of the standardized error, while  ?ത is the unconditional variance matrix of the 
standardized error,  ?௧. Since  ?௧ does not generally have ones on the diagonal, the 
correlation matrix, R, is obtained by rescaling  ?௧. 
                                                          
31
 For detailed overview of the MGARCH model, see Chiang et al. (2007), Silvennoinen and 
Teräsvirta (2008) and Missio and Watzka (2011). 
Chapter 5                                            Dynamic covariances of sovereign CDS markets 
166 
 
 ?௧ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ ? ?ିଵȀଶ ?௧ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?௧ ? ?ିଵȀଶ (24) 
A typical element of  ?௧ is of the form: 
 ?௜௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ?௜௝ǡ௧ඥ ?௜௜ǡ௧ ?௝௝ǡ௧ ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ǡ ? ്  ? (25) 
For a bivariate case, the correlation could be expressed as follows: 
 ?ଵଶǡ௧ൌ  ? െ  ? െ  ? ?തଵଶ ൅  ? ?ଵǡ௧ିଵ ?ଶǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ? ?ଵଶǡ௧ିଵට ? െ  ? െ  ? ?തଵଵ ൅  ? ?ଵǡ௧ିଵଶ ൅  ? ?ଵଵǡ௧ିଵට ? െ  ? െ  ? ?തଶଶ ൅ ? ?ଶǡ௧ିଵଶ ൅  ? ?ଶଶǡ௧ିଵ (26) 
The log-likelihood function can be decomposed into a volatility and correlation 
component,  
 ? ?ൌ  ? ?෍ ? ?  ? ?൅  ? ? ? ?ȁ ?௧ȁ ൅  ? ? ?ȁ ?௧ȁ ൅  ?௧ ? ?௧ି ଵ ?௧ ? ?்௜ୀଵ
ൌ  ? ?෍ ? ?  ? ?൅  ? ? ? ?ȁ ?௧ȁ ൅  ?௧ ? ?௧ି ଶ ?௧ ?்௜ୀଵ
െ  ? ?෍ ? ?௧ ? ?௧ ൅  ? ? ?ȁ ?௧ȁ ൅  ?௧ ? ?௧ି ଵ ?௧ ? ?்௜ୀଵ ൌ  ? ?௏ ? ?ଵ ?൅  ? ?ோ ? ?ଵǡ  ?ଶ ? 
(27) 
where  ? ?௏ ?Ʌଵ ? is the volatility component with parameters Ʌଵ, and  ? ?ோ ?Ʌଵǡ Ʌଶ ? is 
the correlation component with parameters Ʌଵ and Ʌଶ. The volatility component, 
the first part of the likelihood function, is the sum of the individual GARCH 
likelihoods, which can be maximized by separately maximizing each univariate 
model. The correlation component can be maximized to estimate correlation 
coefficients.  
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5.3.3 Model specification 
Although the constant correlation GARCH model satisfies the positive-definite 
condition for the variance-covariance matrix, its validity has to be examined32. More 
importantly, it fails to demonstrate the evolution of correlations over time. Therefore, 
we propose using Engle's (2002) two-step dynamic conditional correlation GARCH 
(DCC-GARCH) model.  
The specification of a DCC-GARCH model requires the identification of lag order 
for: the mean model in Eq (21), the variance model in Eq (23), and the distribution 
model, which is commonly normally distributed, and written as  ?௧ȁ ?௧ିଵ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ?௧ ?. 
Mean model 
To start with, we specify the return equation by fitting an ARMA(m,n) model: 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?൅෍   ௜ ?௧ି௜௠௜ୀଵ ൅෍   ௝ ?௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅  ?௧ (28) 
 
where  ?௧ is the return of the variables, which are the changes in CDS spreads in our 
study, and  ?௧  is the error. The lag-OHQJWK LV VHOHFWHG E\ PLQLPL]LQJ $NDLNH¶V
Information Criterion33, for which we try different orders of ARMA(m,n) models up 
to ARMA(3,3). The results are shown in Table 26. These indicate MA(1) for Austria, 
ARMA(2,2) for Belgium, ARMA(3,1) for France, MA(2) for Germany, ARMA(2,2) 
for Greece, ARMA(2,3) for Ireland, ARMA(1,3) for Italy, AR(3) for Portugal, and 
ARMA(2,2) for Spain. In addition, the models are checked for no remaining 
autocorrelation using the Ljung-Box test, the results of which are shown in the last 
                                                          
32
 The CCC assumption is estimated in Appendix 11. 
33
 Similar approach is adopted by Missio and Watzka (2011) and Dungey and Martin (2007). 
Chapter 5                                            Dynamic covariances of sovereign CDS markets 
168 
 
row of Table 26. The test does not reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation for any 
of the countries, which justifies the appropriateness of the ARMA() specification.  
Variance model 
The specification of the GARCH(p,q) order is chosen by minimizing the information 
criterion (IC). The Akaike information criterion, Bayes information criterion, Shibata 
information criterion and Hannan-Quinn information criterion are reported in Table 
27. The methodology identifies a GARCH(1,1) for most of the cases, despite the fact 
that there is some conflict between the criteria. Moreover, previous researchers, like 
Beine (2004), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Chiang et al. (2007) and Sachs et al. 
(1996), generally suggest that the simplest GARCH(1,1) specification works 
reasonably well in capturing the dynamics of variances. Therefore, we have the 
following variance equation: 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?ଵ ൅  ?௜ ?௧ି௜ ൅  ?௜ ?௧ିଵଶ  (29) 
Standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) for each country are checked for 
remaining conditional heteroscedasticity using the ARCH-LM test, the results of 
which are shown in the last column of Table 27. None of them rejects the null 
hypothesis of no remaining conditional heteroscedasticity, which endorses the 
appropriateness of the use of GARCH(1,1).  
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Table 26 ARMA specification 
ARMA 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
(1,0) 
 
-2841.44 -3010.96 -3002.57 -2848.02 -2013.92 -3381.87 -2978.81 -3100.86 -3003.06 
(0,1) 
 
-2841.47 -3010.95 -3002.45 -2848.38 -2013.77 -3381.35 -2977.86 -3095.85 -3003.08 
(1,1) 
 
-2840.71 -3009.12 -3000.65 -2850.12 -2012.25 -3381.64 -2977.58 -3098.98 -3001.65 
(2,0) 
 
-2839.66 -3009.25 -3000.74 -2852.42 -2013.5 -3381.41 -2978.34 -3099.12 -3002.57 
(0,2) 
 
-2839.76 -3009.24 -3000.9 -2852.81 -2014.4 -3380.95 -2979.35 -3105.16 -3002.71 
(2,1) 
 
-2838.77 -3010.64 -3005.94 -2850.69 -2018.59 -3379.9 -2986.36 -3104.37 -3017.63 
(1,2) 
 
-2838.77 -3010.58 -3000.25 -2851.28 -2018.56 -3380.09 -2981.62 -3105.23 -3002.54 
(2,2) 
 
-2837.2 -3010.97 -3006.98 -2849.83 -2025.35 -3395.88 -2985.33 -3111.32 -3027.71 
(3,0) 
 
-2840.61 -3010.23 -3004.92 -2850.42 -2016.96 -3382.62 -2988.08 -3113.35 -3021.17 
(0,3) 
 
-2840.61 -3009.74 -3003.17 -2850.95 -2015.59 -3385.14 -2985.2 -3107.13 -3011.12 
(3,1) 
 
-2838.96 -3009.92 -3007.39 -2848.42 -2015.72 -3389.22 -2986.69 -3112.82 -3025.99 
(1,3) 
 
-2839.1 -3009.6 -3006.6 -2849.6 -2015.13 -3389.69 -2988.5 -3110.11 -3022.38 
(3,2) 
 
-2841 -3010.13 -3005.25 -2847.82 -2020.09 -3401.99 -2987.41 -3111.56 -3025.9 
(2,3) 
 
-2841.01 -3009.84 -3005.51 -2847.8 -2020.18 -3402.45 -2986.86 -3111.41 -3025.9 
(3,3) 
 
-2841.32 -3008.2 -3003.58 -2849.95 -2022.57 -3400.53 -2985.55 -3112.88 -3023.97 
p-value   0.99 0.75 1 0.97 0.49 0.98 0.97 0.88 0.92 
The mean equation of the GARCH specification is identified by fitting an ARMA(m,n) model, while the lag-length selection is identified via AIC. The model is estimated for 
up to ARMA(3,3) for each country. The lag with the smallest AIC is chosen and highlighted in bold.  Moreover, the remaining autocorrelation in the residual in each 
respective ARMA() model is examined using the Ljung-Box test. The p-value of the Ljung-Box test is shown in the last row, which does not reject the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation.  
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Table 27 GARCH specification 
 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(2,1) GARCH(2,2) ARCH-LM 
Austria          
Akaike -3.0864 -3.0845 -3.0863 -3.0858 
0.73 Bayes -3.0566 -3.0498 -3.0516 -3.0461 Shibata -3.0865 -3.0846 -3.0864 -3.0859 
Hannan-Quinn -3.0751 -3.0713 -3.0731 -3.0707 
Belgium 
    
 
Akaike -3.1645 -3.1672 -3.1655 -3.1635 
0.55 Bayes -3.1198 -3.1176 -3.1159 -3.1089 Shibata -3.1646 -3.1674 -3.1657 -3.1637 
Hannan-Quinn -3.1475 -3.1484 -3.1466 -3.1427 
France 
    
 
Akaike -3.1717 -3.1697 -3.1697 -3.1728 
0.69 Bayes -3.1271 -3.1201 -3.1201 -3.1182 Shibata -3.1719 -3.1699 -3.1699 -3.1730 
Hannan-Quinn -3.1547 -3.1508 -3.1508 -3.1520 
Germany 
    
 
Akaike -3.0042 -3.0022 -3.0061 -3.0062 
0.34 Bayes -2.9695 -2.9625 -2.9664 -2.9615 Shibata -3.0043 -3.0023 -3.0062 -3.0063 
Hannan-Quinn -2.9910 -2.9871 -2.9910 -2.9892 
Greece 
    
 
Akaike -2.9996 -2.9969 -2.9971 -2.9944 
0.76 Bayes -2.9433 -2.9344 -2.9346 -2.9257 Shibata -2.9999 -2.9972 -2.9975 -2.9949 
Hannan-Quinn -2.9779 -2.9728 -2.9730 -2.9679 
Ireland 
    
 
Akaike -3.8073 -3.8011 -3.8016 -3.8000 
0.4 Bayes -3.7577 -3.7465 -3.7470 -3.7405 Shibata -3.8075 -3.8013 -3.8018 -3.8003 
Hannan-Quinn -3.7884 -3.7803 -3.7808 -3.7774 
Italy 
    
 
Akaike -3.1554 -3.1533 -3.1651 -3.1640 
0.19 Bayes -3.1107 -3.1037 -3.1155 -3.1094 Shibata -3.1555 -3.1535 -3.1653 -3.1642 
Hannan-Quinn -3.1384 -3.1345 -3.1462 -3.1432 
Portugal 
    
 
Akaike -3.4162 -3.4142 -3.4142 -3.4122 
0.78 Bayes -3.3765 -3.3696 -3.3696 -3.3626 Shibata -3.4163 -3.4144 -3.4144 -3.4124 
Hannan-Quinn -3.4011 -3.3973 -3.3972 -3.3933 
Spain 
    
 
Akaike -3.2200 -3.2180 -3.2205 -3.2185 
0.34 Bayes -3.1754 -3.1684 -3.1709 -3.1639 Shibata -3.2202 -3.2182 -3.2207 -3.2187 
Hannan-Quinn -3.2030 -3.1991 -3.2016 -3.1977 
The variance equation of the GARCH specification is identified by minimizing the information 
criteria. The lag-length is estimated for up to GARCH(2,2) for each country. The lags with the 
smallest IC for these four ICs are highlighted in bold. The residuals of GARCH(1,1) for each country 
are checked for remaining conditional heteroscedasticity using the ARCH-LM test, with the p-value of 
the results shown in the last column. None of them rejects the null hypothesis of no remaining ARCH 
effect. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Estimates of the model 
Table 28 reports the estimates of the mean and variance equations of the 
DCC-GARCH model. One can see from the table that most of the AR and MA terms 
are significant. As ȁ ? ? ?ȁ ൐ ȁ ? ? ?ȁ ൐ ȁ ? ? ?ȁ and ȁ ? ? ?ȁ ൐ ȁ ? ? ?ȁ ൐ ȁ ? ? ?ȁ, the lower 
orders of ARMA(p,q) are shown to have a stronger influence on the return than the 
higher orders. This suggests that a relatively simple model with few lag orders can 
effectively capture the dynamic of returns. Moreover, the magnitudes of ȁ ? ?ȁ are 
larger than ȁ ? ?ȁ in most cases, which further explains why AR(1) is a common 
setup for the GARCH model ± see Chiang et al. (2007) and Dungey and Martin 
(2007). An advantage of this model is the fact that the pairwise correlation 
coefficients for all 9 countries can be estimated in one single system equation. 
In the variance equations, the constant term is less significant and relatively small 
(less than 0.0005) compared with the other two coefficients. The coefficients for the 
lagged variance and the shock-squared term are highly significant, which further 
justifies our specification of GARCH(1,1). Furthermore, the persistence terms (last 
column), measured as the sum of the coefficients of the lagged variance and the 
shock-squared term, are close to unity for all 9 cases, implying a high degree of 
persistent volatility. 
Table 29 indicates that the a and b coefficients in Eq (26) are statistically significant 
at the 10% level for most of pairs, suggesting that the correlations are not constant 
but time-varying. To confirm this, we employ the Engle and Sheppard (2001)¶V:DOG
test, which evaluates the null hypothesis of constant conditional correlation against 
dynamic conditional correlation. If a=b=0, the DCC-GARCH model reduces to the 
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CCC-GARCH model. The p-value of approximately zero rejects the null hypothesis, 
proving that the time-invariant assumption is too restrictive and that the dynamic 
correlation structure is necessary.   
Table 30 reports the summary statistics for conditional correlation coefficients 
estimated by the DCC-GARCH model defined in Eq (25) and (26). The mean 
correlations are generally higher for the PIIGS nations than for the core nations. 
Moreover, Austria is shown to be the nation least influenced by changes in other 
countries, while Italy and Spain are the most influenced. The result indicates a tight 
connection within the PIIGS members. 
Specifically, comparing the statistics of the correlation between Greece and other 
countries, we find that the mean of  ?௜௝ǡ௧ is generally above 0.52 for the PIIGS and 
below 0.51 for the core countries. Italy has the highest correlation with Greece, at 
0.5477, followed by Ireland, at 0.5334. In contrast, Austria has only half of that, at 
0.2981, which is the lowest of these 8 EMU nations. The minimum correlation 
reaches 0.0254, between Greece and Austria, while the maximum correlation is 
0.7855, between Greece and Portugal.  
For Ireland, we find a similar pattern as for Greece. Austria still has the lowest 
average correlation coefficient, at 0.3505, while other core countries generally have 
weaker co-movements with Ireland, compared with the other PIIGS. Italy, again, 
appears to be the most related to Ireland, at 0.6510.  
We find the smallest mean value of correlation for Italy is with Austria, at 0.4224. 
The negative sign in the minimum value of the correlation, between Italy and Austria 
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(-0.1034), means returns move inversely for the two series. The highest correlation is 
for the co-movements between Spain and Italy.  
The smallest mean correlation for Portugal is also with Austria, at 0.3382. 
Comparing the average across the whole sample period, we have the following order, 
from the highest to the lowest: IT, SP, IR, BG, GR, FR, DE and AT. 
Among the correlations for Spain, Austria has the lowest, at 0.4060, while Italy has 
the highest (0.8261), over twice as much as that of Austria.  
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Table 28 Estimation results for the DCC-GARCH model, first stage 
 
Mean equations  Variance equations ଴ ar1 ar2 ar3 ma1 ma2 ma3  ଵ A B Persistence  
Austria -0.002 
   
0.05 
  
 0* 0.045*** 0.947*** 0.992 
 
[-1.512] 
   
[1.514] 
  
 [1.682] [3.606] [78.005]  
Belgium -0.001 1.067*** -0.224 
 
-0.878*** 0.037 
 
 0** 0.161*** 0.747*** 0.908 
 
[-0.383] [5.671] [-1.488] 
 
[-4.589] [0.25] 
 
 [2.294] [3.145] [10.836]  
France 0 0.89*** -0.085 -0.08** -0.728*** 
  
 0 0.101** 0.884*** 0.985 
 
[-0.306] [5.284] [-1.514] [-2.115] [-4.311] 
  
 [1.165] [2.318] [17.507]  
Germany 0 
   
0.129*** -0.016 
 
 0.001** 0.151*** 0.659*** 0.810 
 
[0.05] 
   
[3.209] [-0.379] 
 
 [2.587] [3.178] [7.211]  
Greece 0.003 0.202*** -0.896*** 
 
-0.152*** 0.94*** 
 
 0 0.061*** 0.938*** 0.999 
 
[1.42] [5.094] [-20.969] 
 
[-5.586] [38.369] 
 
 [1.193] [3.326] [48.532]  
Ireland -0.001 -1.101*** -1.001*** 
 
1.292*** 1.219*** 0.197***  0* 0.171** 0.796*** 0.977 
 
[-0.416] [-163.943] [-118.663] 
 
[333.016] [2650.281] [219.062]  [1.954] [2.226] [11.726]  
Italy -0.001 0.815*** 
  
-0.589*** -0.13*** -0.115***  0* 0.133** 0.817*** 0.950 
 
[-0.427] [6.363] 
  
[-4.337] [-3.136] [-2.877]  [1.697] [2.278] [10.896]  
Portugal 0 0.234*** 0.022 -0.018 
   
 0* 0.117*** 0.844*** 0.961 
 
[-0.016] [5.947] [0.58] [-0.531] 
   
 [1.868] [2.699] [15.922]  
Spain 0.001 0.919*** -0.552*** 
 
-0.742*** 0.421* 
 
 0 0.078** 0.907*** 0.985 
 
[0.434] [4.65] [-2.879] 
 
[-3.846] [1.657] 
 
 [1.316] [2.559] [24.152]  
The estimation results of the mean and variance equations of the DCC-GARCH model are described for each country. The persistence level of the variance is calculated as the 
sum of coefficients of A and B (A+B). The t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.  
Mean equation: ୲ ൌ ଴ ൅  ?   ୧୲ି୧ଷ୧ୀଵ ൅  ?   ୨  ୲ି୨ଷ୨ୀଵ ൅   ୲; Variance equation: ୲ ൌ ଵ ൅ ୧୲ି୧ ൅ ୧ɂ୲ିଵଶ .  
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Table 29 Estimation results for the DCC-GARCH, second stage 
  AT BG FR DE GR IR IT PT SP 
Greece 
         
a 
0.082** 0.041* 0.048** 0.043** 
 
0.028 0.052*** 0.069* 0.069* 
[2.311] [1.888] [2.453] [2.168] 
 
[1.175] [2.926] [1.778] [1.778] 
b 0.904*** 0.869*** 0.801*** 0.834***  0.925*** 0.926*** 0.593* 0.593* [18.622] [23.202] [12.439] [19.991] 
 
[9.884] [37.554] [1.763] [1.763] 
Wald test 0.03 0 0 0 
 
0.08 0 0 0 
          Ireland 
         
a 
0.049*** 0.031** 0.015 0.041 0.028 
 
0.019 0.022** 0.012 
[3.403] [2.359] [1.502] [1.375] [1.175] 
 
[1.507] [2.043] [1.089] 
b 0.938*** 0.939*** 0.957*** 0.879*** 0.925***  0.915*** 0.955*** 0.944*** [55.446] [39.281] [34.686] [5.317] [9.884] 
 
[20.5] [45.101] [39.875] 
Wald test 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0 
 
0 0 0 
          Italy 
         
a 
0.054*** 0.032 0.013 0.044** 0.052*** 0.019 
 
0.013* 0.014 
[5.95] [1.289] [1.617] [2.52] [2.926] [1.507] 
 
[1.783] [1.115] 
b 0.943*** 0.954*** 0.969*** 0.881*** 0.926*** 0.915***  0.972*** 0.986*** [101.746] [20.52] [49.961] [15.76] [37.554] [20.497] 
 
[71.299] [53.095] 
Wald test 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 
 
0 0 
          Portugal 
         
a 
0.039*** 0.048* 0.015* 0.03** 0.069* 0.022** 0.013* 
 
0.042*** 
[2.766] [1.741] [1.65] [2.167] [1.778] [2.043] [1.783] 
 
[3.353] 
b 0.949*** 0.912*** 0.976*** 0.945*** 0.593* 0.955*** 0.972***  0.935*** [52.226] [13.909] [58.493] [38.58] [1.763] [45.106] [71.297] 
 
[49.482] 
Wald test 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 
 
0 
          Spain 
         
a 
0.048*** 0.088*** 0.022* 0.036 0.069* 0.012 0.014 0.042*** 
 [4.816] [3.79] [1.893] [0.92] [1.778] [1.089] [1.115] [3.353] 
 
b 0.939*** 0.872*** 0.96*** 0.915*** 0.593* 0.944*** 0.986*** 0.935***  [76.758] [20.915] [44.441] [6.186] [1.763] [39.877] [53.096] [49.48] 
 Wald test 0.01 0 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 0   
The estimation results of the second stage of the DCC-GARCH model are described for each pairwise relation. The coefficient a and b in Eq (26) are calculated. The 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. The Wald test proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001) examines the null 
hypothesis that a=b=0. The p-value of zero rejects the null hypothesis and indicates the assumption of constant conditional correlation is too restrictive. 
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Table 30 Summary statistics ± DCC  ?௜௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ?௜௝ǡ௧ඥ ?௜௜ǡ௧ ?௝௝ǡ௧ 
 
Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Greece       
GR-AT 0.0254  0.5233  0.2981  0.0868 -0.114 -0.0405 
GR-BG 0.2806  0.7401  0.5079  0.0744 -0.075 0.0199 
GR-FR 0.2668  0.7285  0.4464  0.0741 0.5691 0.8217 
GR-DE 0.2363  0.6475  0.4190  0.0724 -0.0922 0.1694 
GR-IR 0.3278  0.7213  0.5334  0.075 -0.2212 -0.2302 
GR-IT 0.3914  0.7505  0.5477  0.0632 -0.049 -0.1359 
GR-PT 0.2174  0.7855  0.5262  0.0829 -0.7399 1.7341 
GR-SP 0.3215  0.7306  0.5300  0.0868 -0.114 -0.0405 
Ireland 
   
   
IR-AT 0.0240  0.5719  0.3505  0.1082 -0.5542 0.1611 
IR-BG 0.3374  0.7488  0.5713  0.0808 -0.4473 -0.0973 
IR-FR 0.2411  0.7049  0.4750  0.0839 0.2068 0.0046 
IR-DE 0.1967  0.6638  0.4822  0.0892 -0.3346 0.1121 
IR-GR 0.3278  0.7213  0.5334  0.075 -0.2212 -0.2302 
IR-IT 0.4745  0.7856  0.6510  0.0667 -0.3653 -0.4676 
IR-PT 0.4227  0.8151  0.6140  0.0816 -0.0557 -0.6908 
IR-SP 0.4442  0.7967  0.6418  0.0633 -0.3779 -0.2257 
Italy 
   
   
IT-AT -0.1034  0.6081  0.4224  0.1308 -1.307 1.6152 
IT-BG 0.4938  0.8353  0.7201  0.0664 -0.8821 1.0267 
IT-FR 0.3662  0.7667  0.5814  0.0711 -0.1731 -0.1572 
IT-DE 0.3024  0.6993  0.5169  0.08 -0.1625 -0.6987 
IT-GR 0.3914  0.7505  0.5477  0.0632 -0.049 -0.1359 
IT-IR 0.4745  0.7856  0.6510  0.0667 -0.3653 -0.4676 
IT-PT 0.3956  0.8301  0.6382  0.079 -0.7339 0.2802 
IT-SP 0.6947  0.9074  0.8261  0.0407 -0.5751 0.0631 
Portugal 
   
   
PT-AT -0.0782  0.5841  0.3382  0.1129 -0.7443 0.9375 
PT-BG 0.3187  0.7633  0.5374  0.0948 -0.2799 -0.7645 
PT-FR 0.1119  0.6525  0.4381  0.1035 -0.7638 0.5174 
PT-DE 0.1092  0.6217  0.4213  0.1072 -0.641 -0.3677 
PT-GR 0.2174  0.7855  0.5262  0.0829 -0.7399 1.7341 
PT-IR 0.4227  0.8151  0.6140  0.0816 -0.0557 -0.6908 
PT-IT 0.3956  0.8301  0.6382  0.079 -0.7339 0.2802 
PT-SP 0.3708  0.7946  0.6363  0.0866 -0.64 -0.3722 
Spain 
   
   
SP-AT 0.0248  0.6034  0.4060  0.1154 -0.8137 0.218 
SP-BG 0.4850  0.8202  0.6696  0.0699 -0.133 -0.2363 
SP-FR 0.3211  0.7787  0.5648  0.0746 -0.09 0.3136 
SP-DE 0.2941  0.7035  0.5056  0.0806 -0.1392 -0.4794 
SP-GR 0.3215  0.7306  0.5300  0.0694 -0.219 0.2883 
SP-IR 0.4442  0.7967  0.6418  0.0633 -0.3779 -0.2257 
SP-IT 0.6947  0.9074  0.8261  0.0407 -0.5751 0.0631 
SP-PT 0.3708  0.7946  0.6363  0.0866 -0.64 -0.3722 
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5.4.2 Correlation Dynamics 
The pairwise correlation dynamics of the 9 Eurozone countries are estimated for each 
of the countries that experienced financial distress. As Greece was the first to 
experience a full-scale sovereign debt crisis and is generally considered to be the 
source of financial contagion, we first examine the pairwise dynamic conditional 
correlation between Greece and Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. Similar analyses are conducted for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Evidence of sovereign credit risk transfer from a troubled country, like Greece, 
to relatively healthy members will indicated the presence of a spillover effect. If 
WKHUHLVQRVXFKVSLOORYHUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI*UHHFH¶V&'6VSUHDG variance should 
be independent of that of other countries. The changes in correlation could also 
reflect the impact of policy intervention on volatility links34. If some countries suffer 
unjustified financial stress (i.e., solely driven from investor sentiment from bad news 
regarding other countries), it can be concluded that the financing trouble experienced 
by some EMU countries is due to a contagion effect.  
The correlation dynamics between Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and the 
other 8 countries in each instance are shown in Figures 17-21, respectively. These 
figures plot the daily correlation between variances from 2009 to 2012. The red line 
representing the dynamic correlation varies over time. 
From Figures 17-21, the correlation dynamics graphs, we find a constant pattern for 
all the countries, although not all of the interventions have exactly the same influence 
in each case. Most of the policy interventions listed in Table 31 lead to a significant 
increase in the pairwise correlation. Comparing across countries, correlations with 
                                                          
34
 Similar analysis on dynamic covariance are shown in Appendix 12 
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Austria and Germany are less volatile and show weaker reactions to these 
interventions, with less significant peaks, which is consistent with the result shown in 
Table 30. 
At the beginning of the sample period, there is an increase in the correlation for all 
the countries. It is an artefact of the sampling period, which began shortly after the 
bank bailout programme was implemented, but before Greece announced its 12.5% 
deficit. It shows that the banking bailout also had an impact on the interactions 
between sovereign entities. 
The correlation jumps to a new height at the beginning of May 2010, which is about 
WKHWLPHRIWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRI*UHHFH¶VILUVWEDLORXWE\WKH(8DQG,0)DQGSHDNV
at 10 May 2010, which was the setup date of the EFSF, as shown in Table 31. After 
the policy intervention, the correlations fall back to the normal range as quickly as 
they peaked, suggesting a temporary reaction. News about Greece served as a strong 
signal for investor sentiment regarding other countries, which indicates the presence 
of a spillover effect. The only exception is for Austria, which seems to have been less 
sensitive to the news. Its low average correlation in Table 30, which suggests a 
generally weak relation with RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ CDS spreads, might explain its 
behaviour35. 
Another high correlation period is between May 2011 and July 2011, which saw the 
Portugal bailout and the creation of the ESM. During that period, the dynamic 
correlations are constantly higher than normal, and fall back rapidly after July.  
                                                          
35
 The correlation with Austria reached its lowest point (close to 0) in March 2010 In March, Mr 
Papandreou proposed a new financial package for Greece and continued to insist that no bailout was 
needed. By the end of the month, leaders of the euro zone and the IMF agreed upon a deal whereby 
both parties would provide financial support for Greece. 
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A fourth period of high correlation is found around the announcement date of the 
further aid package for Greece by EU leaders at the end of October 2011. The 
correlations are significantly higher than during normal periods (for France, 
Germany and Spain, even higher than at the time of the Greece first bailout and the 
establishment of the EFSF). It further proves the existence of contagion, as this is a 
reaction to news concerning other countries. 
After the date of the Spain bailout, 9 June 2012, the correlations start to climb and 
reached a new high, especially the correlations with Spanish spread. Around 19 
October 2012, the ESM was granted more power to directly recapitalize banks 
(without routing help through national governments). Again, its announcement leads 
to a strong reaction in the correlations.  
Consistent with the observations made by Chiang et al. (2007), Missio and Watzka 
(2011) and Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), our results indicate a potential 
contagion effect in the euro market, as defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), which 
is a significant increase in correlation/covariance during a crisis period. Such an 
increase should be temporary rather than remaining stable at a high level. The 
periods of significant increase become spikes immediately after the announcement, 
but quickly fall back to the level before the intervention. The temporary reaction, 
with a reversion to the normal range, is too fast to be an economically driven 
increase. Therefore, an intervention-caused contagion effect is suggested for all 8 
countries. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that Greece caused the 
financial troubles of other countries, especially those of the other PIIIGS countries.  
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Our interpretation is that through policy interventions, when the increased debt and 
deficit partly result from assisting other troubled nations, a public-to-public risk 
transfer occurs. Here, though, there is the potential for a feedback mechanism, as any 
deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness of the healthy countries could 
transmit back to the bailed-out countries, as the rescue plan is a form of credit 
guarantee. Therefore, ³two-ZD\ IHHGEDFN´, proposed by Acharya et al. (2011), is 
shown as increased correlations between countries. 
Table 31 Policy intervention events date during the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis 
Date  Country   Event 
   
02/05/2010 
 
Greece   EU agrees on a 110 billion-euro rescue package for Greece 
10/05/2010 
 
EFSF  Birth of the European Financial Stability Facility, 750 billion euros 
28/11/2010 
 
Ireland   
Ireland takes a bailout from the IMF, the European 
Commission and EFSF, totalling about 85 billion 
euros 
16/05/2011 
 
Portugal   The EU and the IMF approve a 78bn-euro bailout for Portugal, funded by the EFSM, EFSF and IMF. 
11/07/2011 
 
ESM  
The European Stability Mechanism, the permanent 
bailout fund, is designed to replace the EFSF and the 
EFSM. 
27/10/2011 
 
Greece   The EU agrees extend a new aid package worth 130 billion euros for Greece and a 50% haircut 
09/06/2012 
 
Spain   
Spain need a 100 bn euro bailout in order to help its 
failing banks, after Bankia SA is partly nationalized 
in May 
19/10/2012 
 
ESM  
EU leaders agree to a single banking supervisor. This 
agreement clears the way for the ESM to directly 
recapitalize banks, rather than having to act through 
national governments.  
The table presents the list of bailout events in the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 to 2013. A more 
detailed timeline is presented in Appendix 12.  
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Figure 17 Correlation dynamics for Greece and other countries 
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Figure 18 Correlation Dynamics for Ireland and other countries 
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Chapter 5                                          Dynamic correlation analysis of financial contagion  
185 
 
Figure 19 Correlation Dynamics for Italy and other countries 
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Figure 20 Correlation Dynamics for Portugal and other countries 
Chapter 5                                          Dynamic correlation analysis of financial contagion  
188 
 
 
Chapter 5                                          Dynamic correlation analysis of financial contagion  
189 
 
Figure 21 Correlation Dynamics for Spain and other countries 
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5.4.3 Announcement effects  
As shown in Figures 17-21, the pairwise conditional correlation coefficients between 
sovereign CDS spreads variance of the euro markets were seen to be volatile during 
the sovereign debt crisis period, and were strong reactions to the policy interventions 
listed in Table 31. The high volatility of these correlations indicates that the 
estimation of correlation is less reliable, and casts doubt on the efficiency of market 
portfolio diversification (which relies on estimating such correlation coefficients). 
However, it is still unclear how much the policy interventions affected these 
correlations. To determine this, it is necessary to look into the time-series behaviour 
of the correlations and to capture the impact of external shocks on their movements.  
It should be noted that these correlation coefficients are sensitive to both local and 
global news. In order to analyse the contagious effects of policy intervention 
announcements, we regress the condition correlation between variances on a dummy 
variable of policy intervention, which is set to be 1 if an intervention was announced 
at that date, and zero if not. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 4, the effect of the 
VIX, has a significant influence on the sovereign CDS spreads of EU countries. In 
addition, sovereign credit ratings changes for a particular country (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain) are used to test the impact of rating news on correlations36.  
                                                          
36
 One might argue that correlation changes are not due to rating announcements. It is not caused by 
the announcement itself nor driven by irrational investor sentiment EXW E\ UDWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶
anticipation of an increased likelihood of a potential changes. For example, Ireland is anticipated by 
investors to experience a rating cut shortly after Greece has received one. The worsened refinancing 
conditions of Ireland do not result from announcement contagion, but from fundamental factors.  
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 ?௜௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ?൅෍   ௜ ?௜௝ǡ௧ି௣௠௣ୀଵ ൅෍   ௞ ?௧ି௤௡௤ୀଵ ൅ ෍  ?ଵ ?௧ି௦ଵ௦ୀିଵ ൅  ?ଵ ? ? ?௧ିଵ൅  ?ଵ ?௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?ଶ ?௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?ଷ ?௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?ସ ?௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?௧ (30) 
where  ?௜௝ǡ௧ is the pairwise correlation between variances in sovereign CDS market.  ?௧ି௦ is the intervention variable for measuring the policy intervention events at time t, 
with a window length of s, covering from (T-1) to (T+1).  ? ? ?௧ିଵ is the one-day lag 
of the US market S&P 500 index volatility.  ?௜ǡ௧ିଵȀ ?௜ǡ௧ିଵ and  ?௝ǡ௧ିଵȀ ?௝ǡ௧ିଵ are 
used to capture the effect of sovereign credit rating/outlook changes (one-day lag) in 
the correlation between domestic country, i (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain), and foreign country, j (other 8 countries correlated with country i). When a 
country experiences a rating or outlook change, announced by any of the three rating 
agencies, the rating variable is set accordingly, similarly defined as in Eq (13). The 
lag length is selected by AIC. 
Since our ARCH-LM test in Table 33 finds significant heteroscedasticity in all cases, 
the conditional covariance equation is assumed to follow a GARCH(1,1) 
specification37.  
 ?௜௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ?ଵ ൅  ?௜ ?௜௝ǡ௧ି௜ ൅  ?௜ ?௜௝ǡ௧ିଵଶ  (31) 
where  ?௜௝ǡ௧ is the pairwise covariance between countries i and j. 
The ARMA lag length selection results are shown in Table 34. These indicate AR(1) 
for all of the pairwise relations. The estimates using the maximum-likelihood method 
for the GARCH(1,1) model are reported in Table 32. Panels A, B, C, D and E show 
                                                          
37
 Following Chiang et al. (2007), Missio and Watzka (2011) and Min and Hwang (2012), no external 
volatility is included in the variance equation. We reject the assumption that the variance of 
correlation between variances is sensitive to local and global news. Bensafta and Semedo (2013) 
suggest that the external repressor in the variance equation has to be unanticipated events. 
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the correlations with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. The 
results show that the spillover from the US market (VIX) is insignificant, with 
coefficients less than 0.001, suggesting that the US market did not have much impact 
on the correlations between EMU countries during debt crisis.  
In terms of the focus of this study, the impact of policy intervention, the evidence 
shows that most of the markets were negatively influenced by the policy 
interventions, among which, intervention at day t is found to be the most significant 
factor in affecting the dynamic conditional correlations between variances. In 
addition, interventions at t-1 and t+1 demonstrate less significant but still strong 
impacts on most of the pairwise DCC. However, it should be noted that these 
influences are positive in many cases. One possible reason for the different sign on 
the correlation coefficient is the different speed in reacting to announcements 
(Chiang et al. 2007). Since the intervention variable is constructed as the sum of all 
policy interventions in the region, listed in Table 31, the universal high sensitivity of 
pairwise correlations to interventions in other countries indicates a contagion effect. 
It provides evidence for the argument that investors in the EMU countries were 
generally concerned about any intervention, including bailout plans and rescue funds, 
in the region.  
With respect to the impact of sovereign credit rating and outlook changes on 
correlations, the statistics show that there is no statistically significant influence (for 
both domestic and foreign), with coefficients less than 0.01 in most cases. 
Nevertheless, comparing the influence from µdomestic¶ and µforeign¶ country, rating 
and outlook changes in the domestic country is found to be more influential. The 
coefficients of ³rating domestic´ on IR-AT, IT-AT, IT-PT, PT-DE, PT-IR, PT-SP 
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and SP-AT are statistic significant, while those of ³rating foreign´ have similar 
impacts on the correlations for IR-PT, PT-AT and PT-FR. This suggests that 
investors are more sensitive to sovereign credit status changes in the domestic 
country, in this case the PIIGS countries. This is reasonable considering that the 
development of the sovereign debt crisis mainly affected the financially distressed 
countries. In addition, the finding also supports our assumption in Chapter 4 that the 
influence of the CDS spreads of one country depends on its ³information´, and 
indeed the PIIGS countries generally have larger uncertainty and are more 
informative. Furthermore, outlook change is shown to be a stronger factor in 
affecting the DCC, compared with rating change, as the coefficients of outlook 
changes in the domestic country on IT-AT, IR-FR, PT-SP, SP-AT and SP-FR are 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is in line with the suggestion that outlook has 
a strong impact on sovereign CDS spreads in Chapter 4.  
Putting the information together, our empirical analysis suggests that announcements 
about policy interventions have a significant and consistent impact on pairwise 
cross-market correlations during the sovereign debt crisis. Nevertheless, compared 
with the strong influence of intervention, credit rating/outlook and VIX do not show 
much impact on the dynamic conditional correlation between the variances of EMU 
countries, although they are proven to be a significant factor affecting sovereign CDS 
spreads in previous chapter. This result suggests that policy interventions play the 
most direct and significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlations in 
EMU markets.  
  
Chapter 5                                                                                                          Dynamic correlation analysis of financial contagion  
195 
 
Table 32 Test of influence of policy intervention on DCC 
Panel A   Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Greece 
          
c0 
 
0.304*** 0.512*** 0.454*** 0.424*** 
 
0.537*** 0.543*** 0.531*** 0.533*** 
  
[18.2] [36.166] [35.767] [33.052] 
 
[36.475] [48.864] [33.219] [42.011] 
ar1 
 
0.965*** 0.955*** 0.941*** 0.942*** 
 
0.96*** 0.949*** 0.978*** 0.946*** 
  
[99.365] [87.068] [72.859] [75.305] 
 
[89.157] [91.22] [114.079] [78.428] 
vix 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
  
[-1.553] [-0.524] [-0.557] [-1.039] 
 
[-0.256] [-0.043] [-0.444] [-1.423] 
Intervention(t-1) 
 
-0.001 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.022** 
 
0.027*** 0.013 0.022*** 0.043*** 
 
 
[-0.159] [2.739] [2.754] [2.493] 
 
[3.444] [1.354] [3.223] [5.238] 
Intervention(t) 
 
-0.016*** -0.012 -0.04*** -0.031*** 
 
-0.024*** -0.034*** -0.02** -0.019** 
  
[-3.737] [-1.313] [-3.748] [-3.071] 
 
[-2.698] [-5.416] [-2.526] [-2.038] 
Intervention(t+1) 
 
-0.019** -0.008 -0.018* -0.019** 
 
-0.012 0.028*** -0.013* -0.009 
  
[-2.371] [-1.036] [-1.915] [-2.117] 
 
[-1.5] [4.258] [-1.853] [-1.052] 
Rating home 
 
0.001 0 0.002 0 
 
0.001 -0.002 0 0 
  
[0.363] [-0.026] [1.172] [0.219] 
 
[0.482] [-1.318] [0.14] [0.076] 
Rating foreign 
 
0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.002 
 
0 -0.006 0.003 -0.001 
  
[0.194] [-0.775] [0.085] [0.168] 
 
[-0.159] [-1.559] [1.332] [-0.239] 
Outlook home 
 
-0.002 0 0.004 0.001 
 
-0.005 0.007 0 -0.004 
  
[-0.218] [-0.045] [0.481] [0.166] 
 
[-0.734] [1.155] [-0.013] [-0.561] 
Outlook foreign 
 
-0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 0.013 0.003 0.003 
  
[-0.403] [0.602] [0.069] [-0.057] 
 
[-0.084] [1.439] [0.592] [0.331] 
c1 
 
0*** 0*** 0 0*** 
 
0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 
  
[5.448] [24.727] [1.618] [20.097] 
 
[8.36] [12.885] [13.247] [2.694] 
A 
 
0 0 0.003* 0 
 
0 0.457*** 0 0 
  
[0] [0] [1.896] [0] 
 
[0.001] [5.301] [0] [0] 
B 
 
0.972*** 0.999*** 0.996*** 0.999*** 
 
0.98*** 0.09** 0.999*** 0.955*** 
  
[179.831] [14013.403] [1912.865] [12908.252] 
 
[424.663] [2.557] [12540.785] [58.331] 
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Panel B  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Ireland 
 
         
c0 
 
0.351*** 0.577*** 0.49*** 0.487*** 0.537*** 
 
0.657*** 0.622*** 0.647*** 
  
[18.555] [39.044] [46.381] [30.576] [36.475] 
 
[55.373] [43.686] [57.175] 
ar1 
 
0.99*** 0.982*** 0.969*** 0.974*** 0.96*** 
 
0.975*** 0.978*** 0.971*** 
  
[178.105] [146.016] [161.894] [133.488] [89.157] 
 
[135.574] [147.114] [127.409] 
vix 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
  
[-1.161] [-0.957] [-0.108] [-0.333] [-0.256] 
 
[-0.871] [-0.838] [-0.976] 
Intervention(t-1) 
 
0.002 0.002 0.016** 0.001 0.027*** 
 
0 0.003 0.005 
 
 
[0.315] [0.317] [2.457] [0.121] [3.444] 
 
[-0.095] [0.56] [1.047] 
Intervention(t) 
 
-0.011*** -0.007 -0.018*** -0.02*** -0.024*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.011** 
  
[-3.372] [-1.138] [-3.224] [-2.746] [-2.698] 
 
[-0.915] [-2.203] [-2.098] 
Intervention(t+1) 
 
-0.037*** 0.003 0.011* -0.012* -0.012 
 
0.004 -0.005 0.003 
  
[-6.333] [0.516] [1.736] [-1.842] [-1.5] 
 
[0.812] [-0.914] [0.538] 
Rating home 
 
-0.003* 0 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.002 0 
  
[-1.949] [0.266] [-0.706] [-0.931] [0.482] 
 
[-0.915] [-1.043] [-0.254] 
Rating foreign 
 
-0.012 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0 
 
0.001 0.003* -0.002 
  
[-0.946] [0.384] [-0.958] [-0.268] [-0.159] 
 
[0.339] [1.824] [-1.413] 
Outlook home 
 
0.017*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.002 -0.005 
 
0 0 0.002 
  
[2.967] [0.867] [3.214] [0.307] [-0.734] 
 
[-0.094] [0.081] [0.464] 
Outlook foreign 
 
-0.002 0 0.002 0.011 -0.001 
 
0.001 -0.005 0 
  
[-0.257] [-0.003] [0.375] [0.958] [-0.084] 
 
[0.213] [-1.084] [0.091] 
c1 
 
0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 
 
0*** 0 0*** 
  
[4.366] [2.83] [8.337] [3.019] [8.36] 
 
[6.137] [0.597] [5.897] 
A 
 
0.11** 0.002 0.67*** 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
  
[2.326] [0.522] [4.495] [0] [0.001] 
 
[0.003] [0] [0.001] 
B 
 
0.654*** 0.967*** 0.238*** 0.952*** 0.98*** 
 
0.935*** 0.938*** 0.956*** 
  
[8.301] [86.888] [3.596] [60.346] [424.663]  [544.374] [9.114] [202.508] 
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Panel C  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Italy 
 
         
c0 
 
0.417*** 0.723*** 0.585*** 0.522*** 0.543*** 0.657*** 
 
0.65*** 0.835*** 
 
 
[22.272] [69.024] [46.288] [36.715] [48.864] [55.373] 
 
[49.136] [99.154] 
ar1 
 
0.988*** 0.988*** 0.965*** 0.974*** 0.949*** 0.975*** 
 
0.983*** 0.981*** 
 
 
[203.34] [160.996] [112.473] [132.787] [91.22] [135.574] 
 
[160.599] [143.69] 
vix 
 
-0.001** 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0*** 
 
 
[-2.344] [0.061] [-0.131] [-0.072] [-0.043] [-0.871] 
 
[-1.132] [-3.192] 
Intervention(t-1) 
 
0.002 0.01** 0.012** 0.003 0.013 0 
 
0.001 0.004 
  
[0.252] [2.482] [2.074] [0.481] [1.354] [-0.095] 
 
[0.165] [1.501] 
Intervention(t) 
 
-0.043*** -0.015*** 0 -0.002 -0.034*** -0.005 
 
-0.014*** -0.002 
 
 
[-6.087] [-3.343] [0.013] [-0.228] [-5.416] [-0.915] 
 
[-2.671] [-0.736] 
Intervention(t+1) 
 
-0.046*** -0.006* 0.004 -0.002 0.028*** 0.004 
 
-0.002 0.001 
 
 
[-7.485] [-1.652] [0.681] [-0.371] [4.258] [0.812] 
 
[-0.428] [0.571] 
Rating home 
 
-0.008** 0 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 
-0.005* 0.001 
 
 
[-2.108] [-0.203] [0.859] [0.959] [-1.318] [0.339] 
 
[-1.664] [1.141] 
Rating foreign 
 
0.001 0.001 -0.014 0 -0.006 -0.001 
 
0 -0.001 
 
 
[0.088] [0.248] [-1.374] [0.037] [-1.559] [-0.915] 
 
[0.021] [-0.897] 
Outlook home 
 
0.011 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.007 0.001 
 
0.002 -0.001 
 
 
[1.173] [-0.845] [-0.329] [0.494] [1.155] [0.213] 
 
[0.261] [-0.326] 
Outlook foreign 
 
0 -0.002 -0.002 0.012 0.013 0 
 
0.001 0.009*** 
 
 
[-0.006] [-0.42] [-0.233] [1.071] [1.439] [-0.094] 
 
[0.197] [3.348] 
c1 
 
0 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 
 
0*** 0* 
 
 
[0.501] [3.429] [8.178] [5.139] [12.885] [3.854] 
 
[8.679] [1.883] 
A 
 
0 0.013*** 0 0 0.457*** 0 
 
0.005** 0.008*** 
 
 
[0] [74.807] [0.017] [0.006] [5.301] [0.003] 
 
[2.006] [8.284] 
B 
 
0.916*** 0.972*** 0.977*** 0.997*** 0.09** 0.935*** 
 
0.977*** 0.99*** 
  
[5.472] [129.181] [516.883] [1112.869] [2.557] [71.368] 
 
[466.455] [1886.009] 
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Panel D  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Portugal 
 
         
c0 
 
0.34*** 0.546*** 0.452*** 0.429*** 0.531*** 0.622*** 0.65*** 
 
0.647*** 
 
 
[18.566] [35.344] [26.112] [23.031] [33.219] [43.696] [49.134] 
 
[43.229] 
ar1 
 
0.983*** 0.986*** 0.982*** 0.98*** 0.978*** 0.978*** 0.983*** 
 
0.987*** 
 
 
[168.539] [174.659] [162.835] [150.337] [114.079] [147.1] [160.625] 
 
[173.313] 
vix 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
 
[-0.799] [-0.441] [-0.257] [-1.18] [-0.444] [-0.845] [-1.132] 
 
[-1.466] 
Intervention(t-1) 
 
0.002 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.022*** 0.003 0.001 
 
0 
  
[0.254] [0.975] [1.031] [1.304] [3.223] [0.563] [0.165] 
 
[-0.078] 
Intervention(t) 
 
-0.017** -0.012** -0.018** -0.009 -0.02** -0.007** -0.014*** 
 
-0.017*** 
 
 
[-2.306] [-2.005] [-2.55] [-1.119] [-2.526] [-2.203] [-2.67] 
 
[-3.042] 
Intervention(t+1) 
 
-0.026*** -0.002 -0.011* -0.012* -0.013* -0.005 -0.002 
 
-0.006 
 
 
[-4.098] [-0.481] [-1.812] [-1.712] [-1.853] [-0.915] [-0.426] 
 
[-1.362] 
Rating home 
 
0 -0.002 0.002 0.004* 0 0.003* 0 
 
0.003* 
 
 
[-0.139] [-1.109] [1.133] [1.689] [0.14] [1.831] [0.021] 
 
[1.909] 
Rating foreign 
 
-0.028* 0.004 -0.049*** 0 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
 
[-1.721] [0.841] [-4.734] [-0.013] [1.332] [-1.052] [-0.665] 
 
[-0.934] 
Outlook home 
 
-0.007 0 -0.007 -0.005 0 -0.005 0.001 
 
-0.012*** 
 
 
[-1.325] [-0.057] [-1.274] [-0.781] [-0.013] [-1.073] [0.197] 
 
[-3.286] 
Outlook foreign 
 
-0.001 -0.006 0 0.006 0.003 0 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
 
[-0.056] [-0.905] [-0.033] [0.499] [0.592] [0.083] [0.263] 
 
[0.304] 
c1 
 
0*** 0 0* 0*** 0*** 0** 0*** 
 
0 
 
 
[3] [0.916] [1.911] [5.93] [13.247] [2.489] [8.709] 
 
[1.568] 
A 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005** 
 
0.018 
 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0] [0.001] [0] [0.002] [1.999] 
 
[1.321] 
B 
 
0.905*** 0.927*** 0.948*** 0.925*** 0.999*** 0.937*** 0.977*** 
 
0.883*** 
  
[31.16] [11.258] [34.604] [55.661] [12540.785] [34.697] [464.698] 
 
[12.511] 
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Panel E  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Spain 
 
         
c0 
 
0.35*** 0.58*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.533*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 
 
 
 
[18.56] [39.04] [46.38] [30.58] [42.011] [55.37] [43.69] [57.18] 
 
ar1 
 
0.99*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.946*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 
 
 
 
[178.1] [146.02] [161.89] [133.49] [78.428] [135.57] [147.11] [127.41] 
 
vix 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[-1.16] [-0.96] [-0.11] [-0.33] [-1.423] [-0.87] [-0.84] [-0.98] 
 
Intervention(t-1) 
 
0 0 0.02** 0 0.043*** 0 0 0 
 
  
[0.32] [0.32] [2.46] [0.12] [5.238] [-0.1] [0.56] [1.05] 
 Intervention(t) 
 
-0.01 -0.01** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.019** 0 -0.01** -0.01** 
 
 
 
[-1.37] [-2.14] [-3.22] [-2.75] [-2.038] [-0.91] [-2.2] [-2.1] 
 
Intervention(t+1) 
 
-0.04*** 0 0.01* -0.01* -0.009 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[-6.33] [0.52] [1.74] [-1.84] [-1.052] [0.81] [-0.91] [0.54] 
 Rating home 
 
0* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[-1.95] [0.27] [-0.71] [-0.93] [0.076] [-0.91] [-1.04] [-0.25] 
 
Rating foreign 
 
-0.01 0 -0.01 0 -0.001 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[-0.95] [0.38] [-0.96] [-0.27] [-0.239] [0.34] [0.82] [-1.41] 
 Outlook home 
 
0.02*** 0 0.01*** 0 -0.004 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[2.97] [0.87] [3.21] [0.31] [-0.561] [-0.09] [0.08] [0.46] 
 Outlook foreign 
 
0 0 0 0.01 0.003 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[-0.26] [0] [0.37] [0.96] [0.331] [0.21] [-1.08] [0.09] 
 
c1 
 
0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0 0*** 
 
 
 
[4.37] [2.83] [8.34] [3.02] [2.694] [6.14] [0.6] [5.9] 
 A 
 
0.11** 0 0.67*** 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
[2.33] [0.52] [4.5] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
 B 
 
0.65*** 0.97*** 0.24*** 0.95*** 0.955*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 
 
   [8.3] [86.89] [3.6] [60.35] [58.331] [544.37] [9.11] [202.51] 
 
The estimation results are based on Eq (30) and (31), the mean and variance equations of the DCC of pairwise countries. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant level 
denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1. 
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Table 33 ARCH-LM test 
ARCH lag   Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal  Spain 
Greece 
          1 
 
676.49*** 660.93*** 643.13*** 641.43*** 665.86*** 645.69*** 686.55*** 646.04*** 
2 
 
675.57*** 660.14*** 642.26*** 640.56*** 665*** 644.81*** 685.61*** 645.34*** 
4 
 
673.85*** 658.73*** 640.89*** 639.19*** 663.27*** 643.76*** 683.89*** 644.23*** 
8 
 
671.38*** 655.25*** 637.7*** 636.05*** 660.48*** 640.65*** 680.66*** 640.78*** 
10 
 
673.11*** 653.9*** 635.96*** 635.3*** 
 
658.82*** 638.82*** 679.93*** 641.4*** 
12 
 
670.15*** 651.9*** 634.31*** 633.82*** 656.99*** 637.03*** 678.03*** 638.5*** 
           Ireland 
          1 
 
950.54*** 940.01*** 933.91*** 930.31*** 665.86*** 934.54*** 943.5*** 927.24*** 
2 
 
949.6*** 939.07*** 933.14*** 929.37*** 665*** 
 
933.59*** 942.55*** 926.3*** 
4 
 
947.85*** 937.25*** 931.62*** 927.61*** 663.27*** 931.78*** 940.67*** 924.56*** 
8 
 
944.76*** 933.86*** 928.62*** 924.51*** 660.48*** 928.61*** 937.47*** 920.84*** 
10 
 
943.03*** 931.97*** 926.77*** 922.78*** 658.82*** 926.65*** 935.68*** 919*** 
12 
 
940.99*** 931.14*** 925.34*** 921.03*** 656.99*** 924.92*** 933.88*** 917.27*** 
  
         Italy 
 
         1 
 
956.79*** 949.19*** 919.82*** 933.18*** 645.69*** 934.54*** 951.19*** 942.3*** 
2 
 
955.84*** 948.23*** 918.89*** 932.24*** 644.81*** 933.59*** 950.24*** 941.37*** 
4 
 
953.97*** 946.44*** 917.12*** 930.82*** 643.76*** 931.78*** 948.32*** 939.53*** 
8 
 
951.08*** 942.83*** 914.36*** 927.92*** 640.65*** 928.61*** 946.55*** 937.56*** 
10 
 
949.11*** 940.99*** 912.39*** 925.87*** 638.82*** 926.65*** 944.66*** 935.74*** 
12 
 
947.14*** 939.03*** 910.45*** 923.91*** 637.03*** 924.92*** 942.85*** 933.88*** 
  
         Portugal 
 
         1 
 
948.44*** 955.42*** 945.59*** 942.2*** 686.55*** 943.5*** 951.19*** 956.82*** 
2 
 
947.49*** 954.54*** 944.78*** 941.25*** 685.61*** 942.55*** 950.24*** 955.89*** 
4 
 
945.6*** 952.68*** 943.03*** 939.41*** 683.89*** 940.67*** 948.32*** 953.99*** 
8 
 
943.91*** 949.77*** 942.08*** 937.98*** 680.66*** 937.47*** 946.55*** 950.72*** 
10 
 
942.19*** 947.9*** 940.18*** 936.08*** 679.93*** 935.68*** 944.66*** 949.31*** 
12 
 
940.39*** 946.13*** 938.32*** 934.24*** 678.03*** 933.88*** 942.85*** 947.29*** 
  
         Spain 
 
         1 
 
953.51*** 952.77*** 926.91*** 933.2*** 646.04*** 927.24*** 942.3*** 956.82*** 
2 
 
952.54*** 951.81*** 926.02*** 932.32*** 645.34*** 926.3*** 941.37*** 955.89*** 
4 
 
950.7*** 949.92*** 924.23*** 930.85*** 644.23*** 924.56*** 939.53*** 953.99*** 
8 
 
947.01*** 946.16*** 921*** 927.39*** 640.78*** 920.84*** 937.56*** 950.72*** 
10 
 
946.49*** 944.37*** 919.09*** 926.05*** 641.4*** 919*** 935.74*** 949.31*** 
12  944.53*** 942.47*** 917.34*** 924.29*** 638.5*** 917.27*** 933.88*** 947.29*** 
This table shows the ARCH-LM test statistic for examining the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect. Results of different lag length are shown (1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12) to see if the 
conclusion reached changes for different values. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is ARCH effect in the rho. The results show that all pairwise correlations have 
consistent ARCH at the 1% level of significance. Significance level denoted as ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1  
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Table 34 ARMA specification 
ARMA(,) 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Greece 
          (1,0) 
 
-3457.5 -3456.4 -3271 -3327 
 
-3490.4 -3548.6 -3691 -3419.73 
(0,1) 
 
-2253.75 -2446.96 -2425.81 -2470.11 
 
-2444.65 -2671.63 -2353.7 -2556.05 
(1,1) 
 
-3455.6 -3454.73 -3268.97 -3325.28 
 
-3452.51 -3546.64 -3446.96 -3419 
(2,0) 
 
-3455.6 -3454.72 -3268.97 -3325.26 
 
-3452.48 -3546.64 -3654.73 -3418.87 
(0,2) 
 
-2681.35 -2826.63 -2763.11 -2814.24 
 
-3450.76 -3007.66 -3654.72 -2784.9 
(2,1) 
 
-3453.68 -3452.51 -3267.17 -3323.9 
 
-3267.17 -3545.84 -2226.63 -3418.57 
(1,2) 
 
-3453.02 -3452.48 -3266.99 -3323.8 
 
-3266.99 -3545.78 -3652.51 -3417.17 
(2,2) 
 
-3451.6 -3450.76 -3265.38 -3321.96 
 
-3268.97 -3545.41 -3552.48 -3416.54 
           Ireland 
          (1,0) 
 
-4956.8 -5226.1 -4955.53 -4848.9 -3490.4 
 
-5469.2 -5216.2 -5438.7 
(0,1) 
 
-2689.83 -3240.44 -3186.62 -3014.9 -2444.65 
 
-3617.1 -3236.38 -3711.95 
(1,1) 
 
-4954.99 -5224.16 -4948.94 -4846.91 -3452.51 
 
-5467.9 -5215.4 -5436.93 
(2,0) 
 
-4955.01 -5224.16 -4948.09 -4846.91 -3452.48 
 
-5467.87 -5215.36 -5436.9 
(0,2) 
 
-3409.66 -3909.42 -3799.15 -3628.63 -3450.76 
 
-4250.45 -3893.81 -4303.24 
(2,1) 
 
-4954.21 -5222.3 -4954.1 -4847.89 -3267.17 
 
-5466.22 -5213.37 -5436.76 
(1,2) 
 
-4954.59 -5223.01 -4950.65 -4846.12 -3266.99 
 
-5466.55 -5213.7 -5437.25 
(2,2) 
 
-4953.24 -5221.94 -4944.93 -4843.03 -3268.97 
 
-5464.35 -5212.56 -5435 
  
         Italy 
 
         (1,0) 
 
-4848.7 -5792.6 -5009.1 -5064.3 -3548.6 -5469.2 
 
-5527.4 -6562.1 
(0,1) 
 
-2348.73 -3645.18 -3433.63 -3237.8 -2671.63 -3617.1 
 
-3317.95 -4622.19 
(1,1) 
 
-4846.87 -5790.37 -5007.6 -5062.3 -3546.64 -5467.9 
 
-5525.51 -6561.32 
(2,0) 
 
-4846.88 -5790.45 -5007.59 -5062.33 -3546.64 -5467.87 
 
-5525.51 -6561.27 
(0,2) 
 
-3124.34 -4374.58 -3981.88 -3824.52 -3007.66 -4250.45 
 
-4039.99 -5268.07 
(2,1) 
 
-4844.65 -5788.79 -5006.3 -5060.28 -3545.84 -5466.22 
 
-5523.57 -6560.58 
(1,2) 
 
-4846.47 -5788.99 -5005.63 -5060.54 -3545.78 -5466.55 
 
-5523.54 -6559.66 
(2,2) 
 
-4846.39 -5786.98 -5004.32 -5059.66 -3545.41 -5464.35 
 
-5521.59 -6558.78 
  
         Portugal 
 
         (1,0) 
 
-4824.7 -5248.47 -4930.9 -4718.9 -3691 -5216.2 -5527.4 
 
-5491.1 
(0,1) 
 
-2624.34 -2952.78 -2765.22 -2677.01 -2353.7 -3236.38 -3317.95 
 
-3156.87 
(1,1) 
 
-4822.75 -5248.45 -4929.45 -4717.09 -3446.96 -5215.4 -5525.51 
 
-5490.77 
(2,0) 
 
-4822.75 -5248.37 -4929.47 -4717.09 -3654.73 -5215.36 -5525.51 
 
-5490.75 
(0,2) 
 
-3335.39 -3675.22 -3458.76 -3355.95 -3654.72 -3893.81 -4039.99 
 
-3938.3 
(2,1) 
 
-4821.3 -5247.71 -4927.5 -4714.97 -2226.63 -5213.37 -5523.57 
 
-5487.11 
(1,2) 
 
-4821.35 -5247.94 -4927.77 -4715.1 -3652.51 -5213.7 -5523.54 
 
-5488.79 
(2,2) 
 
-4819.35 -5245.77 -4925.48 -4713.17 -3552.48 -5212.56 -5521.59 
 
-5487.55 
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Table 34 (continued) 
 
         
Spain 
 
         (1,0) 
 
-4958.2 -5754.4 -5010.25 -5068.7 -3419.73 -5438.7 -6562.1 -5491.1 
 (0,1) 
 
-2594.06 -3570.38 -3377.67 -3249.35 -2556.05 -3711.95 -4622.19 -3156.87 
 (1,1) 
 
-4956.46 -5752.65 -5010.03 -5067.7 -3419 -5436.93 -6561.32 -5490.77 
 (2,0) 
 
-4956.48 -5752.71 -5009.93 -5067.75 -3418.87 -5436.9 -6561.27 -5490.75 
 (0,2) 
 
-3320.75 -4285.6 -3933.57 -3830.97 -2784.9 -4303.24 -5268.07 -3938.3 
 (2,1) 
 
-4954.3 -5753.42 -5012.26 -5067.38 -3418.57 -5436.76 -6560.58 -5487.11 
 (1,2) 
 
-4954.97 -5751.2 -5009.02 -5066.39 -3417.17 -5437.25 -6559.66 -5488.79 
 (2,2)  -4953.26 -5751.44 -5010.04 -5065.38 -3416.54 -5435 -6558.78 -5487.55 
 
The specification of the correlation equation, Eq (30), is identified by fitting an ARMA(m,n) model, while the lag-length selection is identified via AIC. The model is 
estimated for up to ARMA(2,2) for each country. The lag with the smallest AIC is chosen and highlighted in bold.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
The pairwise conditional correlations between variance in sovereign CDS spreads in 
the Eurozone were higher during the sovereign debt crisis. The instability observed 
on sovereign CDS spreads of one country is in part due to volatility in another 
market (volatility spillover), especially surrounding policy intervention date. This has 
two important implications from the perspective of international investors. First, a 
high level of correlation will diminish the effect of portfolio diversification, as credit 
products for different Eurozone countries will all be subject to similar risks. Second, 
a higher volatility of correlation suggests that the reliability of correlation is weaker, 
creating doubts over portfolio strategies that are based on estimated correlation and 
covariance coefficients.  
This study looks into the time-varying correlation coefficients and tries to capture the 
impact of the policy interventions. It analyses correlations between 9 EMU countries 
± Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain ± 
during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, using a dynamic conditional correlation 
GARCH (DCC-GARCH) model. It also investigates how policy interventions 
influenced the conditional correlations between these EMU nations.  
First, we find correlations between CDS spread variances are dynamic and 
time-varying for all the sample countries. Comparing the pairwise series, there was a 
significant pattern for all the bilateral relations, although not all of the interventions 
have exactly the same influence. Most of the policy interventions led to a significant 
increase in pairwise correlations. This temporary reaction, with a reversion to the 
normal range, is suggested to be an intervention-caused contagion effect. Comparing 
across countries, correlations with Austria and Germany are less volatile and show 
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weaker reactions to these interventions. One interpretation is that this reflects 
³two-ZD\ IHHGEDFN´ between the healthy country and the bailed-out country, as 
proposed by Acharya et al. (2011), causing public-to-public risk transfer. The 
increased debt and deficit partly result from assisting other troubled nations. Through 
policy interventions, any deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness of the 
healthy countries could be transmitted to the bailed-out countries.  
With respect to the impact of policy intervention, our empirical analysis suggests that 
announcements of policy interventions have a significant and consistent impact on 
pairwise cross-market correlations. The negative sign of policy intervention indicates 
a negative impact on cross-market correlations, which could be interpreted as that 
these policy interventions are successful in relieving the financial stress in the EMU 
by lowering the inter-linkages between markets. In addition, interventions at t-1 and 
t+1 are included in the regression to account for differences in market opening times 
and different reactions speed to interventions news. They demonstrate less significant 
but still strong impacts on most of the pairwise DCC, which are positive in some 
cases, especially for intervention at t-1. One possible reason for the different sign on 
the correlation coefficient is the different speed in reacting to announcements 
(Chiang et al. 2007). Policy interventions have in general been found to be a source 
of market uncertainty. Nevertheless, credit rating/outlook and VIX do not show 
much impact on the dynamic conditional correlation between the variances of EMU 
countries. This result suggests that policy interventions played a direct and 
significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlations in the EMU markets.  
The results of the analysis of the correlation between variances have various 
implications. For portfolio management, an investor seeking to optimize his CDS 
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portfolio or portfolio containing credit risk of the 9 EMU nations may produce more 
accurate estimates by taking account of dynamic correlation. The investor may even 
predict the direction of CDS co-movements using past values. Indeed, failing to 
account for the impact of policy interventions on the correlation will result in an 
over-diversified and sub-optimal portfolio.  
For contagion analysis, following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), financial contagion is 
defined as a significant increase in cross-market correlation/covariance during a 
period of turmoil. It is related to investor sentiment, and by definition goes beyond 
any explanation based on links between the fundamentals applying to each country. 
From this perspective, interventions in one particular market give a strong signal for 
investors in related countries. The announcements of bailout packages on each 
country in financial stress and the news regarding the regional rescue fund were paid 
close attention. Therefore, information specific to one market is likely to be used in 
other markets, causing a spillover effect. This was especially evident after we 
controlled for international influence (the US VIX), and both domestic and foreign 
sovereign credit rating and outlook.  
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CHAPTER 6  
Conclusion and future work 
6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has presented a study that examined pairwise correlations between means 
and variances in sovereign credit markets; in particular, it sought evidence of 
contagion effects, by focusing on parallel movements between markets in the wake 
of the recent financial crisis (using a narrow definition of contagion). Furthermore, it 
tested whether policy interventions had any effect on the dynamics of these 
correlations. 
We first looked at the correlation between means, starting with the interactions 
between credit ratings of 37 sovereign states and their CDS spreads during and after 
the recent global financial crisis. With these results, we were able to examine the 
sovereign CDS spreads interdependence/correlation of 10 EU members during 
Eurozone debt crisis, while controlling for the rating and other external influences 
affecting sovereign CDS spreads. The models employed were mainly the 
cointegration approach, including VECM, Granger causality and impulse response.  
We then looked at the correlation between variances. This part of the study 
investigated the dynamic correlation EHWZHHQPDMRU(08FRXQWULHV¶&'6PDUNHWV
during the sovereign debt crisis, and examined the impacts of policy interventions on 
these markets, using the DCC-GARCH model. Specifically, the main purpose was to 
assess to what extent the bailout plans influenced the dynamics of these correlations 
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in sovereign CDS markets, after controlling for international influence (US VIX) and 
sovereign credit ratings in both domestic and foreign countries. 
We found, first, a significant response of government CDS spreads to both rating and 
outlook, with a stable long-run equilibrium relationship between sovereign CDS 
spreads and rating/outlook for the majority of countries. Credit rating and outlook led 
sovereign CDS spreads in most cases. Second, we found negative international 
spillover effects of outlook changes on CDS markets, but no similar influence from 
rating changes. Moreover, the initial credit quality of a country did not have much 
influence on its spillover effects. Furthermore, the results underline that spillover is a 
regional effect rather than a global effect, because countries within the same region 
share more linkages. Nevertheless, the US market does have a universal global 
influence, but it is unique in this respect. Finally, sovereign CDS spreads become 
more sensitive to external factors during times of crisis, while these same external 
factors have much weaker influence on spillover in pre-crisis periods. International 
investors tend to be more sensitive to recent developments in the global environment, 
while expectations and confidence are crucial during times of turmoil.  
With respect to the EU sovereign CDS interdependence, we found that, firstly, before 
a policy intervention (bailout), the changes in the CDS spreads of bailed-out 
countries had a strong influence on core European countries, while the spillover in 
the opposite direction was much weaker. This leads to the argument that the credit 
risk spillover channel was from the PIIGS to the core countries before intervention. 
Secondly, bailout plans exposed the core countries to the credit risk of the bailed-out 
countries (Ireland, Portugal and Spain); changes in PIIGS spreads were able to 
trigger larger shifts in those for core countries. Austria, Belgium, France and 
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Germany were strongly affected, while the UK, the only non-Eurozone member in 
our sample, was less influenced. Moreover, the influences of bailout countries 
differed from each other. Thirdly, we found that the core countries (especially Austria 
and Germany) gained extra influence on the bailed-out countries after the intervention, 
as they participated in the financial aid as credit guarantees for the PIIGS. It is argued 
that this led to a greater reliance of the bailed-out countries on the core countries; 
there is also the possibility that the core countries will be more sensitive to 
difficulties with their own national debt. The results indicate the existence of credit 
risk contagion. Finally, the spillover of credit risk is consistently found across 
countries and rescue plans after intervention, but its precise nature depends on the 
country-specific characteristics at that time. We suggest that the influence of a country 
GHSHQGVRQLWV³LQIRUPDWLRQ´, while tKHYXOQHUDELOLW\RIFRXQWU\GHSHQGVRQLWV³ILVFDO
VLWXDWLRQ´, corresponding to the two transmission channels discussed in the literature 
chapter38. Although financing the bailout makes the core countries more exposed to 
the PIIGS, countries with solid fiscal fundamentals (high Debt-GDP and Deficit-GDP 
ratio) should be less sensitive to external shocks, like Austria and Germany. In 
contrast, countries with more ³LQIRUPDWLRQ´ (like expectation of future bailout) are 
more likely to affect other nations. The CDS spreads of one country will be less 
informative for investors if it has just experienced a rescue plan.  
In the second empirical chapter, we found that the correlations between CDS spread 
variances are dynamic and time-varying for all the sample countries. There was a 
significant pattern for all the bilateral relations. Most of the policy interventions led 
to a significant increase in the pairwise correlations. The temporary reaction, with a 
                                                          
38
 Misso and Watzka (2011) have similar findings that Greece could influence investor sentiment 
regarding other economically problematic or politically unstable countries, but that such contagion 
does not hit essentially stable countries.   
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reversion to the normal range, is suggested to be an intervention-caused contagion 
effect. Comparing across countries, correlations with Austria and Germany are less 
volatile and show a weaker reaction to these interventions. One interpretation is that 
a ³two-ZD\ IHHGEDFN´ between the healthy country and the bailed-out country, as 
proposed by Acharya et al. (2011), causes a public-to-public risk transfer. The 
increased debt and deficit partly result from assisting other troubled nations. Through 
policy interventions, any deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness of the 
healthy countries could transmit back to the bailed-out countries. To examine the 
impact of policy intervention, our empirical analysis controlled for the external 
regressors, including VIX and credit rating and outlook. The estimation result 
suggests that credit rating/outlook and VIX do not have much impact on the dynamic 
conditional correlation between the variances of EMU countries, while 
announcements of a policy intervention have a significant and consistent impact on 
pairwise cross-market correlations. This finding suggests that policy interventions 
play the most direct and significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic 
correlations in the EMU markets. 
6.2 Implications 
The high level of pairwise correlations between mean and variances has two 
significant implications for international investors. First, they diminish the 
effectiveness of portfolio diversification, as credit products for different Eurozone 
countries will all be subject to similar risks. Second, the higher volatility of these 
correlations undermines the reliability of correlation and covariance, which in turn 
creates doubts over any portfolio strategies based on estimated correlation and 
covariance coefficients. Moreover, the time-varying correlation and covariance 
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coefficients produce evidence of contagion effects, especially surrounding policy 
interventions. This study shows a comprehensive picture of international contagion, 
across national borders and asset classes, during the recent financial crisis.  
International investors would be rightly worried about greater links between asset 
prices across national boundaries and asset classes. If cross-country and cross-market 
correlation and covariance increase during a crisis period, portfolio diversification is 
likely to fail to deliver safety. The diversification strategies for portfolio management 
are unable to diversify risk, leaving a portfolio exposed to international shock. 
Failing to account for the impact of policy intervention on the correlation would 
result in an over-diversified and sub-optimal portfolio. Our results confirm such 
worries about international integration. Nevertheless, our study also provides an 
incentive, in that the contagion we found was regional rather than global. An investor 
seeking to optimize his CDS portfolio or portfolio containing credit risk of the EU 
nations may produce more accurate estimates by taking into account the dynamic 
correlation. In a period of crisis, further portfolio diversification across international 
markets could help limit potential credit risk spillover. On the other hand, for a 
speculator, it could create profit margins if they understand the direction and 
channels of information transmission. For an arbitrager, the difference and the 
lead-lag relation between credit derivate markets can be found more precisely.  
For policy makers, at the country level, of the two factors affecting contagion, 
perhaps the more crucial is economic and political stability. It reflects the fact that 
co-movements are unavoidable without reform at country level. To reduce the scope 
for financial contagion, it will be necessary to reduce the fiscal and current account 
deficit, to enhance the quality of the financial sector. Without resolving the financial 
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stress, either by improving the fundamentals or by receiving a rescue fund, it will not 
be possible to keep the sovereign credit market stable.  
At the EU policy level, the approval of policies, like bailouts, should, amongst other 
considerations, be related to the identification of contagion effects. Interventions in 
one particular market can be a strong signal for investors in similar countries. 
Therefore, information specific to one market is likely to be used in other markets, 
causing a spillover effect, especially after other international influences are 
controlled for. This might explain why interventions are associated with higher 
degrees of correlation between EMU nations.  
The euro was introduced to provide a strong currency across financial markets and to 
avoid devaluations. The stability pact forces each government to remain within the 
deficit limit, 6%, and debt limit, 60%. However, there is no supranational form of 
government to control tax, spending and transfer between poor and rich members. 
Although different countries fell into crisis for different reasons, excessive credit 
creation was a common factor that needs to be taken account of by regulators and 
policy makers. The crisis resolution mechanism (the ESM) provides a precious 
lesson for the EU, and may serve as evidence that a Eurobond will be needed to solve 
the debt issue permanently. The ECB faces constitutional and political obstacles, and, 
for instance, has been unable to act like the Bank of England, which has used QE to 
facilitate its purchase of government debt. The ECB has nonetheless done a 
considerable part in avoiding an even worse crisis by adopting series of 
³XQFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDVXUHV´6HWWLQJXSDSHUPDQHQW ILUHZDOO WRSURWHFW LWVPHPEHUV
from future crisis should be on its task list. 
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6.3 Future research 
There are several limitations to the present study, and these could be addressed by 
further research. First, we did not examine the potential determinants of the 
correlations between the sovereign CDS spreads. This is a fast-growing topic in the 
area, and helps in understanding the mechanisms underlying the Eurozone debt crisis. 
Such data would be especially meaningful to economists and policy makers. Second, 
in terms of the relation between CDS and rating, our sample covers only the period 
2004±12, and some major countries are not included in the sample, in particular the 
US and Germany, because they did not experience any credit rating changes in the 
sample period. Extending both the sample period and the countries could help shape 
a better story and more convincing results. Third, various policy interventions were 
announced during the Eurozone debt crisis, but the present study essentially 
considered the impact only of bailouts (in the correlation between means) and the 
establishment of the rescue funds, the EFSF and the ESM (in the correlation between 
variances). It would be of interest to study other rescue plans, which would also help 
resolve the potential contamination problem of different interventions. The statistical 
and econometric frameworks might be improved so as to eliminate the 
cross-influences of various other supporting measures, to aid the identification of 
their economic and financial implications.   
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1  
Table 35 S&P, Moody's and Fitch rating scales 
  Rating         Outlook   
  S&P Moody's  Fitch Transfer Notation Transfer 
Investment grade 
 
AAA Aaa AAA 20 
 
Positive 1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 18 
 
watch/RUR positive 0.5 
AA Aa2 AA 18 
 
stable 0 
AA- Aa3 AA- 17 
 
watch/RUR negative -0.5 
A+ A1 A+ 16 
 
negative -1 
A A2 A 15 
   A- A3 A- 14 
   BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 13 
   BBB Baa2 BBB 12 
   BBB- Baa3 BBB- 11 
   
Non-investment grade 
 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 10 
   BB Ba2 BB 9 
   BB- Ba3 BB- 8 
   B+ B1 B+ 7 
   B B2 B 6 
   B- B3 B- 5 
   CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 4 
   CCC Caa2 CCC 3 
   CCC- Caa3 CCC- 2 
   CC/C Ca/C CC/C 1 
   SD/D   RD/D 0       
7KLVWDEOHDVVLJQQXPHULFDOYDOXHVWROHWWHUFUHGLWUDWLQJVDQGRXWORRNVIURP6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK  
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Appendix 2 
Table 36 Cointegration test results for CDS & ratings 
  
CDS & Rating 
 
ADF   Johansen Trace   Johansen eigenvalue   
Country t stat lags   r=0 r=1   r=0 r=1 lags 
Asia 
  
 
  
 
   
China -2.147 1 
 
17.325 5.3215 
 
12.004 5.321 4 
Indonesia -2.221 1 
 
17.914 5.077 
 
12.837 5.077 2 
Japan -2.781 1 
 
9.949 2.513 
 
7.436 2.513 5 
Kazakhstan -1.262 1 
 
9.72 3.684 
 
6.036 3.684 2 
Korea -1.670 1 
 
8.736 2.758 
 
5.979 2.758 4 
Malaysia 
   
 
  
 
 
 Philippines -2.746 1 
 
15.783 1.14 
 
14.643 1.14 8 
Thailand -2.334 1  - -   - - 
 
Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina -4.288 1 
 
24.235 3.289 
 
20.946 3.289 12 
Brazil -2.589 1 
 
25.65 6.12 
 
19.53 6.12 2 
Chile -2.067 1 
 
12.362 3.629 
 
8.733 3.629 1 
Colombia -2.811 1 
 
21.026 4.005 
 
17.021 4.005 2 
Mexico -2.274 1 
 
18.527 7.382 
 
11.145 7.382 2 
Panama -2.583 1 
 
11.937 5.238 
 
6.7 5.238 12 
Peru -2.998 1 
 
20.842 8.643 
 
12.199 8.643 2 
Venezuela -1.106 1  16.6 1.918   14.702 1.918 2 
Europe 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Austria -1.805 1 
 
6.357 2.595 
 
3.763 2.595 5 
Belgium -1.242 1 
 
12.276 3.138 
 
9.138 3.137 4 
Bulgaria -0.846 1 
 
23.589 5.357 
 
18.232 5.357 2 
Croatia -2.100 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 France -1.791 1 
 
6.006 1.7 
 
4.31 1.696 8 
Greece -1.247 1 
 
28.992 2.356 
 
26.636 2.356 12 
Hungary -1.870 1 
 
26.603 2.879 
 
23.7 2.879 2 
Ireland -3.427 1 
 
16.932 2.104 
 
14.828 2.104 7 
Italy -1.293 1 
 
16.089 2.519 
 
13.57 2.519 12 
Poland -1.405 1 
 
12.265 3.346 
 
8.919 3.346 6 
Portugal -1.656 1 
 
16.629 4.975 
 
11.954 4.675 7 
Romania -1.047 1 
 
32.367 3.626 
 
28.741 3.626 1 
Russia -1.515 1 
 
36.788 7.123 
 
29.666 7.123 2 
Slovak 
   
 
  
 
 
 Spain -1.505 1 
 
41.501 2.258 
 
39.243 2.258 12 
Ukraine -5.540 1  31.582 2.603   28.98 2.603 12 
MidEast & Latin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Israel -4.038 1 
 
21.528 4.72 
 
16.808 4.72 3 
Lebanon -3.221 1 
 
9.929 1.039 
 
8.89 1.039 10 
Qatar -1.860 1 
 
16.89 7.329 
 
9.56 7.329 7 
South Africa 
   
 
  
 
 
 Turkey -2.840 1  13.097 4.652   8.445 4.652 2 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads and ratings for the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF), Johansen Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, 
while the lags are selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon 
Critical value. Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% level of probability, 
figures are emphasized in bold. For the Johansen trace and max eigenvalue tests, the null hypothesis 
r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively; 
again, where the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level, figures are emphasized in bold.  
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Table 37 Cointegration test results for CDS & outlooks 
  
CDS & Outlook 
 
ADF   Johansen Trace   Johansen eigenvalue   
Country t stat lags   r=0 r=1   r=0 r=1 lags 
Asia 
 
 
 
  
 
   
China -2.726 1 
 
15.131 2.44 
 
12.69 2.44 4 
Indonesia -2.446 1 
 
9.891 3.193 
 
6.698 3.193 3 
Japan -3.359 1 
 
13.678 1.292 
 
12.386 1.292 8 
Kazakhstan -1.927 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Korea 
-1.729 1 
 
6.934 1.438 
 
5.496 1.438 5 
Malaysia 
-1.753 1 
 
7.537 2.13 
 
5.408 2.13 10 
Philippines -2.787 1 
 
14.353 5.022 
 
9.331 5.022 3 
Thailand 
-1.708 1 
 
10.425 3.637 
 
6.788 3.637 4 
Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina -4.563 1 
 
23.201 3.682 
 
19.519 3.682 12 
Brazil -2.751 1 
 
15.206 6.776 
 
8.43 6.776 2 
Chile -1.378 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Colombia -3.449 1 
 
15.95 3.837 
 
12.113 3.836 3 
Mexico -2.829 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Panama -2.611 1 
 
13.912 4.592 
 
9.32 4.592 1 
Peru -3.439 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Venezuela 
-1.835 1 
 
10.589 1.38 
 
9.209 1.38 5 
Europe 
      
 
Austria 
-1.770 1 
 
9.245 2.685 
 
6.561 2.685 5 
Belgium 
-1.964 1 
 
12.705 2.677 
 
10.028 2.677 4 
Bulgaria 
-1.927 1 
 
8.283 1.68 
 
6.603 1.68 2 
Croatia 
-1.419 1 
 
21.577 1.676 
 
19.9 1.676 1 
France -1.710 1 
 
7.901 1.727 
 
6.174 1.727 10 
Greece 
-1.683 1 
 
15.608 6.3 
 
9.309 6.3 1 
Hungary 
-2.362 1 
 
35.116 3.544 
 
31.572 3.544 2 
Ireland -4.708 1 
 
22.566 2.111 
 
20.455 2.111 5 
Italy 
-0.947 1 
 
8.809 2.04 
 
6.77 2.04 4 
Poland -1.971 1 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Portugal 
-1.977 1 
 
10.674 3.7 
 
6.976 3.7 8 
Romania 
-1.033 1 
 
8.175 2.056 
 
6.119 2.056 2 
Russia -1.615 1 
 
18.887 5.5 
 
13.39 5.5 2 
Slovak 
-1.336 1 
 
10.533 1.62 
 
8.913 1.62 1 
Spain 
-2.219 1 
 
8.715 2.856 
 
5.859 2.856 7 
Ukraine -6.406 1 
 
18.866 1.7 
 
17.171 1.7 12 
MidEast & Africa 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Israel - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 Lebanon -3.243 1 
 
15.605 5.634 
 
9.97 5.634 3 
Qatar - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 South Africa -1.356 1 
 
13.824 3.914 
 
9.91 3.914 2 
Turkey -2.934 1 
 
24.523 6.884 
 
17.638 6.884 2 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads and outlooks for the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF), Johansen Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, 
while the lags are selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon 
Critical value. Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% level of probability, 
figures are emphasized in bold. For the Johansen trace and max eigenvalue tests, the null hypothesis 
r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively; 
again, where the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level, figures are emphasized in bold.   
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Appendix 3 
Table 38 Information criterion for VECM lag selection, CDS & Rating 
lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Asia 
            
China -13.8179 -13.8165 -13.8251 -13.8303 -13.8266 -13.8233 -13.8284 -13.8251 -13.8228 -13.8194 -13.8179 -13.8154 
Indonesia -13.8173 -13.822 -13.8181 -13.8161 -13.8146 -13.8115 -13.8103 -13.8091 -13.8068 -13.8055 -13.8037 -13.8003 
Japan -11.221 -11.2476 -11.2833 -11.2943 -11.2992 -11.298 -11.2968 -11.2934 -11.2906 -11.2868 -11.2851 -11.2821 
Kazakhstan -14.1737 -14.1948 -14.1912 -14.1891 -14.1886 -14.1871 -14.1857 -14.1843 -14.1822 -14.1819 -14.1944 -14.1927 
Korea -14.5219 -14.5235 -14.527 -14.5274 -14.5269 -14.5242 -14.5221 -14.5209 -14.5208 -14.5188 -14.519 -14.5182 
Malaysia -15.983 -15.9826 -15.9791 -15.9811 -15.98 -15.9763 -15.9926 -15.9937 -16.0011 -16.0033 -16.0097 -16.0225 
Philippines -14.1811 -14.1846 -14.1812 -14.178 -14.1741 -14.1706 -14.1822 -14.1865 -14.1844 -14.1804 -14.1801 -14.1783 
Thailand -15.1805 -15.1773 -15.1754 -15.1739 -15.1701 -15.1672 -15.1651 -15.1647 -15.1668 -15.1664 -15.164 -15.1617 
Latin America 
            
Argentina -9.28925 -9.35518 -9.35208 -9.40459 -9.40792 -9.40399 -9.40103 -9.41776 -9.46312 -9.46341 -9.46116 -9.48456 
Brazil -13.4765 -13.4811 -13.478 -13.4745 -13.4712 -13.475 -13.4771 -13.4748 -13.4758 -13.475 -13.476 -13.4774 
Chile -13.6203 -13.6168 -13.6129 -13.6122 -13.6096 -13.6063 -13.6037 -13.6002 -13.6021 -13.5995 -13.5973 -13.5941 
Colombia -14.3306 -14.3428 -14.3393 -14.3354 -14.334 -14.3344 -14.3336 -14.3311 -14.3326 -14.3318 -14.3324 -14.3295 
Mexico -14.1534 -14.1779 -14.1747 -14.1714 -14.1683 -14.1652 -14.169 -14.1652 -14.1622 -14.1589 -14.1615 -14.1615 
Panama -14.5307 -14.5286 -14.527 -14.5265 -14.523 -14.5231 -14.5209 -14.5192 -14.516 -14.5181 -14.5154 -14.5534 
Peru -13.8455 -13.8569 -13.8531 -13.8498 -13.8467 -13.847 -13.8436 -13.8403 -13.8469 -13.8466 -13.8469 -13.8446 
Venezuela -12.2811 -12.3168 -12.3139 -12.3109 -12.3072 -12.3038 -12.3003 -12.2989 -12.2977 -12.299 -12.2969 -12.2941 
Europe 
            
Austria -11.5036 -11.5368 -11.5595 -11.5715 -11.584 -11.5803 -11.579 -11.5756 -11.575 -11.5723 -11.5692 -11.5671 
Belgium -11.8694 -11.9843 -11.9885 -12.0096 -12.0083 -12.0065 -12.0069 -12.0035 -12.0002 -11.9963 -11.9927 -11.9893 
Bulgaria -13.5577 -13.5836 -13.5805 -13.583 -13.5816 -13.5819 -13.5791 -13.5759 -13.5725 -13.5693 -13.5665 -13.5634 
Croatia -15.3738 -15.3776 -15.3745 -15.3872 -15.3835 -15.3817 -15.3778 -15.3741 -15.372 -15.3719 -15.3681 -15.3684 
France -11.5912 -11.6391 -11.6536 -11.6644 -11.676 -11.6726 -11.6749 -11.6774 -11.6743 -11.6735 -11.6697 -11.6657 
Greece -10.8468 -10.8434 -10.8396 -10.8381 -10.836 -10.8328 -10.8324 -10.829 -10.8622 -10.8636 -10.863 -10.8699 
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Hungary -13.2273 -13.2294 -13.2263 -13.2228 -13.2235 -13.2202 -13.2201 -13.2174 -13.2141 -13.2102 -13.2073 -13.2051 
Ireland -8.42227 -8.45687 -8.48275 -8.48966 -8.49043 -8.48647 -8.54026 -8.53771 -8.53434 -8.53095 -8.52781 -8.52565 
Italy -12.7742 -12.7813 -12.7804 -12.7955 -12.7926 -12.7908 -12.7889 -12.7862 -12.7834 -12.7796 -12.8059 -12.821 
Poland -14.8962 -14.8922 -14.8895 -14.8859 -14.8948 -14.9125 -14.9102 -14.9065 -14.9051 -14.9014 -14.8998 -14.8996 
Portugal -11.2067 -11.206 -11.2032 -11.2133 -11.2137 -11.2118 -11.3013 -11.2996 -11.2966 -11.2975 -11.2963 -11.2935 
Romania -13.6047 -13.604 -13.6002 -13.6005 -13.6002 -13.5964 -13.5934 -13.5896 -13.5903 -13.5909 -13.5898 -13.5913 
Russia -13.7803 -13.7887 -13.7849 -13.7812 -13.7801 -13.7802 -13.7785 -13.7752 -13.7761 -13.7745 -13.771 -13.7682 
Slovak -13.1823 -13.1807 -13.1773 -13.1744 -13.1734 -13.175 -13.1721 -13.1759 -13.1729 -13.1697 -13.1721 -13.1682 
Spain -10.2418 -10.2677 -10.2714 -10.3017 -10.3031 -10.3011 -10.3043 -10.3138 -10.312 -10.3086 -10.32 -10.3231 
Ukraine -10.0892 -10.3018 -10.3803 -10.4146 -10.4276 -10.4325 -10.4881 -10.4879 -10.5014 -10.498 -10.4943 -10.5408 
Middle Ease & Africa 
            
Israel -14.6704 -14.6666 -14.6731 -14.6717 -14.6688 -14.6653 -14.6614 -14.6615 -14.6581 -14.656 -14.6523 -14.6525 
Lebanon -13.8754 -13.9123 -13.9305 -13.927 -13.9233 -13.9233 -13.9203 -13.9172 -13.914 -13.9351 -13.9321 -13.9301 
Qatar -13.0212 -13.0416 -13.0383 -13.0407 -13.0495 -13.0516 -13.0535 -13.0521 -13.0491 -13.0459 -13.0453 -13.0427 
South Africa -14.2564 -14.2811 -14.2784 -14.2744 -14.2763 -14.3442 -14.3835 -14.38 -14.3773 -14.3735 -14.3716 -14.3688 
Turkey -14.3469 -14.3542 -14.3512 -14.3474 -14.3446 -14.345 -14.3429 -14.3393 -14.3382 -14.3358 -14.3332 -14.3315 
This table presents the $NDLNH¶V Information Criterion (AIC) in the VECM/cointegration/Granger causality lag selection of CDS & Rating, from lag 1 to lag 12. The 
minimized AIC are highlighted in bold, which corresponds to the lag selection in the Johansen test in Table 36.  
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Table 39 Information criterion for VECM lag selection, CDS & Outlook 
lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Asia 
            
China -13.7575 -13.7594 -13.7599 -13.7649 -13.7609 -13.7583 -13.7636 -13.7607 -13.7588 -13.7552 -13.753 -13.7505 
Indonesia -13.6929 -13.6984 -13.6996 -13.6969 -13.6963 -13.6929 -13.6915 -13.6897 -13.6867 -13.6852 -13.6842 -13.6817 
Japan -11.3183 -11.3452 -11.3845 -11.3953 -11.4002 -11.3984 -11.3971 -11.404 -11.4016 -11.398 -11.3969 -11.3941 
Kazakhstan -13.8081 -13.8297 -13.8335 -13.8335 -13.8308 -13.8275 -13.8236 -13.8209 -13.8179 -13.8174 -13.8145 -13.8108 
Korea -14.8089 -14.8093 -14.8085 -14.809 -14.8106 -14.8075 -14.8052 -14.8085 -14.8094 -14.8063 -14.8038 -14.802 
Malaysia -14.4445 -14.4434 -14.4543 -14.4563 -14.4531 -14.4538 -14.4614 -14.4629 -14.462 -14.4744 -14.4725 -14.4704 
Philippines -13.7206 -13.7247 -13.7419 -13.7386 -13.7354 -13.7325 -13.7323 -13.7353 -13.7328 -13.7288 -13.7286 -13.7269 
Thailand -13.7433 -13.7399 -13.738 -13.7676 -13.7639 -13.7604 -13.7594 -13.7585 -13.761 -13.759 -13.758 -13.7554 
Latin America 
            
Argentina -11.8357 -11.9019 -11.8988 -11.9872 -11.9906 -11.9866 -11.9848 -12.0009 -12.0466 -12.047 -12.0446 -12.068 
Brazil -13.3601 -13.3656 -13.3639 -13.3607 -13.3582 -13.3563 -13.3586 -13.3554 -13.3541 -13.3528 -13.3535 -13.3549 
Chile -13.6207 -13.6173 -13.6143 -13.6118 -13.6091 -13.606 -13.6041 -13.6019 -13.6072 -13.6046 -13.6021 -13.6021 
Colombia -13.5542 -13.567 -13.5692 -13.5665 -13.564 -13.5644 -13.5623 -13.5591 -13.5625 -13.5617 -13.5625 -13.5657 
Mexico -14.018 -14.0443 -14.0413 -14.0394 -14.0385 -14.0345 -14.039 -14.0363 -14.0357 -14.0323 -14.0345 -14.0346 
Panama -13.8899 -13.8878 -13.8885 -13.8885 -13.885 -13.8849 -13.882 -13.8797 -13.8771 -13.8782 -13.8857 -13.8866 
Peru -13.3328 -13.3445 -13.3416 -13.3428 -13.3421 -13.3436 -13.3404 -13.3368 -13.3367 -13.3403 -13.34 -13.3374 
Venezuela -14.6084 -14.6413 -14.6389 -14.6371 -14.6543 -14.6514 -14.6476 -14.6461 -14.6448 -14.6474 -14.6477 -14.644 
Europe 
            
Austria -12.198 -12.2313 -12.2541 -12.2665 -12.2791 -12.2757 -12.2742 -12.2705 -12.2699 -12.2672 -12.2641 -12.262 
Belgium -12.3697 -12.4838 -12.488 -12.5086 -12.5073 -12.5055 -12.5057 -12.5021 -12.4992 -12.4956 -12.4949 -12.4915 
Bulgaria -12.974 -12.998 -12.9959 -12.9929 -12.9923 -12.9922 -12.9887 -12.9862 -12.9823 -12.9798 -12.9772 -12.9738 
Croatia -14.1266 -14.1245 -14.1222 -14.1223 -14.1191 -14.1156 -14.1129 -14.1166 -14.1134 -14.1142 -14.1112 -14.1121 
France -12.5749 -12.6229 -12.6374 -12.6483 -12.6594 -12.6561 -12.6584 -12.6608 -12.6578 -12.7719 -12.768 -12.764 
Greece -13.4526 -13.4493 -13.4465 -13.4453 -13.445 -13.4418 -13.4425 -13.44 -13.4366 -13.4376 -13.434 -13.4328 
Hungary -13.4542 -13.4555 -13.4532 -13.4495 -13.4502 -13.4463 -13.4455 -13.4415 -13.4376 -13.4336 -13.4351 -13.4344 
Ireland -10.3243 -10.3604 -10.3853 -10.392 -10.3926 -10.3886 -10.3887 -10.3863 -10.3828 -10.3803 -10.3782 -10.3758 
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Italy -13.4627 -13.4686 -13.4685 -13.4976 -13.4942 -13.4919 -13.4904 -13.4877 -13.484 -13.4808 -13.478 -13.4753 
Poland -13.7953 -13.8206 -13.8185 -13.8153 -13.8257 -13.8446 -13.8522 -13.8501 -13.8524 -13.8588 -13.864 -13.8634 
Portugal -12.98 -12.9784 -12.9831 -12.9858 -12.9862 -12.9848 -12.9848 -12.988 -12.9842 -12.9822 -12.981 -12.9773 
Romania -13.9128 -13.9129 -13.9095 -13.9093 -13.906 -13.9023 -13.9003 -13.8964 -13.894 -13.8912 -13.89 -13.8892 
Russia -13.6676 -13.6764 -13.673 -13.6716 -13.6758 -13.6731 -13.6698 -13.6678 -13.6719 -13.6719 -13.6687 -13.6666 
Slovak -12.8798 -12.8762 -12.8724 -12.8701 -12.8694 -12.8703 -12.8667 -12.8725 -12.8692 -12.867 -12.8667 -12.8634 
Spain -12.0159 -12.0412 -12.0444 -12.0725 -12.079 -12.0784 -12.0812 -12.0797 -12.0771 -12.0758 -12.0786 -12.0808 
Ukraine -9.65105 -9.85992 -9.93751 -9.97179 -10.001 -10.0047 -10.0047 -10.0391 -10.0398 -10.0644 -10.0654 -10.0687 
Middle Ease & Africa 
            
Israel -10.7572 -10.7533 -10.7579 -10.7589 -10.7566 -10.7557 -10.752 -10.7549 -10.7517 -10.7536 -10.7503 -10.7503 
Lebanon -12.1914 -12.2279 -12.2462 -12.2423 -12.2385 -12.2383 -12.2354 -12.2324 -12.2294 -12.2307 -12.2276 -12.2333 
Qatar -14.7007 -14.7017 -14.7002 -14.701 -14.6981 -14.697 -14.6965 -14.6953 -14.6918 -14.6885 -14.685 -14.6817 
South Africa -10.6165 -10.6407 -10.6377 -10.6337 -10.6354 -10.6391 -10.6357 -10.6317 -10.6289 -10.6249 -10.6233 -10.6195 
Turkey -12.2422 -12.2505 -12.2471 -12.2434 -12.2401 -12.2388 -12.2368 -12.2336 -12.231 -12.229 -12.2254 -12.2237 
This table presents the $NDLNH¶V Information Criterion (AIC) in the VECM/cointegration/Granger causality lag selection of CDS & Outlook, from lag 1 to lag 12. The 
minimized AIC are highlighted in bold, which corresponds to the lag selection in the Johansen test in Table 37.  
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Appendix 4 
Table 40 Ljung-Box test for error in VECM for Rating & CDS 
Lag 
 
1 2 3 4 
Asia      
China 
 
  
  
Indonesia  0.991 0.993 0.853 0.352 
Japan 
 
0.128 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan  
    
Korea  
  
  
Malaysia 
 
  
  
Philippines  0.927 0.501 0.537 0.704 
Thailand 
 
0.969 0.366 0.167 0.268 
Latin America      
Argentina  0.341 0.047 0 0 
Brazil 
 
0.971 0.907 0.89 0.921 
Chile 
 
    
Colombia 
 
0.954 0.867 0.962 0.781 
Mexico 
 
0.927 0.904 0.58 0.688 
Panama 
 
0.942 0.158 0.048 0.084 
Peru 
 
0.976 0.957 0.81 0.913 
Venezuela  0.908 0.972 0.582 0.7 
Europe      
Austria 
 
 
   
Belgium 
 
 
   
Bulgaria 
 
0.803 0.605 0.507 0.423 
Croatia 
 
  
  
France 
 
 
   
Greece 
 
0.87 0.921 0.731 0.456 
Hungary 
 
0.933 0.975 0.978 0.208 
Ireland 
 
0.189 0 0 0 
Italy 
 
  
  
Poland 
 
   
 
Portugal 
 
   
 
Romania 
 
0.983 0.897 0.097 0.114 
Russia 
 
0.971 0.887 0.913 0.164 
Slovak  
    
Spain 
 
0.507 0 0 0 
Ukraine 
 
0305 0 0 0 
MidEast & Latin      
Israel 
 
0.999 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Lebanon 
 
0.189 0 0 0 
Qatar 
 
    
South Africa  
    
Turkey 
 
0.922 0.66 0.784 0.548 
The Ljung±Box test statistic (p-value) for examining the null hypothesis of independence in the error 
term is computed. We try several lag values (1, 2, 3, 4) and see if the conclusion reached changes for 
different values. If not, then the conclusion to reach is clear, whereas if rejecting white noise or no 
changes for different values of m, then the conclusion is that the data are close to white noise but 
perhaps not actually white noise. The results show that all countries have white noise at lag 1, and 
most of them retain white noise with more lags, which proves that our assumption of error is adequate. 
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Table 41 Ljung-Box test for error in VECM for Outlook & CDS 
Lag 
 
1 2 3 4 
Asia      
China 
 
0.893 0.962 0.001 0.002 
Indonesia  
    
Japan 
 
0.132 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan  
    
Korea  
  
  
Malaysia 
 
  
  
Philippines  0.906 0.509 0.549 0.714 
Thailand 
 
    
Latin America  
 
   
Argentina  0.3 0.038 0 0 
Brazil 
 
0.988 0.887 0.883 0.915 
Chile 
 
    
Colombia 
 
0.937 0.843 0.948 0.804 
Mexico 
 
0.91 0.904 0.6 0.701 
Panama 
 
0.956 0.158 0.049 0.084 
Peru 
 
0.968 0.966 0.832 0.926 
Venezuela  
    
Europe  
 
   
Austria 
 
 
   
Belgium 
 
 
   
Bulgaria 
 
    
Croatia 
 
0.868 0.472 0.023 0.044 
France 
 
 
   
Greece 
 
    
Hungary 
 
0.962 0.998 0.953 0.276 
Ireland 
 
0.207 0 0 0 
Italy 
 
  
  
Poland 
 
   
 
Portugal 
 
   
 
Romania 
 
    
Russia 
 
0.958 0.882 0.87 0.16 
Slovak  
    
Spain 
 
 
   
Ukraine 
 
0.845 0 0 0 
MidEast & Latin  
 
   
Israel 
 
 
   
Lebanon 
 
0.195 0 0 0 
Qatar 
 
    
South Africa  0.875 0.701 0.727 0.09 
Turkey 
 
0.911 0.633 0.767 0.537 
The Ljung±Box test statistic (p-value) for examining the null hypothesis of independence in the error 
term is computed. We try several lag values (1, 2, 3, 4) and see if the conclusion reached changes for 
different values. If not, then the conclusion to reach is clear, whereas if rejecting white noise or no 
changes for different values of m, then the conclusion is that the data are close to white noise but 
perhaps not actually white noise. The results show that all countries have white noise at lag 1, and 
most of them retain white noise with more lags, which proves that our assumption of error is adequate. 
  
 228 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Figure 22 Rating and Outlook events distribution from 2004 to 2012 
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Appendix 6 
Figure 23 Error plot for VECM analysis of CDS and Rating 
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The figures plot the error term from the VECM analysis for sovereign CDS spreads and 
credit ratings. These sample countries are selected to represent their regions. Corresponding 
to the Ljung-Box test for error, the results show that all countries appear to have white noise, 
which proves that our assumption of error is adequate. 
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Figure 24 Error plot for VECM analysis of CDS and Outlook 
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The figures plot the error term from the VECM analysis for sovereign CDS spreads and 
credit outlook. These sample countries are selected to represent their regions. Corresponding 
to the Ljung-Box test for error, the results show that all countries appear have white noise, 
which proves that our assumption of error is adequate. 
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Appendix 7 
 
Figure 25 Sovereign CDS spreads and Rating co-movement 
Plots of the sovereign CDS spread (solid lines) and the numerical transfer of rating (dashed lines) for 
all 8 countries. The primary axis (left) show the CDS spread, in bp, while the secondary axis (right) 
represents the numerical transfer of ratings. 
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Figure 26 Sovereign CDS spreads and outlook co-movement 
Plots of the sovereign CDS spread (solid lines) and the numerical transfer of outlook (dashed lines) 
for all 8 countries. The primary axis (left) show the CDS spread, in bp, while the secondary axis (right) 
represents the numerical transfer of outlook. 
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Appendix 8 
Table 42 Unit root test for each sub-period 
Country 
Greece bailout Ireland bailout Portugal bailout Spain bailout 
before after 1st after 2nd before after Before after before after 
Austria -2.59 -1.93 -2.83 -3.29 -0.69 -3.03 -0.69 -2.31 -2.82 
Belgium -2.05 -2.64 -2.8 -1.06 -0.56 -1.44 -0.33 -1.4 -2.2 
France -1.34 -2.77 -2.7 -1.23 -1.54 -1.68 -1.6 -1.51 -1.92 
Germany -2.53 -2.38 -2.96 -3.1 -1.56 -3.06 -1.41 -2.64 -2.56 
UK -2.23 -2.58 -1.47 -2.8 -1.42 -2.89 -1.1 -1.48 -1.61 
Greece 0.59 -0.04 -0.84 -0.49 -1.33 -0.55 -2.52 0.16 - 
Ireland -2.77 -0.37 -1.03 -0.21 0.28 -0.48 0.31 -0.92 -1.66 
Italy -1.86 -3.01 -3.29 -2.01 -1.46 -2.49 -2.91 -1.24 -1.77 
Portugal 0.15 -0.69 -2.9 -0.58 -0.93 -0.73 -0.59 -0.98 -1.89 
Spain -1.36 -3.15 -3.33 -1.03 -2.28 -1.67 -2.95 -1.36 -1.69 
The ADF test indicates the presence of a unit root at the 1% level for all the CDS of 10 countries over each sub-period. The table repots the t-statistics for the null hypothesis 
of a unit root. For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon Critical value. None of the CDS spreads of 10 countries is stationary at the 1% level of 
probability.  
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Appendix 9 
Table 43 Cointegration test for Greece¶V first and second bailout 
Event Variables Period ADF Johansen Trace Johansen eigenvalue   
test r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 lags 
First bailout 
GR - AT before -2.697 16.455 4.245 12.21 4.245 3 
after -2.734 14.196 1.319 12.877 1.319 2 
GR - BG before -2.839 14.153 4.774 9.379 4.774 2 
after -2.585 9.177 1.079 8.098 1.079 2 
GR - FR before -2.135 11.768 3.216 8.551 3.216 2 
after -2.795 13.113 1.174 11.939 1.174 2 
GR - DE before -2.772 17.764 5.897 11.867 5.897 2 
after -2.383 0 0 0 0 1 
GR - UK before -2.105 14.504 5.733 8.771 5.733 2 
after -2.727 12.388 2.737 9.65 2.737 2 
GR - IR before -2.83 18.809 7.999 10.81 7.999 2 
after -1.494 5.215 1.427 3.788 1.427 2 
GR - IT before -3.401 17.664 5.293 12.371 5.293 2 
after -3.008 15.719 1.825 13.893 1.825 2 
GR - PT before -2.716 10.951 1.87 9.081 1.87 2 
after -2.523 8.503 1.587 6.916 1.587 2 
GR -SP before -2.921 14.188 4.563 9.625 4.563 2 
after -3.158 14.087 2.26 11.827 2.26 2 
Second bailout 
GR - AT before       
after -3.993 26.121 5.969 20.152 5.969 2 
GR - BG before       
after -2.171 13.516 4.625 8.89 4.625 2 
GR - FR before       
after -3.491 19.135 5.266 13.869 5.266 2 
GR - DE before       
after -2.798 14.555 4.108 10.448 4.108 3 
GR - UK before       
after -3.159 18.021 4.812 13.209 4.812 2 
GR - IR before       
after -2.307 15.681 5.749 9.932 5.749 2 
GR - IT before       
after -2.495 15.418 5.151 10.267 5.151 2 
GR - PT before       
after -3.036 17.236 5.065 12.171 5.065 4 
GR - SP before       
after -4.281 26.617 5.572 21.044 5.572 2 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Johansen 
Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, while the lags are 
selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon Critical value. 
Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% of probability, figures are printed in 
bold. For Johansen trace and max eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no 
cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively. Where the null hypothesis rejected 
at the 10% level, figures are printed in bold.  
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Table 44 Cointegration for Ireland¶V bailout 
Event Variables Period ADF Johansen Trace Johansen eigenvalue   
test r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 lags 
Ireland 
bailout 
IR - AT before -3.178 17.58 2.9 14.68 2.9 5 
after -1.554 5.858 1.017 4.841 1.017 4 
 
       
IR - BG before -1.758 4.893 1.047 3.846 1.047 7 
after -1.921 7.206 0.965 6.241 0.965 8 
 
       
IR - FR before -1.447 3.459 0.708 2.751 0.708 4 
after -2.019 8.33 0.827 7.503 0.827 12 
 
 
 
     
IR - DE before -3.096 7.413 0.728 6.685 0.728 5 
after -2.355 7.367 0.771 6.597 0.771 4 
 
 
 
     
IR - UK before -2.832 0 0 0 0 1 
after -1.895 6.247 1.256 4.991 1.256 8 
 
       
IR - GR before -1.384 9.53 3.047 6.483 3.047 7 
after -1.598 13.84 4.941 8.899 4.941 8 
 
  
 
 
 
  
IR - IT before -2.046 17.982 1.208 16.774 1.208 9 
after -1.393 10.462 3.273 7.189 3.273 8 
 
       
IR - PT before -1.406 8.404 2.435 5.969 2.435 5 
after -1.561 7.013 1.452 5.561 1.452 4 
 
       
IR - SP before -1.591 4.731 1.185 3.546 1.185 5 
after -2.204 7.75 0.983 6.767 0.983 8 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Johansen 
Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, while the lags are 
selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon Critical value. 
Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% of probability, figures are printed in 
bold. For Johansen trace and max eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no 
cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively. Where the null hypothesis rejected 
at the 10% level, figures are printed in bold.  
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Table 45 Cointegration test for Portugal¶V bailout 
Event Variables Period ADF Johansen Trace Johansen eigenvalue   
test r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 lags 
Portugal 
bailout 
PT - AT before -3.197 23.794 6.385 17.409 6.385 5 
after -2.783 11.058 0.425 10.633 0.425 2 
PT - BG before -2.808 9.624 3.12 6.504 3.12 5 
after -2.889 9.301 0.486 8.815 0.486 2 
PT - FR before -2.37 9.457 2.918 6.539 2.918 4 
after -3.095 12.885 0.666 12.219 0.666 2 
PT - DE before -3.109 13.116 4.78 8.335 4.78 8 
after -2.384 6.423 0.386 6.037 0.386 4 
PT - UK before -2.925 12.884 3.794 9.09 3.794 4 
after -1.698 4.405 0.92 3.485 0.92 2 
PT - GR before -3.456 11.021 3.559 7.461 3.559 7 
after -2.947 17.165 5.657 11.508 5.657 2 
PT - IR before -1.33 8.471 3.283 5.188 3.283 5 
after -2.338 8.697 1.539 7.158 1.539 4 
PT - IT before -3.083 11.362 3.395 7.968 3.395 4 
after -3.006 14.829 1.736 13.093 1.736 2 
PT - SP before -2.419 6.954 3.083 3.871 3.083 5 
after -3.053 15.642 1.1 14.543 1.1 2 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Johansen 
Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, while the lags are 
selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon Critical value. 
Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% of probability, figures are printed in 
bold. For Johansen trace and max eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no 
cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively. Where the null hypothesis rejected 
at the 10% level, figures are printed in bold.  
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Table 46 Cointegration test for Spain¶V bailout 
Event Variables Period ADF Johansen Trace Johansen eigenvalue 
 test r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 lags 
Spain 
bailout 
SP - AT before -2.929 19.265 8.165 11.1 8.165 5 
after -2.759 24.41 8.267 16.142 8.267 7 
SP - BG before -3.286 15.771 2.8 12.971 2.8 6 
after -2.942 18.781 6.014 12.766 6.014 2 
SP - FR before -3.475 14.974 2.711 12.263 2.711 6 
after -3.065 15.864 3.805 12.059 3.805 2 
SP - DE before -3.23 15.001 3.746 11.254 3.746 4 
after -2.135 10.697 2.694 8.003 2.694 2 
SP - UK before -3.409 12.647 4.466 8.18 4.466 8 
after -0.801 6.68 2.299 4.381 2.299 5 
SP - GR before -3.163 15.608 6.787 8.82 6.787 5 
after -1.571 0 0 0 0 2 
SP - IR before -1.543 4.704 1.693 3.011 1.693 5 
after -2.344 12.731 4.192 8.539 4.192 4 
SP - IT before -2.091 6.745 2.291 4.455 2.291 5 
after -3.302 15.065 4.255 10.81 4.255 2 
SP - PT before -3.387 13.47 3.391 10.079 3.391 4 
after -2.79 15.169 6.399 8.77 6.399 2 
The cointegration results of sovereign CDS spreads using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Johansen 
Trace, and Max eigenvalue test statistics (with restricted constant) are reported, while the lags are 
selected by AIC.  For the ADF test, critical values are taken from the Mackinnon Critical value. 
Where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% of probability, figures are printed in 
bold. For Johansen trace and max eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis r=0 and r=1 denotes there is no 
cointegration relation and one cointegration relation respectively. Where the null hypothesis rejected 
at the 10% level, figures are printed in bold.  
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Appendix 10 
SMP: another policy intervention 
There was another form of policy intervention implemented in the wake of sovereign 
debt crisis: the Securities Market Programme (SMP), which sought to lower the 
borrowing costs of countries in distress. The creation of the SMP was closely related to 
the Greek debt FULVLVZKLFKWULJJHUHG(XURSH¶VZLGHUVRYHUHLJQGHEt crisis. This led to 
a joint EU/IMF/ECB mission. As yields started to rise in Ireland and Portugal, 
contagion became the overwhelming fear. In an attempt to improve expectations and 
stabilize markets, European leaders agreed to the creation of the EFSF, on 9 May 2010. 
This fiscal commitment made intervention a justifiable policy path for the ECB, which 
announced the creation of the SMP a day later. 
The SMP was conducted under the ECB to buy sovereign bondV WR ³(QVXUHGHSWK
DQGOLTXLGLW\LQWKRVHPDUNHWVHJPHQWVZKLFKDUHG\VIXQFWLRQDO´The plan was to buy 
those sovereign bonds of those with too low prices (high yields). It was similar to 
other asset purchasing programmes launched by other major central banks, like 
quantitative easing (QE). The only and most crucial difference was that ECB 
µVWHULOL]HG¶LWVRSHUDWLRQVE\VLPXOWDQHRXVO\DEVRUELQJWKHVDPHDPRXQWRIOLTXLGLW\
to prevent inflation.  
There were two rounds of bond purchasing. The first period of intense activity 
started from 10 May 2010, mainly focusing on the debts of Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. This round ended on 9 July 2010. The second period of SMP activism 
began by holding debt from Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain from 18 August 2011. 
This round ceased on 16 Jan 2012. Eight months later, the programme was 
terminated by Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). 
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Table 47 Timeline of the SMP during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
Date Event 
Average ln CDS spreads in 30 days 
Country Before event After event 
Panel A SMP 1st period˖ GR, IR, and PT    
10/05/2010 SMP 1st starts 
Greece 6.383 6.494 
Ireland 5.084 5.313 
Portugal 5.508 5.615 
     
09/07/2010 SMP 1st ends 
Greece 6.728 6.574 
Ireland 5.406 5.291 
Portugal 5.583 5.343 
Panel A SMP 2nd period:  IR, IT, PT, and SP    
18/08/2011 SMP 2nd starts 
Ireland 6.744 6.718 
Italy 5.595 5.862 
Portugal 6.818 6.936 
Spain 5.678 5.761 
     
16/01/2012 SMP 2nd ends 
Ireland 6.505 6.306 
Italy 6.047 5.798 
Portugal 6.987 7.116 
Spain 5.779 5.631 
The table presents the list of selected events in the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 to 2013. The 
average ln-CDS spreads in ±30 days around event date are computed as the average changes across 30 
calendar days before and after the event.  
The problem with SMP is that data are published only weekly and then only as 
aggregate values. There is no reference to when during the week they might have 
been bought. Moreover, the ECB does not provide a breakdown describing the 
composition of assets by national origin. Therefore, there is a lack of an appropriate 
approach to compare the different responses across countries, due to the lack of 
detailed information.  
As the table above shows, the two periods of SMP closely match (in date) some of 
the bailouts. This might cause contamination in the analysis of the impact of bailout.  
The results in Figure 27 indicate that the market did not react to the SMP in similar 
fashion to the bailout plan. The average CDS spreads of Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
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(which are the countries that to ECB buy government bond from in SMP 1st period ) 
were even higher than before intervention, in terms of both the 7-day and the 30-day 
average. As for the effect of the second period of the SMP, similar reactions are 
found. Eight months after the second period of the SMP, the program was terminated 
by Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). This indicates the failure of SMP to 
stabilize the secondary bond market.  
6HFRQGO\WKH(&%¶VYHUVLRQRI4(LVDUHODWLYHO\PRGHVWDPRXQWEQZKLFKLV
VPDOO FRPSDUHG WR RWKHU FHQWUDO EDQNV¶ 4( :LWKRXW IXUWKHU VXSSRUWLYH PHDVXUHV
ECB purchasing might not be enough for peripheral countries.  
Thirdly, the two-stage SMP was generally short-term: the first round lasted 2 months 
and the second round 5 months. The effects of bailout on the spillover between EU 
countries are examined over a much longer period.  
Therefore, we can suggest that the overall impact of SMP is weak, not strong enough 
to contaminate the bailout analysis.  
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Figure 27 Average daily CDS spreads changes around SMP dates 
  
   
The figure presents the average daily changes of CDS spreads around SMP dates for the following 
time windows: 30 days before, 7 days before, 7 days after, 30 days after. The countries are selected for 
their different characteristics and importance to the regional economy, while some were directly 
affected by the policy intervention. 
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Appendix 11 
This section discusses the specification of CCC, and compares its estimation results 
of Greece and other 8 countries with the DCC results. 
Constant conditional correlation (CCC) 
Constant conditional correlation models are based on decomposition of the 
conditional covariance matrix into conditional standard deviations and correlations. 
The decomposition comes at a cost: the dynamic structure is lost and more 
restrictions have to be applied to the multivariate distribution.  
Let  ?௜௧ ൌ  ? ?ଵ௧ǡ ǥ ǡ  ?௜௧ ? ? be the vector of interest, changes in CDS spreads in this case. 
With random disturbance terms,  ?௜௧ , time-varying covariance matrix  ?௧  and 
conditional variance equations of  ?௧, then: 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?൅෍   ௜ ?௧ି௜௠௜ ൅෍   ௝ ?௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅  ?௧  
The time-varying covariance matrix,  ?௧, of constant conditional correlation model 
(CCC) could be decomposed into 
 ?௧ ൌ  ?௧ ? ?௧ ൌ  ?௜௝ට ?௜௜௧ ?௝௝௧  
Where  ?௧ is the ( ൈ ) diagonal matrix of the time-varying standard deviations 
from univariate GARCH models with ඥ ?௜௜௧ on the i th diagonal; and R is the 
positive definite constant conditional correlation matrix. The conditional variances 
and   ?௜௜௧ can be estimated and written in the following GARCH(p,q) model: 
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 ?௧ ൌ  ൅෍ ?௜ ?௧ି௜௤௜ ൅෍ ?௜ ?௧ି௜ଶ௣௜ୀଵ  
Where   ?  ?௡ǡ  ?௜ and  ?௜ are ( ൈ ) diagonal matrices. The conditions of the 
positivity of the covariance matrix,  ?௧, are that  ? is positive definite, and the ɘ 
and the diagonal matrices  ?௜ and  ?௜ are positive. Then, the log-likelihood at each 
point in time ( ? ?௧), in the multivariate normal case, be expressed as  
 ? ?௧ ൌ  ? ? ? ?  ? ?൅  ? ? ? ?ȁ ?௧ȁ ?൅  ? ? ?ȁ ?ȁ ൅  ?௧ ? ?ିଵ ?௧ ?  
where  ?௧ ?ൌ  ?௧ି ଵ ?௧.  Thus, Eq (24) includes a term of  ?௧, for the sum of univariate 
GARCH model likelihoods, a correlation term,  ?, and a term for the covariance 
from the decomposition.  
Adopting the same specifications of the ARMA and GARCH models as the DCC 
approach in the main body, we have the following conditional correlation. The 
results in Table 48 show the constant conditional correlation between pairwise 
countries in the EMU. Comparing the magnitude of these correlation coefficients, it 
can be seen that the co-movements between PIIGS are higher than with the cores. 
The highest correlation is for the relation between Italy and Spain, at 0.8609, while 
the lowest is 0.1746, between Austria and Germany. This plotted over time in Figure 
28, along with the dynamic correlation for comparison. The blue dotted line 
represents the hypothesis of a constant correlation.   
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Table 48 Estimates of constant conditional correlation 
  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal  Spain 
Austria 1 
        
Belgium 0.4195 1 
       
France 0.2658 0.6063 1 
      
Germany 0.1746 0.5146 0.5523 1 
     
Greece 0.2248 0.4432 0.3928 0.3268 1 
    
Ireland 0.2426 0.5755 0.4568 0.3893 0.4699 1 
   
Italy 0.3845 0.7419 0.6253 0.5055 0.5188 0.6681 1 
  
Portugal 0.3181 0.5866 0.5207 0.4514 0.4593 0.6256 0.713 1 
 
Spain 0.3408 0.7345 0.6169 0.5135 0.4862 0.6628 0.8609 0.7047 1 
 
Dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
These results examine the correlation between means. The dynamic conditional 
correlation between Greece and other 8 countries is shown in Figure 28. This figure 
plots the daily correlation of CDS spread changes between 2009 and 2013. The 
time-varying red solid line represents the dynamic conditional correlation, which 
rejects the assumption of constant conditional correlation (CCC). The correlation 
between Greece sovereign CDS spread and those of other countries exhibits a 
consistent positive sign, suggesting a same-direction co-movement in the sample 
period.  
Comparing the fluctuation of the correlations between countries, we find that the 
correlation between Greece and other PIIGS members are stronger than the links 
between Greece and the Core countries, while the correlation is generally above 0.5 
for the PIIGS and far below 0.5 for the Cores. The result indicates a tight 
interconnection among the PIIGS members. Among the Core countries, Austria was 
the least related country to Greece, with an average DCC of 0.3, followed by 
Germany.  
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Figure 28 CCC and DCC for Greece 
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The blue line dotted line represents the constant conditional correlation, while the pink solid 
represents the dynamic conditional correlation.  
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Appendix 12 
Dynamic conditional covariance analysis 
Comparing the pairwise covariances in Figure 29-33, there was a significant pattern 
for all the bilateral relations. There was significant increase in the covariances around 
the date of each policy intervention, but they descend rapidly after each intervention. 
What did differ across the countries were which the specific policy interventions that 
produced a response in the degree of covariance, and the extent to which they did so. 
*UHHFH¶VILUVWEDLORut and the creation of the EFSF, especially the latter, appear to be 
the prominent source in influencing the co-movements of these 9 EMU countries. 
$OWKRXJK*UHHFH¶VILUVWEDLORXW,UHODQG¶VEDLORXWDQGWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKH(60
did have significant impacts on the covariances, none of the other policy 
interventions had the same level of impact as the EFSF. This finding highlights the 
prominent influence of the EFSF on all EMU nations. Moreover, the extent of the 
response to news about bailouts and the regional rescue fund varied across countries. 
Our results indicate that the news hit the economically problematic and less 
politically stable countries harder, that is, had more influence on investor sentiment 
in relation to these countries. 
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Table 49 Descriptive statistics ±covariances 
 
Min Max Mean 
Greece    
GR-AT 0.00024  0.00508  0.00101  
GR-BG 0.00049  0.01431  0.00158  
GR-FR 0.00034  0.00913  0.00146  
GR-DE 0.00045  0.01035  0.00135  
GR-IR 0.00035  0.01485  0.00136  
GR-IT 0.00048  0.02530  0.00194  
GR-PT 0.00043  0.03112  0.00176  
GR-SP 0.00052  0.01643  0.00182  
Ireland 
   
IR-AT 0.00016  0.00271  0.00070  
IR-BG 0.00039  0.01559  0.00136  
IR-FR 0.00027  0.00988  0.00114  
IR-DE 0.00025  0.01008  0.00116  
IR-GR 0.00035  0.01485  0.00136  
IR-IT 0.00040  0.02413  0.00165  
IR-PT 0.00035  0.02740  0.00155  
IR-SP 0.00032  0.01724  0.00159  
Italy 
   
IT-AT -0.00006  0.00411  0.00120  
IT-BG 0.00068  0.01995  0.00222  
IT-FR 0.00042  0.01270  0.00182  
IT-DE 0.00062  0.01315  0.00170  
IT-GR 0.00048  0.02530  0.00194  
IT-IR 0.00040  0.02413  0.00165  
IT-PT 0.00051  0.03511  0.00209  
IT-SP 0.00056  0.02248  0.00262  
Portugal 
   
PT-AT -0.00062  0.00460  0.00091  
PT-BG 0.00048  0.02277  0.00163  
PT-FR 0.00032  0.01372  0.00136  
PT-DE 0.00043  0.01491  0.00135  
PT-GR 0.00043  0.03112  0.00176  
PT-IR 0.00035  0.02740  0.00155  
PT-IT 0.00051  0.03511  0.00209  
PT-SP 0.00043  0.02445  0.00206  
Spain 
   
SP-AT 0.00020  0.00346  0.00117  
SP-BG 0.00053  0.01378  0.00206  
SP-FR 0.00031  0.00809  0.00176  
SP-DE 0.00049  0.00962  0.00167  
SP-GR 0.00052  0.01643  0.00182  
SP-IR 0.00032  0.01724  0.00159  
SP-IT 0.00056  0.02248  0.00262  
SP-PT 0.00043  0.02445  0.00206  
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Figure 29 Covariance dynamics for Greece and other countries 
.
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Figure 30 Covariance Dynamics for Ireland and other countries 
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Figure 31 Covariance Dynamics for Italy and other countries 
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Figure 32 Covariance Dynamics for Portugal and other countries 
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Figure 33 Covariance Dynamics for Spain and other countries 
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Appendix 13 
Detailed summary of policy intervention events during the sovereign debt crisis 
EFSF 
09/05/2010  
EU finance chiefs, in a 14-hour overnight session in Brussels, agree to set up a 750 
billion euro rescue mechanism for countries facing financial distress and the ECB 
says it will buy government and private debt in the biggest attempt yet to end the 
sovereign debt crisis. The meeting gives birth to the European Financial Stability 
)DFLOLW\WKHUHJLRQ¶VWHPSRUDU\EDLORXWPHFKDQLVPZLWKLQLWLDOFDSLWDORIELOOLRQ
euros. European Financial Stability Facility, or EFSF, was created to provide loans to 
cash-strapped countries. The EFSF issues bonds that are guaranteed by the euro-area 
countries. The EFSF also props up foundering banks and other financial institutions 
through loans to governments. 
 
EFSM 
05/01/2011  
The European Union creates the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM), an emergency funding programme reliant upon funds raised on the financial 
markets and guaranteed by the European Commission using the budget of the 
European Union as collateral. 
 
ESM 
11/07/2011  
European Stability Mechanism, the permanent bailout fund, is designed to replace 
the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism. The new bailout fund is able to lend up to 500 billion euros and is 
funded by euro-area countries. The original launch date was July 2013, but that was 
later moved to summer 2012 and then pushed back to launch in late 2012. 
19/10/2012 
European leaders agree to a single banking supervisor for the Eurozone to be up and 
running by early 2013. This agreement clears the way for the European Stability 
Mechanism to directly recapitalize systemically important banks, rather than having 
to act through national governments. 
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Greece 
12/04/2010  
Following worsening financial markets, Euro-area finance ministers agree to provide 
up to 30 billion euros of emergency loans to Greece over the next year with the IMF 
agreeing to put up another 15 billion euros in funds. 
23/04/2010  
Greece Prime Minister, Papandreou, asks EU for a 45 billion-euro bailout from the 
EU and IMF. 
01-02/05/2010  
Euro-region agrees on a 110 billion euro rescue package for Greece. Greece agrees to 
30 billion euros in austerity cuts over the next three years in exchange for the aid. 
21/07/2011  
EU summit passes second bailout package for Greece. The EU agrees a 
comprehensive 109 bn euro package designed to resolve the Greek crisis and prevent 
contagion among other European economies. Bankers agree to take losses of 21 
percent on the net present value of their Greek bond holdings.  
27/10/2011  
EU leaders hold 14th crisis summit in 21 months. After more than 10 hours of talks, 
OHDGHUVDJUHHGWROHYHUDJHWKH(8¶VWHPSRUDU\EDLORXWIXQGWRERRVWLWVILUHSRZHUWR
trillion euros, force private investors to accept a 50 percent haircut on Greek bonds, 
push European banks to raise 106 billion euros in new capital, and extend a new aid 
package worth 130 billion euros for Greece. 
Leaders from the 17 euro-area countries meet in Brussels and agree to write down 
Greek debt by 50 percent. (In February 2012, the Germans register their opposition 
to the plan but it's too late ± by March, Greek debt is cut by slightly more than half.) 
21/02/2012  
Euro-area finance ministers reach agreement on the final details of the second bailout 
package (of 130bn euros) for Greece. The deal includes a 53.5 percent write-down 
for private investors in Greek bonds. 
25/02/2012  
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Greece formally asks investors to exchange their holdings of government debt for 
new securities in the biggest sovereign restructuring in history. Two days later, the 
*UHHNFUHGLWUDWLQJLVFXWWR³VHOHFWLYHGHIDXOW´E\6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶V 
2Q6HSWHPEHUWKHVHFRQGWUDQFKHRI¼EQZDVGLVEXUVHG7KHWKLUGWUDQFKHRI
the same amount was paid on 19 January 2011. On 16 March, the fourth tranche 
¼ ELOOLRQ ZDV SDLG RXW IROORZHG E\ WKH ILIWK LQVWDOPHQW RQ  -XO\ 7KH VL[WK
WUDQFKH¼EQZDVSDLGRXWDIWHUPRQWKVRIGHOD\LQHDUO\'HFHPEHU2IWKLVDPRXQW
WKH,0)WRRNRYHU¼EQ 
 
Ireland 
28/11/2010  
EU agrees to 85 billion-euro bailout for Ireland. 
Ireland reluctantly took a bailout from the IMF, the European Commission and the 
bailout fund, the EFSF, to the amount of about 85 billion euros. The Irish Republic 
soon passed the toughest budget in the country's history. 
 
Portugal 
16/05/2011  
The EU and the IMF approve a 78bn-euro bailout for Portugal.  
The deal gave them a three-year loan of up to 78 billion euros from the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility and the 
IMF. 
 
Spain 
09/06/2012  
Spain announces that it will need a 100 bn euro bailout in order to help its failing 
banks, after it partly nationalizes Bankia SA in May. 
By the end of June, EU leaders agreed to ease the terms of Spanish bank loans and 
paved the way for bond buying by thHUHJLRQ¶VUHVFXHIXQGV 
 
 
 
